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ABSTRACT
Brian Massumi’s concept of affect offers a model of change that relies on sensory
modes of resistance to neoliberal power relations. Influenced by Bergson’s concepts of
time and space, Massumi develops an account of perception as the capacity to entrain
with ontological, affective flows of becoming before they are captured and reduced to
quantifiable forms. This requires a radical reconfiguration of the body as a zone of
indetermination between the virtual field of unformed potentialities and the realm of
determined existence. I argue that affect theory cannot fulfill its promise to open new
political possibilities without the negativity of critique that Massumi pointedly rejects.
The wholly affirmative ‘Yes’ of affect is not enough to resist the deeply entrenched drive
to quantify and commodify life.
Adorno’s concept of non-identity offers a way of distinguishing between affective
tendencies that deceptively serve the reification and commodification of experience and
those that have the potential to resist what Adorno calls the “ontology of the wrong state
of things.” Negative dialectics expresses the necessity of a wholly critical ‘No’ within
capitalist life. However, this ‘No’ requires extensive qualification in order to clarify what
kind of intellectual and somatic commitments are required to engage in non-idealist
dialectics. On the one hand, reading Massumi in the context of Adorno’s concept of nonidentity provides a critical edge that affect theory needs if it is to live up to its claim to be
a force for change. Affect must include dialectical attunement. On the other hand, reii

examining Adorno’s thought in light of Massumi’s concept of the body considers a more
substantial and constitutive role of embodied suffering in what is traditionally interpreted
as an epistemological form of critique.
There is a radical difference between Adorno’s dialectical critique and Massumi’s
dismissal of it. While the latter maintains that the dialectical tradition is too negative,
Adorno insists that it is not negative enough. This fundamental tension between the two
thinkers creates an opening to consider new political possibilities unencumbered by the
privileging of one approach at the exclusion of the other.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Thesis and Scope
How and why do subjects participate in their own repression? Even more, why do
they desire it? This question has long plagued philosophers and cultural theorists.
According to affect theorist Brian Massumi, dialectical critiques of ideology and
poststructuralist accounts of subjectivity provide inadequate answers to this dilemma
because they fail to account for the ontological autonomy of affect and its primary role in
all human (and non-human) activity. Although Massumi’s theorization of affect as an
affirmative force of difference illuminates a profoundly important dimension of
experience that has been largely neglected in cultural theory, I argue that it cannot fulfill
its promise to open new political possibilities without the negativity of critique that
Massumi pointedly rejects. The wholly affirmative ‘Yes’ of affect is not enough to resist
the deeply entrenched drive to quantify and commodify life.
Adorno’s concept of non-identity offers a way of distinguishing between affective
tendencies that deceptively serve the reification and commodification of experience and
those that have the potential to resist what Adorno calls the “ontology of the wrong state
of things.”1 Negative dialectics expresses the necessity of a wholly critical ‘No’ within
capitalist life. However, this ‘No’ requires extensive qualification in order to clarify what
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Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 11.
1

kind of intellectual and somatic commitments are required to engage in non-idealist
dialectics. On the one hand, reading Massumi in the context of Adorno’s concept of nonidentity provides a critical edge that affect theory needs if it is to live up to its claim to be
a force for change. Affect must include dialectical attunement. On the other hand, reexamining Adorno’s thought in light of contemporary affect theory considers a more
substantial and constitutive role of embodied suffering in what is traditionally interpreted
as an epistemological form of critique.
To summarize, there is a radical difference between Adorno’s dialectical critique
and Massumi’s dismissal of it. While the latter maintains that the dialectical tradition is
too negative, Adorno insists that it is not negative enough. This fundamental tension
between the two thinkers creates an opening to consider new political possibilities
unencumbered by the privileging of one approach at the exclusion of the other.

Statement of the Problem
Overview of Critical Theory and Negative Dialectics
The Frankfurt School was an interdisciplinary network of German intellectuals
that formed in affiliation with the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in the early
1920’s. It is most commonly associated with the term ‘Critical Theory’. It is difficult to
summarize the views of the Frankfurt School without glossing the substantial but often
fruitful disagreements that emerged from its broad spectrum of theoretical and political
positions. Marxist and psychoanalytic traditions were critically mined for alternative
ways of thinking and being that were not rooted in the assumptions of scientific
positivism or the false desires generated by the mass media. Several members, including
2

Adorno, were meticulously conscientious about the role of idealist thought in critical
theory. Despite their differences, most Frankfurt School theorists shared a concern
regarding the totalizing tendencies specific to twentieth century capitalist societies. The
unprecedented assimilative powers of modern capitalist modes of production and
consumption required a rethinking of the concept of critique that could resist unwitting
collaboration with the forces it was meant to interrogate. Cultural critique would need to
involve an unceasing critique of itself to ensure that it did not succumb to the reifying
processes that had pervaded the economic, social and intellectual realms. Critical theory,
according to Frankfurt member Max Horkheimer, must be inseparable from the
metatcritical work of becoming “self-aware.”2 The reflexivity of critical theory would
keep it grounded in the social-material conditions of knowledge production and would
also presume that theory is not invulnerable to commodifying forces. Adorno warns, “no
theory escapes the market place.”3 This defining trait of critical theory expresses the
concern shared by Frankfurt School members that we are always already complicit in the
forces of our own oppression. There is no such thing as an external standpoint. In fact,
Adorno insisted that negative dialectics was decidedly not a standpoint, that thought
which is honest with itself (critique that is metacritical) cannot legitimately claim a
standpoint because this would presuppose a detachment from the current material/social
situation that is not possible.

2

Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory.” In Critical Theory: Selected
Essays. Translated by Matthew J. O’Connell and others. New York: Continuum, 1968.
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Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 4.
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Adorno described this form of reflexive critique which he termed ‘negative
dialectics’, as a “consistent sense of non-identity.”4 It is worth noting Adorno’s defense
of his choice of the term ‘negative’ to qualify a tradition that already operates through the
principle of negation.5 Adorno argues that the inclusion of the term ‘negative’ to qualify
dialectics is not tautological, because it is meant to negate the positive negativity of
Hegelian dialectics.6 It also proclaims a necessary corrective to the unchallenged cultural
injunction to affirm the given. According to Adorno, this compulsive positivity had
penetrated all spheres of life, ranging from seemingly non-controversial leisure time
activities (gift giving, reading astrology columns in the newspaper, mounting the steps of
a train) to scientific positivism and the philosophical works of Kant and Hegel. Because
nothing in society is immune to the capitalist forces of conformism, Adorno claimed that
negative dialectics must entail nothing more and nothing less than “the ruthless criticism
of all that exists.”7 Maintaining a fidelity to the non-identity of concept and object and

4

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 6.
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“Negative Dialectics is a phrase that flouts tradition. As early as Plato,
dialectics meant to achieve something positive by means of negation; the thought figure
of a “negation of negation” later became the succinct terms. This book seeks to free
dialectics from such affirmative traits without reducing its determinacy. The unfoldment
of the paradoxical title is one of its aims” (Adorno, Negative Dialectics, xix).
6

To critique Adorno’s interpretation of Hegel exceeds the scope of this work.
Adorno acknowledges that he reads Hegel against the latter’s intentions and that Hegel is
a major influence on Adorno’s thought. “The enormous power of Hegel – that is the
power which impresses us so hugely today and, God knows, it is a power that impresses
me today to the point where I am fully aware that, of the ideas that I am presenting to
you, there is not a single one that is not contained, in tendency at least, in Hegel’s
philosophy” (Adorno, Lectures in Negative Dialectics, 21).
7

Adorno, Lectures in Negative Dialectics, 13.
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the myriad manifestations of this relation, including within critical theory itself, is a
radical departure from a mode of experience that defaults to identity and the complacency
of recognition.
Because Adorno believed that any critique of society must necessarily involve a
critique of knowledge, much of his philosophical work was a response to the prevailing
philosophy of German Idealism. Nowhere were the consequences of idealism more
obvious for Adorno than in the alienation of the individual in modern society and the
widespread conviction that the reified relations between individuals and society was a
form of freedom. Adorno’s heterodox reading of the German Idealists was shaped by his
rejection of any thought or practice that he interpreted as equating truth with the Whole
and presuming the identity of subject and object. The concept could no more exhaust the
object than philosophy could capture the totality of reality. The failure of philosophical
idealism to account for the social conditions from which this inherent limitation of
thought emerges, and more importantly, its failure to even acknowledge the actual
existence of this limitation, is precisely what ensures its complicity with the given. When
the complicity is successful, it is touted as freedom. Not only did Adorno reject the
totalizing premise of idealism with its presentation of reality as a rational and meaningful
whole, he feared that idealism signaled the dissolution of the very possibility of
philosophy. Only an ongoing effort to express the futility of identity could resuscitate
philosophy. As he argues in Negative Dialectics, “The freedom of philosophy is nothing
but the capacity to lend a voice to its unfreedom.”8 According to Adorno, philosophers

8
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such as Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger, prevented the emergence of
critical consciousness through their prioritization of identity over difference and their
dismissal of the transformative power of objects in their concrete particularity.9
Philosophies which were grounded in the primacy of the subject would always be guilty
of this, Adorno argued, because of the domination inherent in any one-sided account of
the subject-object relation.
Hegel was particularly problematic for Adorno. His interpretation of Hegel’s
proclamation that the real is the rational presented intolerable consequences. The “false
positivity” achieved through the negation of negation robs dialectics of its critical
potential. If the totality is rational to the core, and meaning is only possible through the
identity of thought and reality, then as Adorno interprets Hegel, concepts and objects that
fail to coincide with this seamless integration are dismissed as irrational or irrelevant. The
particular is banished by the general, resulting in a conflation of fact and value that
obscures the irreconcilable contradictions that actually constitute society. However, for
Adorno, in many ways Kant is as equally if not more problematic than Hegel. Like
Hegel, Kant’s conflation of fact and value perpetuated the given as the only possible
reality. However, Kant’s philosophy unwittingly expresses the despair of living in a
society that thrives on the obscuration of its real conditions of reproduction. The all-

9

Adorno departed from traditional Marxism as well. He rejected the proletariat as
a collective revolutionary subject and posited the primacy of the exchange principle over
forces of production as determinative of the social realm. His deep pessimism towards
political practice further distanced him from Marxist tradition(s), including Lukács to
whom he was heavily indebted for his concept of reification and analysis of the
antinomies of bourgeois thought. Adorno could not support Lukács’ theory of the
proletariat as the subject-object of history.
6

powerful transcendental subject that is the condition for knowledge renders itself
powerless to experience anything that does not conform to its perceptual structures.
Kant’s transcendental approach was meant to secure for knowledge, particularly
scientific knowledge, an unassailable objectivity which would further the goal of the
enlightenment to replace superstition with reason. In turn, rationality would lead to
emancipation. Auschwitz challenged these Enlightenment principles, not least of which
was the emancipatory potential of reason.
In The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer address this
phenomenon of liberating forces taking on the traits which they were meant to overcome.
In this collaborative work, Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the enlightenment
rationality which emerged from the need to critique the irrational and controlling nature
of myth had lapsed into the very totalitarianism it set out to abolish. The archaic
barbarism associated with myth had returned in the forms of anti-Semitism, the mass
media/culture industry, and identitarian ideology. For instance, the enlightenment ideal of
equality and freedom is falsely realized through the reduction of the heterogeneous
individual to the abstract equivalency of exchange. Under these conditions, freedom is
the ability to participate more fully in the dominating structures of exchange society. The
possibility of negative dialectical critique that emerges from these kinds of contradictions
reveals the untruth of identity.
Adorno is perhaps most famously known for his critique of the “culture industry”,
a term coined by Adorno and Horkheimer in The Dialectic of Enlightenment. The culture
industry refers to the mass production and consumption of cultural products that have
been standardized by the exchange principle to meet manufactured, and therefore false,
7

needs. Amusement and pleasure are not offered as “flight from a wretched reality, but
from the last remaining thought of resistance.”10 This is a significant point because it
illustrates the need for dialectical interpretation of pleasurable somatic responses that
arise through encounters with structures that are ultimately oppressive. The mass
deception of pop culture reduces the critic’s discourse to likes and dislikes, masking the
culture industry’s identitarian logic of assuring people that they know what they like and
hiding the fact that they only like what they know. This fetishization of positivity causes
social relations of production to appear as immutable laws of nature rather than products
of material historical conditions unique to contemporary capitalism. According to
Adorno, this process of reification is specific to advanced forms of capitalism that are
driven by the abstract logic of exchange. The ubiquity of this exchange principle which
reduces qualitative differences to quantitative values has the regrettable result of
attributing value only to what is useful for the reproduction of society. Any experience
that easily conforms to existing social practices and signification is suspect because of its
affirmative status in a society that only values what is fungible. “We have to ask what
has to be or has not to be affirmed, instead of elevating the word ‘Yes’ to a value in itself,
as was unfortunately done by Nietzsche with the entire pathos of saying yes to life.”11

10

Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 144.
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Overview of Massumi’s Concept of Affect
Massumi’s theory of affect was developed in response to the limitations of
cultural theory in addressing contemporary forms of capitalism.12 Although there are
differences between contemporary neoliberal capitalism and the post-World War II
Keynesian form of capitalism that neoliberals claim to oppose, both Massumi and
Adorno share a concern regarding the assimilating powers of advanced capitalism. While
Adorno focused on the totalizing dynamics of mass media and the conforming forces of
the culture industry, Massumi analyzes the affective dimension of experience that he
identifies as the primary target of neoliberal commodification. It is important to note that
Massumi’s understanding of neoliberalism is derived primarily from Foucault’s analysis
of American neoliberalism. In Foucault’s account, a shift has occurred from the
domination of exchange relations that Adorno considered to be the driving force of
conformism, to the operative principle of competition. Under the latter, workers
understand themselves as entrepreneurs rather than passive consumers, driven to invest in
and thereby objectify themselves as human capital.13 The market becomes the ethos of

12

Massumi has been criticized for neglecting the range of differences within
poststructuralist theory and for exaggerating the shortcomings of poststructuralist
discourse in order to bolster his own argument. These are valid criticisms. However,
Massumi’s theory of affect highlights a dimension of experience and culture that is
particularly relevant to neoliberal subjectivity that is critiqued in this present work.
13

“…in practice, the stake in all neoliberal analyses is the replacement every time
of homo oeconomicus as partner of exchange with a homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur
of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being
for himself the source of [his] earnings” (Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 226).
9

human activity, blurring the line between citizen and entrepreneur; as a result, the
boundary between state and economy is ambiguous and perpetually shifting. Under these
conditions, freedom is ultimately redefined as entrepreneurial freedom.
The aspects of neoliberal governmentality that are significant for Massumi’s
theory of affect concern the active production of subjectivity through perpetual
differentiation. The entrepreneurial self that emerges through the logic of competition
must, by definition, possess the self-management skills and capacity for innovation that
are not typically associated with the subject that passively consumes and conforms. In a
neoliberal context, the production of different identities including the contemporary trend
for personal branding, promotes the individual’s economic interests and autonomy. In
this sense, power is more intense than the standardization of the exchange principle
because it saturates the social field in order to multiply differences and intensify interests
rather than imposing a uniform standard. The cultural standard in neoliberalism is to
increase the individual’s affective capacities that align with market principles – to be
more creative, resilient, less dependent on the social protections of government - in order
to create an ongoing supply of surplus value. Although the proliferation of industries that
promote technologies of the self effectively serve neoliberal principles of competition
and accumulation, individuals purportedly derive a deeper (some would even say more
spiritual) pleasure from them than the relief offered through conformist social norms that
consumerism has provided in the past.
In theorizing affect, Massumi claims to counter neoliberal power on its own
terrain. Affect is an open-ended field of differential potentialities from which reality as
we know it actualizes. It is virtual in nature, a multiplicity of imperceptible tendencies
10

always in movement and difficult to pin down because they are always in the process of
becoming. These traits are also what characterize neoliberal capitalist processes. The
production of difference and the capacity for ongoing change constitute capitalism’s
power to re-emerge continually from crises (of its own invention) in myriad forms that
remain true to the capitalist relation. The difference between the productive potential of
affect and the compulsion to produce in neoliberal society, is the difference in nature of
affect as a virtual state verses its actualization in capitalist capture. This is not a
difference of degree; the imperceptibility of affect does not possess a greater degree of
reality when it crosses the threshold to conscious perception. It simply becomes useful.
The generative capacity that emerges from affect is not only activated in the service of
capitalism, it is its life force. Affect is immanent to capitalism, so capitalism is
“immanent to the field of life.”14 In A History of the World in Seven Cheap Things,
authors Raj Patel and Jason Moore present an account of capitalism’s entanglement with
webs of life that emphasizes not just its destructive relations but also its productive
powers to create new frontiers through which it reinvents itself. They identify
“cheapness” as a set of strategies, always short-term, whereby crises of capitalism are
managed by mobilizing natures (human, animal, plants, geology) for work and made to
serve the production-consumption relation for as little cost as possible. Cheapness
“controls a wider web of life.”15 Moore and Patel explain: “While much has been made
of its gory and oppressive history, one fact is often overlooked: capitalism has thrived not

14

Massumi, Politics of Affect, 109.
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because it is violent and destructive (it is) but because it is productive in a particular
way.”16 This way includes the creation of new frontiers through which diverse
configurations of capital and life-making processes emerge.17 Moore and Patel could not
find a suitable word in the English language for the life-making process so they employed
the Greek term oikeios. “Oikeios names the creative and multilayered pulse of life
making through which all human activity flows, shaped at every turn by natures that
consistently elude human efforts at control.”18 Massumi argues that the concept of affect
meets capitalism on its own terrain because it assumes that capitalism is an island in a
vast and open-ended sea of life-making processes rather than a structural monolith with
no outside. No matter how thorough capitalist capture is, no matter how powerful its
siphoning off of oikeios, it does not exhaust the always larger flow of life. The concepts
of affect and oikeios resonate with one another, but there is an important difference.
Moore and Patel’s book haunts the reader with a grim question: Is capitalism running out
of frontiers? What will happen if it does? What I aim to show in my reading of Massumi
is how affect theory’s rejection of these kinds of questions undermines its power as a
force for change. That said, the power of affect theory is that it attends to the externalities
that capitalist relations miss, and it attempts to operate similarly to the movements that
manage to elude the cheapening of natures.

16

Patel and Moore, The History of the World in Seven Cheap Things, 19.
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I am avoiding the use of concepts such as ‘society’ and ‘nature’ which, as Patel
and Moore point out, obscure their colonial origins and do not capture the complexity of
relations of natures that are not destroyed but put to work.
18

Patel and Moore, The History of the World in Seven Cheap Things, 19-20.
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According to Massumi, there are always potentialities in the zone of
indetermination between the virtual and actual that escape capture and emerge as selfaffirming movements. Their significance is their uselessness to the consumptionproduction processes. They could actualize as barely perceptible ephemeral phenomena
or as major events such as the Occupy Movement. Affect theorists and Massumi in
particular view the power of Occupy as an embodied collective becoming, direct
democracy in action. Massumi writes:
Anywhere representation is eschewed in favor of presentation, in the sense of
affective tuning-in; anywhere the square or the street takes precedence over the
party meeting; anywhere directly embodied participation takes the upper hand
from the communication of opinion or the prescription of intended outcomes;
anywhere decision is an emergent property of the coming-together, for becomingtogether, of a differential human multiplicity, and not the edict of an individual
leader or lead group backed by an existing power structure of whatever stripe –
there, a direct democracy is being improvised. There, resistance is unfolding.19
Occupy movements famously did not conform to traditional forms of activism
and did not evaluate their success or failure in terms of measurable outcomes. Theorizing
resistance in terms of affect meets neoliberalism on its own terrain by “acting directly in
the register of affect”20 rather than through the activity of ideology critique and
epistemological models which are inherently constrained by disembodied concepts. In
Massumi’s view, epistemological critiques analyze capitalism in terms of power
structures instead of affective processes, and since ideology is an expression of power
structures, it is twice removed from the true conditions of capitalism. As virtual

19

Massumi, Politics of Affect, 98.
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Massumi, Principles of Unrest, 19.
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potentiality, affect is affirmative by nature, so acting directly in the register of affect
requires the perception and affirmation of the affective tendencies that escape
signification. The negativity of critique is unable to recognize this form of affirmation as
anything other than a form of domination.
This marks a significant departure from Adorno’s negative dialectics. For
Massumi, freedom is the experiential augmentation of the excess that remains after
capitalist capture. As such, it must be enacted and performed, not critiqued. Adorno
claims that freedom can only be described in negative terms by revealing the constitutive
contradictions of society (the non-identity of concept and object). Under the current
conditions of society, positive articulations of freedom will always coincide with
identitarian thinking. The fetishization of the positive that is at the heart of Adorno’s
critique is even more powerful in contemporary neoliberal society with its drive to
produce human capital. Massumi’s response to this argument is that knowing how we
are unfree is not the same as becoming free.

Argument
This dissertation will explore new discussions stimulated by the fundamental
dissonance between Adorno’s concept of non-identity and Massumi’s claims regarding
the emancipatory potential of affect. I will argue that affect can only live up to this
promise if it is grounded in the sense of dialectical non-identity that will prevent its
affirmative tendency from reproducing the very neoliberal relations that would
domesticate it. I am arguing, in other words, against the autonomy of affect. Massumi’s
most significant contribution to cultural theory is the introduction of affect as a uniquely
14

powerful force in the structuring of experience through a desubjectivized body and its
distinct correspondence with neoliberal processes that offers a site for contestation. But
while Massumi insists that the power of affect as a liberating force depends on its
ontological autonomy from the signifying and subject-producing structures of
neoliberalism, I aim to demonstrate how affect is powerful to the extent that it is
understood as a product of those material and social conditions. Dialectical negativity is
also a product of material and social conditions, but it has the potential to experience and
understand that relation reflexively. Affect is a significant dimension of this experience,
but it is most powerful when it manifests negatively through the non-identity of subject
and object. In other words, when it manifests through suffering.
I will examine how Adorno relies on the workings of affect more than has been
traditionally acknowledged. His critique of Kant’s transcendental subjectivity is rooted
in the suffering embodied in everyday life in capitalist society. There is a non-conceptual
nature of affect as Massumi claims, but it actualizes through suffering. For Adorno, the
negative affect of non-identity can be difficult to sense because suffering is habitually
perceived through rationalizations that distort the bodily ‘No’ that desires expression.
According to Adorno, the negativity of affect is in some ways more accessible in the
aesthetic realm, where dissonance is experienced in a way that can invoke critical
capacities that are largely shut down in the social and political realms. In a society driven
by identity, dissonance is painful because it reveals the untruth of the harmonious whole.
Therefore, it is in the aesthetic realm that the value of affect as a potential critical force is
most prominent. An artwork is ‘true’ if it provokes the sense of non-identity that
musical/social norms conceal. However, the negative affects that emerge from the
15

experience of dissonance are always mediated through the dialectical relation. Contrary
to Massumi’s theory of affect, there is no such thing as immediate experience, even in the
aesthetic realm. Art has the potential to express the contradictions of an antagonistic
society while maintaining a degree of autonomy (never full and complete) from the
exchange principle, but as a social product of material conditions it is not invulnerable to
reifying forces.
What I am proposing is something less than the robust ontology of autonomous
affect that Massumi locates outside of social production, but more than the cognitive
activity of negative critique. It is based on the sense of non-identity that emerges from
the bodily suffering of dissonance in all its forms and its counterpart in dialectical
interpretation. This involves a deep engagement with affect on the same micrological
level that Adorno analyzes cultural phenomena. To this end, Massumi has laid
invaluable groundwork, particularly in relation to the neoliberal interpellation of the
subject as enterprise. The space between affect and critique that emerges from an
encounter between Massumi and Adorno offers a potentially new terrain of resistance to
the neoliberal landscape.

Methodology
This study employs a comparative strategy of reading concepts together from two
traditions in Western continental philosophy: the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School,
specifically Theodore W. Adorno’s philosophy of negative dialectics, and Brian
Massumi’s theory of affect. My methodology also includes a reconstructive reading of
Massumi’s works by examining the revolutionary potential for affect in the context of
16

negative dialectics. This work draws on the texts of other philosophers, mainly Kant and
Bergson, who were influential to Adorno and Massumi in developing their concepts.

Contribution to the Field
This dissertation aims to contribute to the growing field of affect theory as it
relates to cultural theory. It further develops the scholarship on Adorno that focuses on
his relevance for the contemporary dilemmas of neoliberalism. Specifically, it explores
the implications for Adorno’s philosophy separately from the ‘normative turn’ taken in
critical theory by second generation Frankfurt School members such as Habermas.

Chapter Outline
Chapter One: Introduction
The current chapter provides an introduction to the problems posed by affect
theory and critical theory, followed by a brief summary of the argument. Reading
Massumi through Adorno’s dialectical concept of non-identity and the primacy of
suffering can provide a critical edge to affect that is missing in Massumi’s theory.
Reading Adorno through Massumi develops the negative role of affect in the dialectical
interpretation of phenomena. The chapter includes a brief description of each chapter and
identifies the contribution to relevant fields.

Chapter Two: The Primacy of Suffering in Negative Dialectics
This chapter begins with an explanation of the primacy of suffering as a crucial
element that differentiates negative dialectics from affect theory. This is the immanent,
17

materialistic motive for Adorno’s critique of oppressive structures and practices.
Suffering is a troubled concept and requires some unpacking to understand what Adorno
means by it. First, it secures an indispensable role for the body in critique. Second,
suffering manifests and continually re-emerges through a specific configuration of the
subject-object relation. Massumi rejects the subject-object terminology as laden with
modernist postulates that portray the subject as autonomous and grounded in a universal
rationality that transcends place and time. Adorno’s conviction that all thought is guilty
because the concept cannot directly capture its non-conceptual roots, makes him
suspicious of the creation of new terminology. In this sense, Massumi’s language of
affect is similar to the jargon of authenticity Adorno critiqued in Heidegger’s works.
Suffering is caused by the contradictions of capitalism that manifest through a reified
subjectivity. Posthuman concepts run the risk of ignoring the suffering subject that cannot
escape its material conditions.
Kant’s concept of transcendental subjectivity presented for Adorno one of the
most problematic configurations in philosophy of the subject-object relation. His
philosophy accurately portrayed the ideological interpellation of individuals living in a
capitalist society, but it failed to see the actual ideology behind it. Adorno interprets the
“Kantian Block” as an unintended expression of resignation and mourning for what is
lost in establishing the inevitability of the given. The construction of noumena is a
metaphysical mourning of what we should never forget but are always compelled to
forget. Adorno claims, “I believe that this is the deepest thing to be found in Kant.”21 In
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place of the “fallacy of constitutive subjectivity” Adorno posits a “fearlessly passive
subject” that is attuned to the aspects of the object that do not coincide with the concept.
This involves an entrustment of experience that contradicts the subject’s perception.
Suffering is this experience. Trusting it entails both a somatic and cognitive openness. It
must be noted that Adorno believed the body/mind split was a consequence of an
undialectical and therefore false understanding of origins. The dialectical attunement of
the fearlessly passive subject is reflexively engaged with the experience of somatic
dissonance and suffering. The ‘No’ of negative dialectics transforms suffering such that
respite from the given becomes possible. That is all, but for Massumi that is not enough.
The second half of this chapter explores Adorno’s aesthetic theory of dissonance:
its implications for theory and practice and its role in revealing the untruth of pleasure.
Dissonance is fundamentally memory, an expression of the suffering that is forgotten
through the imposition of norms. Adorno’s analysis of the musical system of tonality
focuses on the pleasure induced by identity and the culture industry’s production of
musical commodities based on this principle. His essay on jazz illustrates the seductive
manipulation of tonal structures and the culture industry’s presentation of this as a
revolution in music that transforms the individual who purportedly possesses the freedom
of spirit and cultural sophistication to appreciate it. Schoenberg’s atonal compositions
provide a counter approach to this manipulation of subjectivity by exemplifying
Adorno’s concept of the primacy of the object. His music demands a level of
attentiveness to the inner logic that does not rely on musical norms to pre-determine the
role of each note. The listener cannot be lulled by pleasure inducing tactics. In fact, the
common reaction to Schoenberg’s music was pronounced displeasure. What are the
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conditions for experiencing dissonance as painful and harmonic resolution as
pleasurable? What are the conditions for experiencing dissonance as memory? Adorno’s
negative dialectical interpretation of music provides an example of the fearlessly passive
subject that trusts somatic dissonance by becoming dialectical attuned. For Adorno,
music exemplifies how suffering is a condition of truth. This reading rejects the
reduction of Adorno’s aesthetic theory to a defense of modern art as the only source of
intramundane transcendence.

Chapter Three: Affect Theory and Perception
Chapter three traces the development of Massumi’s affect theory through the
conceptual framework of Bergson’s ontology of time and memory. It begins with what
Massumi refers to as the Bergsonian revolution that turned the world on its head: the
primacy of movement. “The problem is no longer to explain how there can be change
given positioning. The problem is to explain the wonder that there can be stasis given the
primacy of process.”22 Bergson argues that most of the problems in philosophy can be
addressed by thinking in terms of time instead of space, or as Massumi describes it,
passage instead of positionality. Affect is on the side of time, a temporal becoming that
is characterized by indeterminacy. Its virtual status does not make it any less real than
actualized reality. In fact, Massumi illustrates the worldly consequences and power of
affect by analyzing how the U.S. military has used the objective uncertainty of affect to
fight the war on terror. The operative logic of preemption developed by Bush and
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Rumsfeld is a form of ontopower - the power to incite the emergence of that which needs
to be captured. The operation of ontopower depends on a special kind of perception that
can detect a threat before it emerges and to influence the conditions of its emergence so
that it actualizes in a determinate form that can be dealt with.
The kind of perception that can detect change before it takes form and influence
the shape of its actualization is rooted in Bergson’s account of perception as action rather
than knowledge. This is key to understanding the primacy of temporal becoming that is
affect. According to Massumi, only the body is quick enough to “perceive the smaller
than the smallest perceivable interval”23 between becoming and being. Only the body can
perceive pure movement. Massumi’s emphasis on the body’s role in affect theory has
elicited various responses from disciplines that also theorize the body. Disability/Crip
theory is a rich interlocutor for affect theorists. Erin Manning, affect theorist and
longtime colleague of Massumi, explores the critique of neurotypicality as perception that
is rooted in positionality instead of passage. Autistic perception, she argues, foregrounds
movement and confuses the boundaries between “where the body ends and the world
begins.”24 Orienting perception in terms of mobility instead of positionality is the
lynchpin of Massumi’s concept of affective attunement – the capacity to entrain with
flows of intensity before they solidify into subjects and objects, body and world.
Although some of Manning’s views on autism are controversial, her framing of
neurotypicality as a foundational form of identity politics interrogates material and social
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conditions that are structured around perceptions that “chunk” the world into objects
rather than temporal becoming.
While perception is constituted through action, memory directs its movement and
enriches perception in new ways. Bergson’s pivotal insight was that the new can only
emerge from the past. Memory is not beholden to the utilitarian demands of the present,
and its engagement with perception creates a gap, a zone of indeterminacy between
stimulus and reaction where movement can be redirected. Massumi’s concept of priming
as the method of ontopower works with the zone of indeterminacy, inflecting the field of
emergence, but not directly causing anything. Affect can only be accessed indirectly.
What counts as priming is, according to Massumi, purposely vague, and it requires a
“subjectivity-without-a-subject.”25 The relation between subjectivity and priming is
defined by the capacity for affective attunement of what I will argue is a highly modified
subjectivity that is not so much a dissolution of the subject as a reconfiguration that
foregrounds the body.

Chapter Four: Conclusion
Chapter four begins with an overview of neoliberalism as portrayed by David
Harvey and Michel Foucault, focusing on the production of subjectivity as human capital.
While I believe that affect theory is responding to a unique phenomenon of neoliberalism
that was not fully manifest in Adorno’s lifetime, it is not so different that it renders
negative dialectical analysis irrelevant. I argue in fact that the duplicity of neoliberal
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subjectivity and the ‘genuine pleasure’ that it generates offers a renewed necessity for
Adorno’s form of negativism that has been dismissed by his critics as apolitical
pessimism. Massumi’s affect theory provides a more nuanced account of the body that
expands its boundaries and potentials, but bodily affective attunement by itself does not
provide the critical edge that can only come from critique that is rooted in suffering. This
section concludes with a brief examination of the mindfulness movement in North
America as an example of how the neoliberal injunction for constant self-improvement
generates technologies of the self which promote human capital as a spiritual endeavor. It
illustrates the confusing nature of ‘genuine pleasure’ that cannot be easily dismissed as
mere conformism.
The rest of this chapter explores the question posed at the beginning of this
dissertation: How and why do subjects participate in their own repression? Even more,
why do they desire it? While Massumi claims that complicity is an ontological condition
under neoliberalism and that resistance entails embracing creative duplicity, Adorno
argues that the best that can hoped for is withdrawal and respite from suffering, given that
the nature of capitalist domination is to forbid the recognition of suffering. Both of these
approaches have significant consequences for the relation between theory and practice.
Massumi dismisses critique as a “sadistic enterprise” that must be countered with priming
affective experiences that generate surplus values of life. Adorno claims that any
interpretation of negative dialectics that reads affirmative traits into the work of nonidentity reifies the kind of negativity that exists for the sole purpose of breaking through
reification. Two examples of interpretations that reify negative dialectics by not being
negative enough are Jane Bennett’s comparison of negative dialectics to negative
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theology, and John Holloway’s equation of creativity with non-identity. Bennett’s
reading of Adorno is especially relevant for the contemporary debate between the
traditions of new materialism and historical materialism.
One of the consequences of critique not being negative enough is the conflation of
theory and practice. Adorno was suspicious of the compulsion for practice because it is
rarely separated from the compulsion of identity, and the coercion of identity in thought
and action is at the base of all violence. Examples of contemporary manifestations of the
taming of theory for the sake of actionable, digestible forms of practice are explored
through the books Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World by Anand
Giridharadas, and The Ideas Industry by Daniel Drezner. Drezner traces the ascendancy
of thought leaders over political intellectuals. The former often gain fame and fortune by
delivering TED talks that go viral and usually consist of a few award winning talking
points about how to improve the status quo. Thought leaders proclaim to stand for rather
than against something, while public intellectuals critique what is wrong with society and
address issues of social inequality and injustice.
The following section provides an examination of the definitive trait of affect – its
autonomy - and how claims for an unmediated form of autonomy under capitalist
processes is problematic for a few reasons. The first reason concerns the distorted
concept of autonomy that is based on the structure of the commodity and serves the
reproduction of capitalist social relations. The truth of autonomy lies in its untruth. The
second problem with claiming autonomy, especially as non-conceptual in nature as
Massumi does, is that it displaces autonomy outside of the subject’s intentionality and
conscious perception. According to Massumi, the subject must disappear in order to
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access the autonomy and agency of affect. Massumi repeatedly emphasizes the difference
in nature between emotion and affect in order to establish affect’s autonomy. This seems
to neglect the long and rich history of feminists working with the ambiguous nature of
emotion. Affect’s clean break with emotion is suspiciously clean and reflects patriarchal
practices of relegating emotional knowledge to a derivative, secondary status.
Affect theory re-values the body as a vital force and radically reconfigures it in
the process. This is the most significant contribution of affect theory to cultural theory.
However, the affective body does not does not escape mediation. For example, while
Massumi openly admits to “poaching” scientific concepts to activate creative tensions
between science and the humanities, his reliance on the theories and technologies of
neuroscience fail to take into account its discursive production of normal and abnormal
bodies. Imbedded in this exchange is an implicit dualism of good and bad affect which
the autonomy of affect by definition, resists. Is this resistance an avoidance of
contradictions that plague ordinary material existence or is it a liberating force from those
conditions? On the one hand, any critique of culture that neglects the expanded
potentialities of the body developed through affect theory will be partial and
compromised. Negative dialectics considers the body to be an essential part of critique,
which is why it is grounded in suffering, but it does not attend to the body as explicitly as
affect theory does. On the other hand, the absence of critique in a theory that conflates
itself with practice and views the nature of thought as generally obstructive to change,
has no way of discerning between what Massumi refers to as “creative duplicity” and the
duplicitous affective practices and structures that ensure complicity.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PRIMACY OF SUFFERING IN NEGATIVE DIALECTICS

Introduction: The Primacy of Suffering
For Adorno, the concept of suffering is vital to understanding how oppression
works. Making suffering the object of critique accords an indispensable role to the body.
The body as a contested site for pain and oppression is hardly a new insight for cultural
theory, but negative dialectics simultaneously assumes the body’s thoroughly mediated
nature and, crucially, its non-identity with the conceptual constructs employed to
understand it. The tension created by bodily suffering resists the discursive reduction of
somatic experience and also provides the opportunity to attend to the sensuous aspect of
thought.
Suffering is a troubled concept. There is no pure form of it that Adorno relies on,
although sometimes he makes statements to the effect that we just know what suffering
is. These statements require further unpacking, because there are overt forms of bodily
suffering experienced by the victims of Auschwitz, but Adorno also addresses more
subtle and deceptive forms of suffering that are masked as pleasure. These
manifestations of suffering present a uniquely insidious phenomenon that requires
interpretation because they encompass forms of unwitting complicity with oppressive
forces. Massumi argues that “being woke” does not incite the change that matters. But
for Adorno, exposing how certain ways of acting and thinking inflict pain is the only way
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to generate enough critical distance to abstain, even if only partially, from participating in
one’s own oppression. Adorno’s famous proclamation that “wrong life cannot be lived
rightly,”26 expresses his conviction that diagnosing ideological deceptions offers respite
from suffering. The significance of respite is too often overlooked by the urgency of
practical action. Adorno warns of the consequences of underestimating the necessity of
“mere” non-participation (nicht mitmachen) and its critical tension with the status quo.
History has revealed the consequences of bypassing critique and the suffering that
ensues:
It is part of the mechanism of domination to forbid recognition of the suffering it
produces, and there is a straight line of development between the gospel of
happiness and the construction of camps of extermination so far off in Poland that
each of our own countrymen can convince himself that he cannot hear the
screams of pain. 27
The capacity to step back from habitual affirmations of the given provides respite
from the repression and rationalization of pain, and this has important implications for
theory and practice. Adorno is highly critical of the value placed on practice and the
dismissal of any thought that does not provide an effortless segue into its implementation.
But the unity of theory and practice that activists in an exchange society seek must be
regarded with deep suspicion, because history has shown (and here Adorno is mainly
referring to the failure of Marxist movements and Lukac’s intellectual submission to the
control of party) that this unity results in the domination of practice. This default to
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action unhindered by theory is itself an expression of unacknowledged suffering. “The
repressive intolerance to the thought that is not immediately accompanied by instructions
for action is founded on anxiety.” 28 Here Adorno refers to the fear that “the thought is
right” and will “disenchant the pseudo-reality within which actionism moves.”29 Under
these circumstances, respite from the pseudo-reality would in itself constitute an act of
resistance.
What suffering is, who gets to define it, how to give voice to it, and discerning
what kinds of suffering obstruct freedom and what kinds suffering unmask the conditions
of our unfreedom, are just some aspects of suffering that make it as problematic to pin
down as theories that are founded upon notions of justice, the good, or as we will see,
affect. Suffering is also problematic because it is not immune to conversion into cultural
capital. However, because Adorno grounds suffering materially in the body, it harbors the
potential to disrupt and evade the homogenizing capitalist logic of equivalence and
exchange – not because the body provides a substratum of raw immediacy to return or
escape to, but because it offers a materialist and immanent context from which to engage
in analysis and critique. For Adorno, suffering is a form of saying ‘No’. What it means to
say no, what is being refused and why, is the task of negative dialectics to decipher.
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Subject-Object Relation as Expression of Suffering
Much of Adorno’s thinking on suffering is intimately bound to his examination of
the subject-object relation in capitalist society. Whether subject and object are viewed in
terms of the universal and particular, form and content, or the conceptual and nonconceptual, the diremption of the subject’s concepts and the objects it attempts to
represent is, for Adorno, inseparable from the experience of suffering. Massumi argues
that the traditional categories of subject and object are no longer useful terms for cultural
analysis because they assume a mediated relation between preconstituted entities, and the
emancipatory potential of affect lies precisely in its unmediated nature which cannot be
captured by epistemological models of representation. However, Adorno contends that all
thought is guilty. “The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects
do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder.”30 Creating new concepts
avoids the hard work of starting exactly where we are, within the existing conventions
and practices from which suffering emerges. “Only an essentially undialectical
philosophy, one which aims at ahistorical truth, could maintain that the old problems
could simply be removed by forgetting them and starting fresh from the beginning.”31
Negative dialectics begins with our unfreedom and cannot extract itself from the burden
of the subject’s suffering. “Only in the strictest dialectical communication with the most
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recent solution-attempts of philosophy and of philosophic terminology can a real change
in philosophic consciousness prevail.”32
Adorno’s thought on the nature of suffering is most coherent and impactful when
he examines its emergence through the philosophic terminology of the subject-object
relation. Adorno views subject and object as constitutive of experience, each with
uniquely sedimented histories that are irreducible to each the other but cannot exist
without each other. This is consistent with his anti-foundationalism and the ‘consistent
sense of non-identity’ that is cultivated through the dialectical interpretation of everyday
concepts and objects. New terminology does not guarantee new thoughts, and it risks
neglecting the limitations in material reality that give rise to the limitations in thought
reflected by the subject-object relation. Massumi’s attempt to eradicate the subject in
theory is problematic because the subject is still very much alive (and suffering) in
practice. Creating new concepts will not redeem the guilt of the concept, but neither will
positing a non-conceptual reality that can be accessed without concepts. We could no
sooner speak of a non-conceptual cognition than to lose it. While Massumi argues this is
precisely what differentiates affect from conceptual cognition and its inherent limitations,
Adorno soberly insists that it is a futile endeavor because it ignores the process of the
subject’s critical self-reflection in getting there. He argues:
We would achieve the utopia of cognition if it might prove possible to grasp the
non-conceptual not by means of some allegedly superior non-conceptual methods,
but by unlocking the non-conceptual by means of the concept, and the selfcriticism of concepts – without reducing what has been comprehended, the nonconceptual, to concepts by main force. 33
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Negative dialectics constellates concepts in order to think the dissonance between
the finitude of the subject’s concepts and the object they attempt to capture. “Cognition
of the object in its constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object.” And it
is in this sense that subject and object are not preconstituted entities - although the
ideology of exchange society would have us believe otherwise – but are rather
expressions of the experience of living in a reality fundamentally constituted by
unexamined contradictions.
Adorno and Massumi both value an interdisciplinary approach. For Adorno, the
activity of constellating concepts is enriched by the inclusion of concepts traditionally
segregated from other disciplines. The lived sense and meaning of subject and object and
the tension between them shifts within social contexts and across disciplines. Adorno’s
engagement with a variety of disciplines including literary critique, sociology, aesthetics,
and philosophy, stems from the rejection of the rigid separation of disciplines that a
totally administered society requires.

Kant’s Prison
The Belly Turned Mind
The first part of this chapter consists of an examination of the different forms of
suffering that emerge through the subject/object relation in Adorno’s reading of Kant.
Adorno’s critique of the philosophical tradition of German idealism and Kant in
particular, centers around the concept of constitutive subjectivity – a concept that is at the
heart of the suffering prevalent in capitalist exchange society. Adorno argues that the
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force of intolerance that constitutive subjectivity harbors towards difference is analogous
to the force of self-preserving instincts such as the hunger and rage that are necessary for
animals to paralyze their prey. In Adorno’s view, the development of the superego and
the identity of the human being as a zoon politikon prevented openly acting on this
instinct of self-preservation and was therefore masked as a “rationalized rage against
nonidentity”.34 In Kant and philosophical idealism in general, the somatic element poses
a threat to thought and is devoured with a rationalized rage. Adorno takes issue with
Kant’s presentation of constitutive subjectivity as an inevitable outcome of the ahistorical
conditions of human experience, because there are no unmediated or ahistorical sources
of human experience. Human beings are not ontologically or epistemologically
hardwired to perceive the world stripped of its otherness, although it may appear this way
to the unexamined life. The compulsion of identity emerged through the social-historical
conditions of capitalism. The subject of contemporary capitalism is driven by intolerance
of the forms of difference that resist exchange and consumption. The capacity to
commodify personal forms of dissent is a continuation of the constitutive subject that
only sees in objects that which can perpetuate its dominant status.
This “belly turned mind”35 phenomenon of idealistic thought does not tolerate
somatic dissonance. In a society where everything is subjected to the capitalist injunction
of exchangeability, suffering has the potential to disrupt and elude the identitarian
thinking of exchange relations. Negative bodily sensations can and do resist total
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subsumption by the concept. Therefore, the experience of suffering is crucial to the
dialectical interpretation of the object. “The smallest trace of senseless suffering in the
empirical world belies all the identitarian philosophy that would talk us out of that
suffering.”36 According to Adorno, German idealism channels the rationalized rage
against the other into the constitutive subject, which holds the dual function of being the
condition and denial of suffering. It is the condition of suffering because it cannot allow
whatever does not already fit into its perceptual structure, thereby precluding the
possibility of the other’s expression. It is a denial of suffering because to acknowledge
the other’s suffering would require a subjectivity that is not rooted in identity, thereby
eliminating its constitutive powers. The denial of suffering is a perquisite for the
condition of suffering.

Adorno’s Critique of Transcendental Apperception
Although Adorno rejected some major tenets of Marxism, he never lost touch
with his materialist roots. This is evident in his critique of Kant’s transcendental
empiricism. His close examination of the irreconcilable contradictions imbedded in
Kant’s transcendental subject is key to understanding the concept and role of non-identity
in cultural critique. Kant’s philosophy unwittingly reveals how the inability to see that
contradictions in thought derive from contradictions in material reality prohibits critical
engagement with the status quo. Adorno treats The Critique of Pure Reason as an object
that requires interpretation to bring its sedimented history to expression. By critiquing
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the “fallacy of constitutive subjectivity” in Kant’s work, Adorno lays the ground for his
account of the subject-object relation that shapes the experience of suffering.
Kant set out to refute Hume’s deep skepticism about the scientific laws of
causality by proving that knowledge of the world is possible if it meets certain
conditions. First, it must adhere to the logic of non-contradiction to avoid arbitrary
constraints. Second, it must provide new information about the world that extends beyond
analytic judgements that contain the predicate in the subject by logical necessity. Proving
the possibility of a priori synthetic statements would fulfill these two conditions. Kant
met the first requirement through attributing a priori status to the structures of perceiving
and knowing. In this way, objectivity is established through relying on the necessity of
formal logic that is operative in the twelve categories (Principles of Understanding) and
is independent from experience. The second requirement is fulfilled by making
knowledge dependent on sense perception, thereby establishing a connection with
material reality.
The formal laws of reason can only contribute to knowledge of the world when
they are limited to the sensory content received through the a priori forms of time and
space. The a priori structures are necessary to avoid reducing knowledge to the
contingency of moment to moment experience. As Kant puts it, “without intuition
concepts are empty; without concepts intuition is blind.”37 The seamless fit between these
two is necessary for synthetic a priori judgements.
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To summarize, Kant could only prove the possibility of objective knowledge by
limiting what we can know to phenomena that conform to the a priori structures of
consciousness. The consequence of Kant’s Copernican Turn is that objective knowledge
is based on the inability to know things-in-themselves. The grounds for the possibility of
experience requires the exclusion of noumena from knowledge production.
Kant’s Schematism also has significant implications for subjectivity, and
Adorno’s critique of Kant is leveled most explicitly at the ideological presuppositions
contained in the Kantian subject. Kant begins his argument with the commonsense
notion that in order for a sensible intuition to occur, there must be something which
receives it. Intuitions must be presented to a unified consciousness. Kant explains:
It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at
all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or
at least would be nothing to me.38
There must be a “pure original unchangeable consciousness”39 that allows an
object “to become an object for me.”40 However, this a priori logical subject is not to be
confused with the empirical subject that appears through the form of inner, temporal
intuition. The empirical self is no different from any other object of experience in that it
is the phenomenal product of transcendental structures. The transcendental unity of
apperception however, is part of the a priori conditions of experience and can therefore
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not be the same as the objects it is a condition for. The significance of the purely logical
subject for Kant’s philosophy cannot be overestimated, for it is the lynchpin on which the
rest of the transcendental structures depend. “The principle of apperception is the highest
principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge.”41 It is to this that Adorno turns his
critical gaze.
In the preface to Negative Dialectics, Adorno announces that he aims to “give the
Copernican revolution an axial turn.”42 As explained above, Kant’s Copernican
revolution consisted of showing that we can only know objects on the condition that they
conform to our mode of cognition. In the Kantian object, there is no longer a clear
distinction between ontology and epistemology because it is ontologically constituted
through epistemological structures. The transcendental turn in Kant examines the
conditions for the possibility of experience. It is important to note that the kind of
experience Kant refers to is ordinary, everyday experience of objects, not a specific
version of transformed consciousness. The distinction between false consciousness and
critical consciousness is not relevant to Kant’s project, and this is precisely what Adorno
takes issue with. Kant claims to have found a satisfactory answer to his question for the
conditions of ordinary experience, but Adorno argues it was a bad question to begin with,
one that could only be generated from a false consciousness. The rest of Adorno’s
critique reveals the contradictions that inevitably arise when reality is analyzed through a
reified consciousness. Instead of examining the conditions for ordinary experience,
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Adorno’s axial turn takes this one step further by inquiring into the conditions for the
possibility of the transcendental forms themselves. What he discovers is that the
conditions of the conditions for the possibility of experience of objects include the
objects that are constituted by the forms.
Kant claims the logical subject to be the condition of the empirical, psychological
subject and so by definition cannot itself be an object of experience. Adorno maintains
that the very concept of subjectivity is not possible without the empirical subject from
which it is derived.43 Kant’s reliance on pronomial references in his description of the
transcendental forms is not an arbitrary linguistic slip. Adorno explains:
If you completely detach this ‘I think’, that is, the pure transcendental subject,
from the ‘I’ as actual fact, then not only does all talk of an ‘I’ lose all its meaning
but it also becomes impossible to imagine what Kant means by ‘context of
consciousness’ or ‘synthesis’ or ‘memory’ or ‘reproduction.’44
We are fooling ourselves if we believe that our capacity to envision a pure form
of apperception is possible without the actual experience of an empirical unifying
consciousness. In this sense, the transcendental subject becomes a representation of the
material self. Kant’s reliance on “naturalistic modes of speech,”45 such as the use of the
pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’, reveals the unconscious presupposition of the psychological
subject of which the transcendental self is a hypostasized abstraction.
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This presents a crucial contradiction for a theory of cognition that posits the
transcendental unity of apperception as the highest governing principle for the “objective
condition of all knowledge.”46 Kant makes the empirical world an indispensable part of
knowledge, but not in the way he claims. The outside world may indeed be the starting
point, in that something must be intuited outside of pure concepts in order to provide
content for the structures of understanding, (and this certainly sets Kant apart from
dogmatists such as Leibniz), but the conditions for something outside of thought to be
given in the first place coincide with the structures of perception of the reified empirical
self. Under these conditions, the object is stripped of any non-identical qualities with the
subject, rendering the object powerless to resist subsumption under the concept. The
object becomes a ‘fact’ of ordinary experience. However, Adorno argues that objects of
ordinary experience are not the value neutral phenomena that Kant claims them to be,
since they are always already products of a reified process of production. The conflation
of fact (what is) and value (what ought to be), is a result of the way objects emerge
through subjective structures of knowing. We are left with possible objects of experience
that are “an abbreviated version of the given world, and something that is external to, and
has nothing in common with, what there is to be known.”47 Adorno remarks that perhaps
Kant gained consolation from the concept of things-in-themselves as that “other which
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knowledge ultimately refers to”, but, he quips, “this consolation is of the kind that we
generally feel at funerals.”48
Because the parameters of transcendental logic concern the origin and possibility
of knowledge, Adorno argues that the transcendental subject acts in a way that a purely
logical subject cannot. It brings about objects of experience; it acts. Adorno writes:
And if I did not possess the consciousness of such an ‘I do’, then there would be
no such thing as an ‘I think’ that accompanies all my representation’. It is in this
circumstance that we see why the transcendental form depends on an element of
content – however sublimated, however abstract – as the precondition of its
possibility and vice versa.49
Kant’s insistence that the ‘I think’ does not act because it is a logical condition
ignores its dependence on the ‘I do’ of the empirical subject. How, Adorno asks, can
anything be given to a subjective form that is completely emancipated from the
empirical? The doing of the transcendental “I” and its thought forms presupposes that
which it constructs, for “no purely logical construct could have any sort of experience.”50
Kant might counter this argument by pointing out that Adorno has committed the
categorical error addressed in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason:
Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must
presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (the
thought) is distinguished from the self that is be determined (the thinking subject)
in the same way as knowledge is distinguished from its object.51
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Kant goes on to explain, “Nevertheless there is nothing more natural and more
misleading than the illusion which leads us to regard the unity in the synthesis of
thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts.”52 By Kant’s account,
Adorno is confusing the transcendental unity of apperception with the object status of the
empirical self. But Adorno contends that Kant is the one guilty of the fallacious
reasoning critiqued in the Paralogisms. As a “profoundly hypostasized abstraction from
the individual consciousness,”53 the a priori structures of the subject are modeled on the
characteristics of immutability, that which in ordinary experience is characterized as the
enduring identity of the object. We cannot know things in themselves that are not
represented through the structures of intuition and the categories – and this includes the
transcendental subject, “for we can understand only that which brings with it, in intuition,
something corresponding to our words.”54 And yet we can only conceive of the
transcendental structures because of the phenomena they make possible. “When it comes
down to it, Kant had no right to speak undialectically of such things existing in
themselves, of such fixed forms given to us in reality once and for all.”55 This rigid
dualism does not hold up under dialectical analysis because the contradictions it
generates are rooted in a material reality that Kant does not acknowledge.
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In his oft-quoted statement that form would be empty without content and content
would be blind without form, Kant acknowledges a necessary reciprocity, but by not
taking it far enough into the underlying dialectical relation, he is caught in a reified
account of the world where the knowing subject is disconnected from its material
conditions. The true nature of constitutens and constitutum is that they are extreme poles
that are irreducible to each other - so there is a dualism - but at their core they are
mediated by their opposite. Kant is unwilling to accept these constitutive contradictions
that go beyond the preformed static oppositions of form and content, or noumena and
phenomena, that he presents in the Critique. Therefore, Adorno concludes, “We may say
that a dialectical approach establishes itself in the Critique of Pure Reason against Kant’s
will or behind his back.”56

Critique of Origins
This analysis of Kant’s “crass dualism” is inseparable from Adorno’s critique of
absolute first principles. He reads The Critique of Pure Reason as a “philosophy of
origins” (prima philosophia), i.e., as a commitment to a causal, underlying unity. Adorno
views The Critique of Pure Reason as exemplary of an intellectually rigorous philosophy
that, despite Kant’s claims to the contrary, fails to acknowledge the futility of assuming
the primacy of immediacy or unity. Kant locates an absolute underlying unity in the
transcendent thing-in-itself,57 because he cannot tolerate the contradictions of positing a
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rigid separation of realms (form/content, subject/ object, constitutens/constitutum), and
“being constantly compelled to recognize that one cannot exist without the other.”58 Kant
cannot tolerate the contradiction because he does not understand it dialectically and must
resort to origins and first principles. The intolerance for contradiction, not only in Kant,
but according to Adorno, in philosophy in general, is evidenced by the compulsion to
“regress to an earlier stage and relapse into sheer immediacy.”59 For Adorno, duality
only becomes a problem when it is reified and cut-off from its dialectical and always
historical conditions. This is what Adorno means when he claims that nothing escapes
mediation. The answer does not lie in transcendence and the dualism this creates. “The
only escape route from this impasse is the one we have been trying out here in a modest
way, and that is to transcend it by advancing through this dualism, that is to say, by
demonstrating that what is divided is itself mediated.”60
The dualism that Kant creates between knowledge and the forms that make
knowledge possible does not, as Kant proclaims at the end of The Critique of Pure
Reason, mean that “the critical path alone is still open.”61 If we are to take seriously
Kant’s question of, as Adorno puts it, “what constitutes what”,62 then we must engage in
the dialectical path. Adorno stated that his axial turn on Kant’s Copernican revolution is
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the only way to provide a corrective to the “fallacy of constitutive subjectivity”63 that
denies the material/historical conditions of its emergence. Only by recognizing the
mediated nature of immediacy and the compensatory concept of absolute origins, is it
possible to break through the concepts, experience, and social relations that have become
so thoroughly reified as to appear – convincingly – as second nature.

Inevitability of the Given
Adorno’s critique of Kant has important implications for his analysis of culture.
Because Adorno believed that any critique of society must necessarily involve a critique
of knowledge, much of his philosophical work was a response to the prevailing
philosophy of German idealism. Nowhere were the consequences of idealism more
obvious than in the alienation of the individual in modern society and the widespread
conviction that the reified relations between individuals and society was a form of
freedom. In his inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt in 1931, Adorno outlined
his concern for the actuality of philosophy if it were to resist socially sanctioned forms of
thought. A philosophy which severs its dependence on “the security of current
intellectual and social trends,”64 he stated, faces the threat of its own liquidation.
Therefore, a philosophy which permits new understandings of ourselves and the world
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necessarily sacrifices plausibility. “Truth is objective, not plausible.”65 Adorno never
deviated from this insight and consistently developed it in close conjunction with his
philosophy of negative dialectics, cultural critique, and aesthetic theory, throughout his
career.
By Adorno’s reading, Kant’s philosophy perpetuated the status quo because it did
not severe its dependence on the rational commitments of society. The antinomies of
bourgeois thought which derived from the material contradictions of capitalist society
(wage labor and capital), and the refusal of bourgeoisie thinkers to acknowledge these
constitutive contradictions, led to various rationalizations of the irrational. Kant’s concept
of the thing-in-itself is the most obvious example of this. Taking his cue from Lukács,
Adorno claimed that the structure of commodity relations had invaded Kant’s thought to
the core. The complete lack of mutual reciprocity between subject and object, and the
indifference of the subject to any possible influence by the object, reflects the reified
relations in bourgeois society between products of labor and workers, between workers,
and through the alienation experienced within each human to herself. In Negative
Dialectics Adorno compares Kant’s dualistic model for criticizing reason with the
structure of a production process. “The merchandise drops out of the machine just as his
phenomena drop out of the cognitive mechanism, and where the material and its own
definition are a matter of indifference vis-à-vis the profit, much as appearance is a matter
of indifference to Kant, who had it stenciled.”66 The subject as a logical, abstract
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necessity reflects the abstraction of exchange value replacing use value. And finally, the
inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself is not a universal condition of knowledge, but rather a
historical manifestation of the fetishism/mystification of commodities. For Kant,
knowledge is objective only when it is filtered through the subject and all hope for
knowing things-in-themselves is relinquished. For Adorno, true knowledge is only
possible through the consistent sense of non-identity between opposing elements. This
requires a dialectical movement that has no need for and does not acquiesce to the
compulsion of identity. In an economy and culture permeated by exchange relations,
identitarian thinking is at minimum never neutral because it legitimizes the given, and
more often than not, it perpetuates the conflation of fact and value that makes political
resistance difficult to define and act upon. If there is no tension between what is and
what ought to be, what need is there for resistance? If the resistance is directed towards
this conflation, then what would its starting point consist of? Because everything is
already affirmed just by existing, the starting point would have to be negative critique,
saying ‘No’ to the seeming inevitability to the way things are.

Mourning and Memory
Kant already expressed, albeit unintentionally, an implicit form of saying ‘No’
through his construction of the noumena and its inaccessibility via the subject. Referring
to this as the “Kantian Block”, Adorno explains that the consequences of limiting
knowledge in a way that only allows us to understand what we can control, creates the
unfortunate effect of instilling fear and dread of the unknown. The Kantian block
presumes there is something real, perhaps more real than the world of appearances, but
45

we have no meaningful connection to it. “This is what is reflected in the doctrine of the
block; it is a kind of metaphysical mourning, a kind of memory of what is best, of
something that we must not forget, but that we are nevertheless compelled to forget.”67
Adorno states, “I believe that this is the deepest thing to be found in Kant.”68 The block
is an expression of the futility of constructing totalizing systems of reality. We are
fundamentally blocked from fulfilling this kind of philosophical aspiration, but the failure
of philosophy is actually the only form in which we can grasp the totality, through its
impossibility. Adorno states that Kant’s “entire philosophy is actually nothing more than
a form of stammering, it is a form of Dada, the attempt to say what actually cannot be
said.”69 This characterization of Kant’s philosophy explains Adorno’s meticulous
attention to its ruptures and antinomies because he believes these reveal the heart of
Kant’s thought.
The significance of Adorno’s interpretation of the Kantian block for this present
work lies in the decisive importance of the role that memory serves. The phenomenon of
reification and its ubiquitous manifestation comprises the majority of Adorno’s work.
Adorno was in agreement with Lukács’ claim that all reification is a forgetting. There is
something we should never forget – what is it? The non-conceptual part of the concept.
What compels us to forget it? The concept. The particularity of the object is the nonconceptual part of the concept. All thought is guilty because the concept operates as if it
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were not in a constitutive relation with the non-conceptual. The guilt of the concept is,
strangely, the expression of the non-conceptual. It is the experiential content that cannot
be exhausted by the concept. Due to the concept’s classificatory nature, the only parts of
the object that can be captured are those which are capable of being repeated in other
objects. The particular resists subsumption under the concept and therefore literally does
not count because its qualitative nature cannot be quantified without changing in nature.
The crucial characteristic of the concept is that it compels us to forget that “objects do not
go into their concepts without leaving a remainder.”70 The object is constituted always in
a social historical context and so its particularity as sedimented history is always
changing through time. On the one hand, “….the appearance of identity is inherent in
thought itself, in its pure form. To think is to identify.”71 On the other hand, “the power
of memory thrives because that identity is not possible.”72 But the fact that identity is not
possible does not, as in Kant’s philosophy, mean that whatever resists identity is banished
from a meaningful connection with the concept that by nature always identifies. As the
consistent sense of non-identity, negative dialectics holds in tension that which we should
never forget but are nevertheless compelled to forget. Kant’s block mourns the
conflation of fact and value that compels us to forget. This is why Adorno considers it to
be the deepest thing found in Kant.
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The Fearlessly Passive Subject
Adorno offers a different account of the subject-object relation to counter Kant’s
transcendental subject. In place of constitutive subjectivity, Adorno proposes a
“fearlessly passive subject”. Rather than reducing objects to the conditionality of the
subject, the fearlessly passive subject directs an open and “uncoercive gaze” towards the
object. “Approaching knowledge of the object is the act in which the subject rends the
veil it is weaving around the object. It can do this only where, fearlessly passive, it
entrusts itself to its own experience.”73 The veil woven around the object is reification,
and according to Adorno, “reification is a function of subjectivization.”74 The reified
subject obstructs the non-conceptual part of the object so that “the more we appropriate,
the more we find ourselves alienated from what we are really looking for, and what we
do actually appropriate is only a kind of lifeless residue.”75 The forgetting of reification is
forged through a memory cleansed of the socio-historical conditions from which the
subject-object relation emerges. Kant’s a priori structures of the subject cleanse objects
of their singularity and historicity that would disqualify them as phenomena, and qualify
them as legitimate objects of knowledge. The conditions for the possibility of experience
diminish experience to a mirror of the subject’s structures of knowing. Objects that
contradict the subject’s mirror of knowing are not only wrong but also irrelevant. The
veil deadens the world, reducing it to a lifeless residue. The fearlessly passive subject
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opens to the part of the object that resists subsumption. The experience that it entrusts
itself to is the somatic and cognitive feeling of encountering the object’s resistance.
Contradiction is the experience of the subject’s limitation.
The price of knowledge in Kant’s world is that we cannot really know anything
beyond what already affirms the status quo. The a priori structures of the transcendental
subject not only ground ordinary consciousness but preclude the possibility of a critical
consciousness that could sense the constrictive conditions of perception and would have
the capacity to resist the socially habituated impulse to only register identity. Ordinary
perception and cognition is false consciousness because it can only ever say what has
already been determined. Under these conditions, suffering is rationalized and rendered
meaningful in ways that support the inevitability of the given. Contrary to Hume, who
radically altered the concepts of self, causality, and object in such a way that he provoked
Kant to awake from his dogmatic slumber and write The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s
philosophy is committed to “producing with the enormous power of the productive
imagination the world as it already exists.”76 The more the subject constitutes the object,
the farther away the object moves. Instead of seeing this as a prison of its own making,
idealism celebrates it.
What transcendentalism praised in creative subjectivity is the subject’s
unconscious imprisonment in itself. Its every objective thought leaves the subject
harnessed like an armored beast in the shell it tries in vain to shed; the only
difference is that to such animals it did not occur to brag of their captivity as
freedom.77
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Kant’s philosophy unwittingly expresses the suffering inherent in social reality
and sanctions it by celebrating the subject’s inability to break out of its socially
constituted indifference to itself. This “awareness of a defect – of the limits of
knowledge – becomes a virtue, so as to make the defect more bearable.”78
Adorno reminds us however, that the imprisonment eternalized through the
transcendental subject and its rationalized rage towards the other, would not have secured
such a firm ground in philosophy if there was not already a corresponding degree of its
truth in reality. “The separation of subject and object is both real and illusory. True,
because in the cognitive realm it serves to express the real separation, the dichotomy of
the human condition, a coercive development.”79 The separation is real because the
abstract relations of exchange that permeate social practices and relations have much in
common with the transcendental subject, in that they determine the perception and
behavior of empirical beings and detach them from “what they are for themselves.”80
Adorno compares the activity of the transcendental subject to labor and the world as its
product or congealed labor. Congealed labor includes all objects of experience, which
along with the empirical subject, appear to stand on their own. Like commodities, they
appear unattached to their material-social conditions of production. “And the livelier the
subject becomes, the deader the world becomes.”81 In turn, the world dominates the
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subject by appearing as a reified and immutable reality which the subject is powerless to
change.82 The separation of subject and object is not just an academic distinction but
speaks to the actual alienation of the self, the relations between human beings, and
between human beings and nature, that is the constitutive norm of exchange society.
These reified relations “that we register daily in our own bodies”, is a prison of our own
making that nonetheless confronts us with the “facade of objectivity, a second nature.”83
However, the truth of the separation of subject and object is also its untruth.
“False, because the resulting separation must not be hypostasized, not magically
transformed into an invariant.” 84 The subject needs the object. “Once radically departed
from the object, the subject reduces it to its own measure; the subject swallows the
object, forgetting how much it is an object itself.”85 Once again, the possibility of
conceiving the transcendental subject relies on the “unreflected experience of the
enduring identical object.”86 It is the goal of achieving objectivity that is so crucial in
securing the transcendental subject as the foundation for all the other transcendental
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forms that make knowledge (a priori synthetic judgments) possible. We can only know
about these transcendental mechanisms of the subject because of the existence of
phenomena or objects. “Actually, everything in the subject is chargeable to the object;
whatever part of it is not objective will semantically burst the ‘is’.”87 In short, the subject
is not thinkable without the object. It cannot be reduced to the object, but the subject
cannot exist outside of its relation to the object.
The separation between subject and object is an illusion because the
hypostasization of the separation conceals the relation of mutual interdependency. The
object needs the subject. Not only is the subject not thinkable without the object, but the
object needs the mediation – not constitution - of the subject. This gets tricky, because
Adorno’s focus on the primacy of the object sometimes makes it seem as if the object
holds autonomous status. “Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an
object; but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is part of
the meaning of subjectivity; but it is not equally part of the meaning of objectivity to be a
subject.”88 Contrary to idealism, the most significant aspects of the object are those that
resist constitution by the subject. It is not the case that we can only experience objects
that fit seamlessly within the subjective structures of knowing, and it is important that if
we take this constitutive function away then the noumenal status of objects is no longer
necessary. When objects are wholly confined to appearing through the transcendental
mechanisms of the subject, it makes sense to acknowledge that we can never really know
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the thing-in-itself. But as sedimented content, the object contains a history or social
reality that is concealed and requires interpretive engagement with the subject and its
concepts to come to expression. This requires a mutual reciprocity between subject and
object. The necessity of dialectical mediation is the object’s dependency on the subject.
“The subject is the object’s agent, not its constituent.”89 It is in this way that the object is
not autonomous and separate from the subject, however, it takes a fearlessly passive
subject to engage the object as its agent.
Adorno is critical of reified, diminished experience. The veil of reification can be
countered with the primacy of the object, but it is important to remember that this is
always done in the context of the dialectical movement between subject and object. As a
corrective to the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity, the dialectical primacy of the object
reveals the untruth of identity and the illusory nature of philosophical first principles.
“The test of the object’s primacy is its qualitative alteration of opinions held by the
reified consciousness, opinions that go frictionlessly with subjectivism.”90 The fearlessly
passive subject is able to entrust its experience with an object that qualitatively alters its
perception. This is not an erasure of the subject – only a rationalized rage against the
other would interpret it this way.
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Role of Suffering in Negative Dialectics
The force of negative dialectics lies in its uncompromising commitment to a
negativity anchored in suffering. What makes dialectics more than a descriptive device is
the fearlessly passive subject’s attunement to suffering as its guiding force. Being an
agent for the object entails an affective openness to somatic and cognitive dissonance.
Since the subject is historically and socially oriented to perceive identity, dissonance
poses a threat to its dominance and is either met with denial or rationalized rage. The
instinct for self-preservation in a society governed by the law of exchange and the profit
motive requires identitarian modes of being and a rationality that is only concerned with
the means to achieve these ends. The capitalist organization of reality adheres to a logic –
that of exchange – and in this sense, cannot be dismissed as irrational per se. But if these
market principles pervasively govern how subjects think and behave, is there any element
immanent to the current historical situation that can serve as a normative guide for how
things should be?
This kind of question is highly problematic for Adorno, because he believed that
the recognition of normative foundations would compromise the accuracy and truth of
interpretation. Recall that for Adorno everything requires interpretation because every
aspect of reality is mediated. This especially includes that which resists positive
articulation and requires negative dialectical engagement to name what is absent or
wrong. Adorno understood normative foundations to be inherently repressive because of
their universalizing nature that overrides temporal activity. Norms, by definition, resist
change. Their successful implementation demands an intolerance towards that which
cannot be determined or understood by heteronomous standards. Critics find Adorno’s
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rejection of all norms seriously flawed because while some norms are obviously
oppressive, judging them as such requires adherence to a normative position. How else
would we know that a wrong has been committed?91 Prima facie it does seem like
Adorno assumes a normative standpoint, as evidenced by his frequent use of moralizing
language. He consistently relied on terms such as right/wrong, true/false, and good/evil.
Just as Adorno criticized Kant for unwittingly demonstrating the truth of dialectical
relation in his dualisms, it seems as if a normative approach grounds Adorno’s work
against his will or behind his back. And yet, Adorno insists that negative dialectics is
devoid of positive norms. It is not necessary to have knowledge of the good in order to
name the bad. Pain does not require knowledge of pleasure.
The only guide for critique in a world dominated by capitalist relations of
exchange is the experience of suffering. Negative dialectics is an attunement to the
somatic process of suffering contained in the object. “The need to lend a voice to
suffering is a condition of all truth.”92 This is perhaps the deepest thing to be found in
Adorno. Negative dialectics is the attempt to give a voice to suffering that cannot be
reduced to the concept but nevertheless is expressed through concepts and their inevitable
failure to fully capture it. However, the somatic experience of suffering is not a
transparent matter. The truth and untruth of suffering requires interpretation that is
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dialectically grounded in the social and physical body. “The physical moment tells our
knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should be different.”93 If dialectical
interpretation does not remain rooted in the somatic ‘No’, then it loses connection with
the non-conceptual experience that drives thought to think against itself. Without this,
philosophy is left with no other choice but to endorse a wrong world. “If thought is not
measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is from the outset in the nature of
the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the screams of its
victims.”94 Suffering is the extremity that both drives and eludes the concept.
It is also inseparable from the body. But neither bodily suffering or its conceptual
meaning can claim the status of a first or original principle so consistently critiqued by
Adorno, as this would presuppose a rigid opposition between body and mind. Adorno
contends that “the controversy about the priority of mind and body is a pre-dialectical
proceeding. It carries on the question of a “first””.95 Suffering is always mediated by our
concept of it and our concepts are always mediated by the material conditions from which
suffering arises. Unlike positive normative standards, suffering can only tell us that
something is wrong but does not provide an account of the good by which we can judge
why this wrong. Not all suffering points to social ills, which is why dialectical
interpretation is necessary to discern whether an experience of pain is the result of a
wounded ego or a reaction to a wrong world. It most definitely does not determine
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political action to correct that wrong. What it does offer is an empirical, immanent point
within social reality from which critique can emerge.
There is a demand that suffering makes on us that does not emanate from a
positive alternative. When Adorno speaks of the new categorical imperative to think and
act in ways that will ensure Auschwitz or anything similar to it does not happen again, he
is countering the ahistorical formal principle of Kant’s categorical imperative. In
rethinking his claim that there could be no poetry after Auschwitz, Adorno pondered
whether the real question, especially for survivors plagued with guilt, should concern the
possibility of living after Auschwitz when “mere survival calls for the coldness, the basic
principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been no
Auschwitz.”96 When this coldness feels far more basic than abhorrence of the suffering it
causes, there is no normative account of justice or freedom that can penetrate it. The
discrepancy between abstract and disembodied concepts of the good and the concrete
experience of suffering that they cannot speak to marks a contradiction - a somatic and
cognitive dissonance – that exceeds the boundaries of normative critique.
A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind:
to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so
that nothing similar will happen. When we want to find reasons for it, this
imperative is as refractory as the given one of Kant was once upon a time.
Dealing discursively with it would be an outrage, for the new imperative gives us
a bodily sensation of the moral addendum - bodily, because it is not the practical
abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed
even with individuality about to vanish as a form of mental reflection. It is in the
unvarnished materialistic motive only that morality survives.97
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Adorno concludes that the evil perpetrated through Auschwitz was inconceivable
to Kant who failed to see that the problem with evil is not that human beings do it, but
that there is no alternative world where “men would no longer need to be evil.”98 Adorno
continues, “The secret of his philosophy is the unthinkability of despair.”99 Auschwitz is
proof that identity is death, so in a world where subjectivities, bodies, work, relationships,
and happiness, are intimately bound up with the principles of identity and exchange, the
only meaningful act is to say ‘No’. Becoming attuned to contradiction and turning away
from identitarian impulses requires a fearlessness of what is stake and an unwavering
trust in the bodily experience of suffering.
To see the suffering for what it is instead of dismissing the body’s response to a
wrong world, to understand the nature of its concealment instead of normalizing it, are
the tasks of negative critique. The ‘No’ of negative dialectics offers something that is
undervalued by affect theorists but that is crucially necessary, hard won, and perhaps the
most that can be hoped for in a life lived in capitalist society: respite from the given. For
some, this may not enough. For Massumi, Adorno’s negativism perpetuates suffering
because it does not offer an alternative way of being, as affect does. Adorno contends
that critique is transformative because it changes how individuals relate to their suffering.
“That it is spoken, that distance is thus won from the trapped immediacy of suffering,
transforms suffering just as screaming diminishes unbearable pain.”100 Negative critique
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requires both a somatic and dialectical attunement to pain, and it is the only thing that
stands between a life determined by a calculus of exchange (the “damaged life” described
in Minima Moralia) and a life that does not seamlessly fit into quantified relations of
domination. In response to critics like Massumi who see dialectics as the reduction of
life to the narrow parameters of logical contradiction and as the inability to see difference
in non-contradictory terms, Adorno argues that as long as the structure of consciousness
strives for identity, difference will always appear in terms of contradiction.101 Negative
dialectics exposes the untruth of identity, not through taking a standpoint, but by
invoking the consistent sense of non-identity that lurks behind every totalizing tendency.

Aesthetic Theory: Dissonance and Suffering
Given that Adorno’s critique of philosophical idealism presents the theoretical
framework for his critique of society, what can his aesthetic theory add to this? The
concepts of non-identity, negative critique, dialectical interpretation, and the primacy of
suffering are essential to both negative dialectics and Adorno’s aesthetic theory. The
difference is one of emphasis. Adorno’s analysis of aesthetic experience foregrounds the
emotional engagement of dialectical interpretation in a way that critiquing Kant does not.
Adorno understood music to be the most non-conceptual of the art forms and thus a
phenomenon that could explicitly evoke a stronger somatic element of experience that the
fearlessly passive subject entrusts itself to. But music could also be a formidable vehicle
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for the ideological affirmation of exchange society. Music can carry all the opacity and
abstract fungibility as any commodity, and as a commodity of the culture industry, it
induces the kind of pleasure that “promotes the resignation which it ought to help to
forget.”102 Its affective power is widely desired, and even when it is not, its presence in
everyday life is nearly inescapable. For Adorno, there is no difference between the
experience of pleasure and consent to the status quo. “To be pleased means to say
Yes.”103 However, while music promotes the pleasure that causes one “to forget
suffering even where it is shown,”104 it also offers the potential to remember, not
nostalgically but critically, the reality of human suffering and the ways that it is
rationalized by social norms.
Much of Adorno’s philosophy was inspired early on by his study of music. His
analysis of tonal and atonal music produced a theory of dissonance as memory.
Dissonance is the moment of negativity in music that expresses the untruth of harmonic
norms and the whole. By exploring the role of dissonance in the composition and
consumption of music, Adorno exposes the social-historical nature of norms and the
unfreedom perpetuated by them when their temporal nature is concealed. There are no
natural laws of music that speak to an ahistorical human essence. There are only
configurations of notes that assert specific relations between parts and whole. Because
musical pieces are never completely separate from material and social conditions, the
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relation between parts and whole will, to varying degrees, reflect the moral norms of
society. The untruth of an artwork lies in its expression of musical norms as natural and
characterized by the impossibility of alternative configurations. From this side,
dissonance only exists to be resolved. The promise of resolution with the whole is
fulfilled through narrow conditions that predetermine the kind of dissonance that is
resolved before it even arises. The parts are predetermined by the whole. The truth of an
artwork negates the myth of totalizing systems by showing how “the whole is the
false.”105 Adorno explains that “the question posed by every artwork is how, under the
domination of the universal, a particular is in any way possible.”106 Compositions based
on this question offer the possibility of dissonance that does not require a ready-made
solution. They have the potential to destabilize, even if momentarily, the unchallenged
norm of a harmonious whole and allow for another kind of dissonance. Revealing the
truth about the repressive nature of musical norms also calls into question the truth and
falsehood of the freedom promised through harmonic resolution of the social whole.
The dissonance experienced in listening to music provides a concrete example of
somatic responses that can be subjected to negative dialectical analysis. The operative
assumption is that when harmonic conventions are breached, dissonance is experienced
as a form of suffering, and since suffering is the anchor for dialectical analysis music
provides the opportunity to examine emotional and cognitive entanglements with norms
and their contradictions. The musical composition is an object; like all objects, it emerged
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out of and is an expression of social-historical conditions. Its sensuous nature emphasizes
its enigmatic character which all objects have, but the overtly sensuous side of music
makes its need for interpretation more pronounced. Art has the potential to heighten our
capacity to be affected, but this capacity depends on the fearless passivity of the subject.
Adorno argues that how we relate to true musical works (not culture industry products) is
the prototype for cognition that assumes the primacy of the object. How the subject
composes, performs, and listens to music could be thought of as a form of praxis.
To the extent that subject is for its part something mediated, praxis rightly
understood is what the object wants: praxis follows the object’s neediness. But
not by the subject adapting itself, which would merely reinforce the heteronomous
objectivity. The neediness of the object is mediated via the total societal system;
for that reason it can be determined critically only by theory.107
Tonality and Dirty Notes
The truth-content of a musical composition requires dialectical negotiation that is
grounded in the subject’s somatic response. This section explores Adorno’s critique of
tonality as the false reconciliation of the given world. The effect that tonal music aims to
produce requires a form of subjectivity that cannot tolerate contradiction and craves the
pleasure derived from recognition. Adorno’s essay on jazz outlines how a musical genre
that proclaims to challenge easy harmonic resolutions further solidifies the reign of
tonality. The true break with tonality does not occur until Schoenberg’s atonal
compositions.
Nowhere are the consequences of identity thinking more evident than in the
disruption of pleasure that dissonance creates in listening to tonal music. When
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dissonance occurs, one of two things can happen. The sharper the dissonance, the
stronger the pleasure experienced upon its resolution. To the listener who is accustomed
to predigested music, dissonance that resists resolution will sound like noise. In either
case, there is a sensuous, non-conceptual reaction. In a society constituted through
exchange relations and in which the value of objects is determined by their fungibility
rather than their singularity, dissonance plays a dialectical role of both enforcing and
challenging the rationality of the totalizing system but can also be potentially disruptive
in it revelatory value.
All pop music is composed within the musical system of tonality. The structure
of this system is based on a dominant tonal center that pre-determines the chord structure,
melodic developments, and forms of harmonic dissonance and resolution. If a piece is
written in the key of C, the degree of harmony in every note is determined through its
degree of deviation from the major scale of C. F-sharp, for instance creates considerably
more dissonance than the perfect fifth interval of the note G (and there are a finite set of
resolutions pre-determined by the relations of the seven notes in the key of C or any key).
But F-sharp in another key, say D major, is part of the triadic major chord and does not
produce significant harmonic tension. All of this is to say that any song composed within
the tonal system – always a closed system - has already been written. There is a large but
finite number of allowable harmonic combinations which adhere to the single rule of
creating harmonic tension in order to resolve it. Notes that do not participate in this
formula are heard as nonsensical noise, equivalent to a small child blindly pounding on
the piano keys (which is how Schoenberg’s music sounded to many).
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The successful commodification of music requires that the mollifying nature of
tonality be masked by the production of pleasurable effects. Above all, the economic
success of tonality depends on the endless production of techniques which distract the
listener from the repeated dominance of the externally imposed whole over the parts.
Exposure of this truth could transform the pleasurable experience of music as we know it
into intolerable mind-numbing sounds. The standardization that is synonymous with the
tonality of pop music, is supposedly countered by jazz and its claims to resist tonal
norms. But what jazz really offers, according to Adorno, is much more insidious than
pop music, because it only offers a pseudo-individualism which does not severe its
obedience to the principle of the pleasure industry to “be always new and always the
same.”108
The intrigue of jazz is sustained by its professed individuality and subversive
harmonies that have purportedly never before been played. It is the avant-garde that
transcends the monotonous harmonies of pop music and avoids the starchy bourgeois
pretensions of classical music. But the formulas remain the same. They are
“kaleidoscopically mixed into ever new combinations”109 without affecting in the
slightest the overall tonal scheme. The schemas for creating and dissolving tension are
every bit as predictable as the musical genres it claims to break out of: the 2-5-1 chord
progression constitutive of most jazz standards, the extensive improvisation solos which,
no matter how far they play out from the tonal center, as an “outburst of untrammeled
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subjectivity,”110 always return home. In fact, the intense feelings of elation described by
jazz connoisseurs is produced in direct proportion to the increasingly prolonged
dissonance during the solo session. “Jazz, like everything else in the culture industry,
gratifies desires only to frustrate them at the same time.”111
It is not a coincidence, Adorno argues, that the syncopation characteristic of jazz
was derived from the military march and its totalitarian function. And yet, jazz continues
to present itself as one of the most innovative forms of music. “Anyone who allows the
growing respectability of mass culture to seduce him into equating a popular song with
modern because of a few false notes squeaked by a clarinet; anyone who mistakes a triad
studded with ‘dirty notes’ for atonality, has already capitulated to barbarism.”112 All of
this is amplified peripherally by the cult of jazz personalities – movies are made about
Charlie Parker’s struggle with heroin addiction and the relation this had to his music and
creative capacity, much ink has been spilled on Miles Davis’s prima donna stage, or Bill
Evans’ ‘whiteness’. These narratives enforce the lie that jazz offers a revolutionary form
of music because they distract from the fact that “sociologically, jazz has the effect of
strengthening and extending, down to the very physiology of the subject, the acceptance
of a dreamless-realistic world in which all memories of things not wholly integrated have
been purged.”113
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Adorno observes that all of the seemingly non-conformist elements of jazz
mentioned above had already been discovered and developed by serious music since
Brahms. The contingent nature of these components in jazz, evidenced by the fact that
they can be rearranged in no particular order, reflects the arbitrary nature of oppressive
social structures. The jazz components do not have an internal organization – “no single
measure follows from the logic of the musical progression.”114 They have no memory,
just as the social structures are cut off from their historical origins, presenting themselves
as second nature. The fungibility of notes in the tonal system coincides seamlessly with a
society based on exchange relations. Adorno refers to jazz as a symbolic castration. It
offers a promise of freedom in exchange for ascetic denial so that jazz can meet the
manufactured needs of the culture industry instead of the needs of unfree subjects. The
mass deception of pop music and jazz reduces the critic’s discourse to likes and dislikes,
masking the culture industry’s logic of assuring people that they know what they like and
hiding the fact that they only like what they know.
The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually
promises. The promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws on
pleasure is endlessly prolonged; the promise, which is actually all the spectacle
consists of, is illusory: all it actually confirms is that the real point will never be
reached, that the diner must be satisfied with the menu.115
Classical music relies on the same tonal mechanisms of identity thinking as jazz
and pop music. The important distinction for Adorno is not between high and low art,
which typically refers to classical and pop music, but rather between music that is
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composed and listened to as a commodity verses music that reflects on its sedimented
history of musical norms and the “voice of the nonidentical – of everything that refuses to
be submerged.”116 Classical music can fall into the former category just as easily as pop
music or jazz, depending on the composition’s relation between whole and part. The
sonata form ensures just enough dissonance to generate repeated sensations of relief
without confusion or the need for thought. The fact that everything is based on the
formula of harmonic tension and resolution, regardless of the differences between
musical genres, ensures a comfortable predictability. We’ve heard it all before even
though we are told that we haven’t. But when you hear a purportedly ‘new’ pop song, a
‘new release’, it is not uncommon and does not require a sophisticated knowledge of
music theory, to finish humming the tune before it is played or to at least hum a note in
the scale that will inevitably follow the present moment in a chord progression. We know
these formulas even if we think we do not. And there is great comfort to be experienced
in this process, a pleasure derived from humming along with a tune. Pleasure is the
culture industry’s goal. “To be pleased means to say Yes.”117 The harmonic conflicts
that produce tension will always be resolved, providing a sense of ordered unity that
cannot be achieved with the real conflicts of material life created by the existing social
relations of production.118
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Schoenberg
Schoenberg’s twelve-tone music presented a truly new musical innovation
because it had no structural dependency or allegiance to the system of tonality. His early
atonal compositions challenged the widely held belief amongst composers, musicians,
and audiences that tonal structures expressed the natural laws of music. But there was
nothing natural, he declared, about limiting music to the indifference of standardized
forms that remained unaffected by the content they subsumed. However, the conditions
which required the inner logic of the composition to determine its direction and form
were more aligned with Adorno’s conception of the primacy of the object. Schoenberg’s
atonal music was an exemplary instance of the whole being determined by the internal
organization of the object, not by external forms indifferent to the object. The internal
organization of twelve-tone composition expressed its truth free of external imposition,
thereby banishing the bourgeois indifference of form to content.
It is a significant point for Adorno’s dialectical approach to music that twelvetone composition did not appear out of nowhere. To those cultural and music critics who
would dismiss Schoenberg’s work as ‘experimental’ Adorno replies there is more
tradition present in his works than in those which overtly claim to be loyal to tradition.
Using Freud’s concept of latent and manifest content he explains why Schoenberg’s
atonal compositions, despite their rejection of traditional musical forms, are liberating the
latent structure buried under two hundred years of manifest content. Adorno claims that
the replacement of harmony and melody with polyphony is making good on the
unfulfilled promise of Classicism. As we have seen, all phenomena is dialectically
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enmeshed with its historical material conditions. The difference between a reified and
dialectical engagement is the openness to memory which only a fearlessly passive subject
can enact.
Schoenberg’s compositions emerged from the decaying bourgeois forms of music,
evidenced already in Beethoven’s later works and Wagner’s chromaticism. The
prolonged dissonance and untidy resolutions in the development section of Beethoven’s
later sonatas signaled the exhaustion and eventual futility of tonal forms. This set a
precedent for Wagner’s extensive use of chromatic scales which never reached full
resolution, but provided just enough harmonic traces to allow the audience familiar
reference points. The impact of the famed Tristan chord from Wagner’s Tristan und
Isolde opera, and the conspicuous refusal to resolve it conventionally cannot be
underestimated. It is reported that the orchestra commissioned to perform the piece was
initially unable to rehearse it because it lacked any of the familiar criteria that would help
them evaluate the correctness of its performance. In this sense Wagner’s music was, at
times, revolutionary. What ultimately impeded the chance to follow through with its
revolutionary beginnings was Wagner’s belief, influenced by Schopenhauer, that music
was an expression of a subjective, irrational truth grounded in the eternal realm of spirit.
This is in direct opposition with Schoenberg’s assertion that the truth expressed in music
had to be objective truth because it was born from the music itself.
One of the implications of this conception of music was that the truth of the
composition could in no way rely on legitimation from the audience. Schoenberg insisted
that aesthetic validity not be determined by the audience’s reaction. It is not difficult to
see the appeal this had for Adorno, who had rejected a crucial aspect of Lukács’ critique
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that had made truth dependent on a collective proletarian consciousness. Schoenberg’s
compositions exemplify Adorno’s dictum that “truth is objective, not plausible.” Unlike
the musical commodities of the culture industry, designed to produce pleasurable effects
in order to satiate the listener’s false needs, the truth-value of a musical composition for
Schoenberg is not subject to the audience’s experience. Adorno explains, “Schoenberg’s
music honors the listener by not making any concession to him.”119 Because there is no
pre-existing external reference point by which the musical piece can be interpreted, the
only path to engagement with Schoenberg’s compositions was through a concentrated
attentiveness to the inner movement and logic of the work. The act of listening in this
way is already subversive for it “sins against the division of life into work and leisure.”120
Adorno acknowledges that Schoenberg’s music requires the opposite of the psychological
regression needed for the consumption of conventional music, and although this restricts
the scale of influence, Schoenberg’s compositions offer a rare opportunity to engage in
praxis. “It requires the listener spontaneously to compose its inner movement and
demands of him not mere contemplation but praxis.”121
Adorno later criticized the devolvement of twelve-tone composition into a closed
system, serving as a warning that he would repeat throughout his life that revolutionary
movements are not invulnerable to the reifying processes of the culture industry. In the
end, twelve-tone composition became nothing more than the “bad heir of tonality.”

119

Adorno, Prisms, 154.

120

Ibid., 150.

121

Ibid.
70

Adorno warns, “to be true to Schoenberg is to warn against all twelve-tone schools.”122
Schoenberg’s complicity with this process began with his declaration of the possibility of
the twelve-tone series to create large forms. The identity of the octave - the only remnant
of tonality allowed within the twelve-tone structure – was increasingly used to this effect,
defeating the initial revolutionary impulse of developing the composition from within the
inner logic of tone rows. By elevating it to the status of a universal objective,
Schoenberg subordinated the twelve-tone method to external categories. When
Schoenberg’s followers continue to employ twelve-tone composition in this way, they
achieve nothing more than an expression of their “impotent longing for security.”123 The
false comforts of the culture industry would fill in the rest.
There are a few final points on Adorno’s aesthetic theory and analysis of
Schoenberg’s music worth considering because of the issues it raises for cultural critique.
Adorno’s writing has been dismissed by some critics as obscure and elitist. But for
Adorno, the essay was as much a dialectical practice as twelve-tone composition.124 His
writing practice attempts to develop thoughts differently from traditional discursive logic
through the refusal to rely on first principles. Although this results in dense and
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seemingly conflicting prose, this is consistent with Adorno’s self-reflexive concept of
critique. Just as the singular value of each note cannot be realized until it is released from
its subjection to external forms, human beings cannot be free when the words that they
use are not free. Adorno argues that “the innermost form of the essay is heresy.”125
Whatever in the object is rendered invisible by thought, is expressed by the guilt of
thought through the negative work of constellating concepts, not through first principles.

Truth and Untruth of the Artwork
“The comprehension of an artwork as a complexion of truth brings the work into
relation with its untruth, for there is no artwork that does not participate in the untruth
external to it, that of the historical moment.”126 The untruth of the artwork is enacted
through its perpetuation of ideology. In the case of music, tonal harmony presents the
ideology of a unified whole that holds no place for dissonance unless it is experienced in
terms of resolution, effectively obstructing any serious consideration of alternatives. The
untruth of ideology becomes increasingly solidified with each repetition and expansion
into different aspects of life. The relation between truth and untruth in any given
phenomenon is never transparent because each dimension emerges through the other.
Untruth moves dialectically. While it is untrue that there are no alternatives to the
prevailing ideology expressed in the artwork, it is true that this is the prevailing socially
constructed worldview. Just as the relevance of each note is determined by its relation to
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a tonal center, the value of each object consists of its fungibility within capital relations.
In this sense, the falseness of ideology is its truth. This is the historical moment in which
the artwork participates. It is always dependent on the technical, material, and musical
norms imbedded within a particular social context. An artwork is true to the extent that it
points to the non-absolute nature of these norms. It illuminates its own falsity that is
concealed through the appearance of immediacy, its conflation of what is with what
ought to be.
This tension between the truth and untruth makes the artwork an enigma rather
than a mystery because it requires interpretation and concentrated engagement rather than
euphoric transcendence, and dialectical struggle in place of escapism. The musical
composition embodies all of these aspects because it is a sedimented object. “All forms
of music…are sedimented contents. In them survives what is otherwise forgotten and is
no longer capable of speaking directly. What once sought refuge in form subsists
anonymously in form’s presence.”127 The musical norms that constitute it are historically
constructed; insofar as they are employed to advance the kind of false unity that conceals
underlying contradictions in society, they enact the repressive function of norms. The
moment of non-identity exposes their historical nature. Non-identity is the expressed
refusal to forget that something is being forgotten and unable to come to expression.
Dissonance can be the expression of this failure. Dissonance is memory. But this must be
understood in terms of reified consciousness that forgets the truth of suffering. That is,
rather than experiencing dissonance as obstructive to an otherwise fulfilling aesthetic
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experience, we are faced with the broken promise of happiness that dissonance reveals.
The untruth of harmony is exposed, negatively, through dissonance as a crack in the
unified whole hinting that what is perhaps is not what should be. The negativity of
dissonance is no more and no less than that. This is a significant point, because it goes
against readings of Adorno that attribute a normative foundation to his work, or that
judge the lack of normative foundations as a fatal deficit. The latter renders negative
dialectics irrelevant for contemporary critique; the former makes it indistinguishable from
other forms of social criticism. There is a third reading which attributes a weak
foundationalism, but this meets the same problems that any attribution of a foundation
evokes, which is a denial of a certain groundlessness that dialectical movement embodies.
What singularly characterizes negative dialectics from other forms of cultural critique is
the ability to name what is wrong without relying on positive criteria for what is right.
The dissonant artwork refuses to participate in the unfreedom and forces of domination
that lull the senses into contentment. Adorno writes, “Art is the ever broken promise of
happiness,”128 and therefore, “art breaks its promise in order to stay true to it.”129
Adorno stated that The Philosophy of New Music was a “detailed excursus” to The
Dialectic of Enlightenment. The fact that music can provide a way to think about the
nature of suffering specific to society attests to the ubiquity of exchange relations and the
reifying relations that emerge from this in all aspects of life. Adorno writes:
How fundamentally disturbed life is today if its trembling and its rigidity are
reflected even where no empirical need reaches, in a sphere that people suppose
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provides sanctuary from the pressures of the harrowing norm, and that indeed
only redeems its promise by refusing what they expect of it.130
Radical modern music breaks the promise of happiness made by the culture
industry; its dissonance illuminates the futility of such a promise. Because this does not
serve the culture industry’s mission to induce pleasure and forgetfulness, society has no
use for new music and it takes on an increasingly obscure role that is commonly viewed
as evidence of its meaninglessness for society. But it is precisely this lack of a
meaningful role which points to the impossibility of unreified experience. Adorno states
that “the isolation of radical modern music is due not to its asocial content but to its
social content.”131 Strangely, its uselessness becomes its purpose, albeit a negative one.
The tension between it and the givenness of the world lends a voice to the suffering of
unfreedom masked as pleasure. New music “has taken all the darkness and guilt of the
world on itself. All its happiness is in the knowledge of unhappiness; all beauty is in
denial of the semblance of the beautiful.”132
New music exposes the whole as false and demands a mode of listening that does
not fetishize the status quo. If it lacks familiar tonal handles (primacy of melody, standard
chord progressions, etc.), the sensuous aspect of unapproachability – the music’s
“prickliness”, may provoke frustration, anger, or a defensive indifference. It will not
cultivate pleasure. But how do we know if negative affective reactions are based on the
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fear of encountering a phenomenon that resists the socially sanctioned ways of being on
which much of our survival depends or are negative reactions based on personal taste?
The answer, Adorno argues, can only be deciphered through dialectical analysis.
Dialectical interpretation reveals the sedimented history in the object, which includes the
emotional reactions it evokes.
The furious listener who wrote his radio station after hearing a performance of
Stockhausen’s Gesang der Junglinge saying that the piece had reminded him of
atom bombs, whereas what he wanted from art was relaxation, exaltation, and
edification, understood more in his subaltern repressiveness than the sophisticated
connoisseur who simply takes note of such music and weighs up its merits in
comparison to those of other products.133
The subaltern repressiveness of this listener bears witness to despair. Although the object
reproduces social structures of oppression, it may also resist that reproduction by giving
voice to the antagonistic experience of unacknowledged contradictions that are the quiet
driving force of society.
The subject’s fearlessly passive engagement with a musical composition, a
philosophical work, or ordinary everyday objects can give voice to the social and
historical experiences that become embedded in the object as its process of coming to be.
This is why interpreting artworks and critiquing the manipulations of the culture industry
cannot be accomplished through cold dialectical analysis. It must also rely on affective
engagement with the object. Art has the potential to qualitatively expand affective
capacity, to challenge and stretch our capacity to be affected. Adorno’s love of music
made it the most accessible object for him to explore the primacy of the object. It is true
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that Adorno thought the non-conceptual form of music could invoke alternative ways of
engaging sense perception and thought. Although I am sympathetic with readings of
Adorno that claim he confined any hope for resistance solely to the encounter with new
(atonal) music,134 I believe that grounding this potential in suffering considerably
expands the range of phenomena that offer potential for respite from reified experience
far beyond music.
I therefore do not mean that people should become merely cold rationalists and
shouldn’t have affects and passions any more. On the contrary, if they have more
affects and more passions, they will have less prejudice. I would like to say, if
they allow themselves more of their affects and passions, if they do not once
again repeat in themselves the pressure that society exerts upon them, then they
will be far less evil, far less sadistic, and far less malicious than they sometimes
are today.135
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CHAPTER THREE: AFFECT THEORY AND PERCEPTION

Introduction
At the beginning of Massumi’s groundbreaking book on affect, Parables of the
Virtual, he states that a theory of affect aims “to put matter unmediatedly back into
cultural materialism along with what seemed most directly corporeal back into the
body.”136 The key to doing this, he explains, is to rethink the body in terms of passage
and movement rather than positionality. He then states: “When it comes to grappling
productively with paradoxes of passage and position, the philosophical precursor is Henri
Bergson.”137 In the nearly two decades that have passed since this writing, Massumi has
drawn from a diverse range of thinkers, including neuroscientists, artists, other affect
theorists, and philosophers. However, it is the influence of Bergson’s legacy that
continues to function as a driving force behind certain aspects of affect theory that play a
critical role in the conflicting theories of affect and negative dialectics. Massumi draws
substantially from Bergson’s thought regarding the paradoxes of passage and how
Bergson works through these paradoxes by developing an ontology of time and memory.
It is from these concepts that Massumi is able to build an argument for affect as the
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source of singularity and change that he contends is missing in cultural theory,
particularly in the approaches of social constructivism and ideology critique.
Massumi’s conclusion that critique always “arrives too late” to effect real change
is based on his interpretation of Bergson’s theory of the becoming of time (the paradox of
passage). The first section of this chapter explores the implications for conceptualizing
time as becoming and movement, emphasizing its primordial status as the source of life
and its ontological priority over space (paradox of positionality). Bergson posits that the
deepest philosophical conundrums can be solved by thinking in terms of time instead of
space. I then examine how Massumi uses this account of time to establish the nonmediated and autonomous nature of affect that he claims can fight neoliberalism on its
own terrain.

Massumi on the Becoming of Time
Bergson’s Concept of Time and Space
Bergson states that “a philosopher worthy of the name has never said more than a
single thing: and even then it is something he has tried to say, rather than actually
said.”138 For Bergson, thinking in terms of time instead of space constituted his “single
thing”. His theories of memory, perception, subjectivity, and change are attempts to
continuously reformulate this distinction between time as the primacy of movement, and
space as a reaction to time. Real movement, he argued, must be understood in a nonspatialized way. Movement should be thought of in terms of a pure time that is
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immeasurable and indivisible; the direct experience of time is duration (dureé), an
irreversible becoming that cannot be repeated. Time is pure heterogeneity. Space
presupposes a homogenous medium in which the world consists of discontinuous,
motionless parts. The conventional approach to time is spatialized because it can be
quantified and reduced to repeatable units. Quantifying time in this way is “a kind of
reaction against that heterogeneity which is the very ground of our experience.”139 In
other words, for Bergson, the becoming of time is the primordial ground of existence. “If
movement is not everything, it is nothing.”140 The idea that movement has ontological
priority over space, positionality, and extension, constitutes what Massumi refers to as
the “Bergsonian revolution that turns the world on its head.”141 Massumi writes: “The
problem is no longer to explain how there can be change given positioning. The problem
is to explain the wonder that there can be stasis given the primacy of process.”142 This
radical insight requires a certain “miraculation”, according to Massumi. Affect theory is
based on this reversal of the relation between movement and positionality where what has
traditionally been posited as secondary is now primary. The ceaseless unfolding of time
cannot be understood or experienced through the immobility of space, and yet time is
usually presented in terms of stable, quantified units that can be manipulated for practical
purposes. The pragmatic spatialization of time is not in itself a problem, as this is
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necessary for everyday functioning. The real issue is mistaking space for time so
completely that the primordial becoming of time is glossed over and does not factor into
philosophical or existential matters.
According to Bergson, the source of the most tenacious philosophical problems
can be traced to a confusion between space and time. Traditional dualisms such as
mind/body, free will/determinism, and knowledge as representation or immediate
experience, are the result of mistaking space for time, of privileging quantitative change
over qualitative change. Spatial distinctions involve differences of degree or number
which assumes the simultaneous existence of mutually external objects. The conditions
that allow for the possibility of counting and measurement consist of a motionless
“reality without quality.”143 Bergson uses the example of counting sheep to illustrate his
point. Although each sheep possesses qualities that uniquely sets it apart from the others,
in order to be counted, only the common element in each sheep is retained. Ignoring the
qualitative differences between individual sheep is a necessary step to ensure the previous
sheep remain - even if only in an ideal space in the mind – so they may be set side by side
in external relation and counted. This juxtaposition of separate sheep forms what Bergson
calls a discrete or numerical multiplicity, a simultaneous existence of discrete entities that
can only occur within the homogenous medium of space.
While the homogenous medium of space necessitates that objects with identical
traits and well-defined external boundaries remain, simultanesously, divided by spatial
intervals, time is processual - it passes. In Time and Free Will Bergson describes the
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nature of inner experience to elucidate the concept of time as the primacy of movement
and becoming. Psychic states, for instance, are singular experiences that cannot be
repeated without changing.144 Because they are not stripped of their qualitative
differences and separated out in space, they form what Bergson refers to as a confused
multiplicity. A discrete multiplicity can be counted, but a confused multiplicity results
from a lack of intervals between states of consciousness and a lack of immobility that
would enable juxtaposition. Bergson explains that “states of consciousness, even when
successive, permeate one another, and in the simplest of them the whole soul can be
reflected.”145 A succession in space is constituted by abstract, numerical, distinctions
which rely on a homogenizing process of reducing material objects to their identical
elements. A succession in time cannot accommodate numerical order because nothing
remains the same from one moment/movement to the next. A qualitative multiplicity
consists of interpenetrating movements that cannot be isolated and compared. Bergson
beautifully describes succession without numerical distinction through the example of
music. The notes in a melody melt into one another. All of the previous notes of a
melody can be perceived in the current note being played, because playing one note from
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the melody in isolation would mean nothing, but prolonging one note changes the whole
of the melody. To think of a note and melody as part to whole requires thinking in
abstract terms of space, because the experience of the note cannot be extracted from the
whole and parsed out among the other notes. This mutual penetration is a qualitative
multiplicity, a temporal, not spatial, succession. This applies to states of consciousness as
well, which is why Bergson is critical of any treatment of psychological states as distinct
units that, if manipulated correctly, can be made to repeat.
It is not a coincidence, Bergson notes, that the law of the impenetrability of matter
- two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time - came about at the same
time as the concept of number. This is a logical necessity of thinking in terms of space
instead of time, but it does not reflect the true nature of the reality of movement and the
becoming of time. As a “reality without quality”, space “enables us to use clean-cut
distinctions, to count, to abstract, and perhaps also to speak.”146 Spatializing movement
and time is essential for language, for functioning in daily life, and it provides the
conceptual tools for scientific knowledge. Strangely, survival depends to a large extent
on the denial of the heterogeneous reality of movement and becoming that undergirds the
world in which humans negotiate their survival.
In Time and Free Will, Bergson explains the difference between space and time
through various dualisms: exterior/interior, objectified positions in space/interpenetrating
movements, immobility/process, quantitative multiplicity/confused multiplicities,
extensity/intensity, and time flown/the flowing forth of time. Bergson also transposes the
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difference between time and space into two kinds of selves: the social self and the
fundamental self which endures through the direct experience of dureé. While the former
ensures our physical and social survival, it is only through the latter that freedom can be
realized.
Below homogenous duration, which is the extensive symbol of true duration, a
close psychological analysis distinguishes a duration whose heterogeneous
moments permeate one another; below the numerical multiplicity of conscious
states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self with well-defined states, a self in
which succeeding each other means melting into one another and forming an
organic whole. But we are generally content with the first, i.e. with the shadow of
the self projected into homogenous space.147
Although it is the confused multiplicity, the succession without quantitative
distinction, that constitutes the real, it is a deeply ingrained habit to spatialize time and
mistake this for the mutual penetration which actually occurs at the heart of things. An
object can be infinitely divided in space, but not a temporal movement or act.148
Movement is indivisible. In space things are interchangeable, can be switched back and
forth, added, subtracted, reversed, and so on, but if something is added or cut off from an
instant of duration, it fundamentally changes in nature. “When the regular oscillations of
the pendulum make us sleepy, is it the last sound heard, the last movement perceived,
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which produces this effect? No, undoubtedly not, for then should not the first have done
the same?”149 The interpenetrating movements of duration cannot be placed in order in
the same way that objects in space can form a line, but they are nevertheless organized.
The notes of a melody and the cumulative movements of the pendulum are organized.
They hang together in a singular way, a continuous multiplicity that cannot be repeated.
The smallest change of a part simultaneously changes the whole, although it would be
more accurate to speak of movements since parts imply distinct entities. There is no thing
that moves, only different movements that connect, overlap, and interpenetrate. “There
are changes, but there are underneath the change no things which change; change has no
need of a support. There are movements, but there is no inert or invariable object which
moves: movement does not imply a mobile.”150 The time of pure movement unreduced to
spatial conditions, only answers to itself. External values such as positions in space, size,
fungibility, are irrelevant to the ceaseless becoming of time.
What follows from the fact that no psychic state can ever be experienced twice is
that no cause ever repeats. Every moment is different because, like the experience of a
note in a melody, it is an accumulation of previous moments. The impact of the last
swing of the pendulum is only possible because of the previous oscillations, none of
which are identical since each oscillation is a singular coalescing of previous movements.
Qualitative multiplicity does not have a linear relation of cause and effect that can be
formulated and repeated, because there is nothing in the nature of time that stands still
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and enables reproduction, nothing that can be put to use to achieve a predetermined end.
Every temporal movement is an expression only of itself.

Affect’s Functional Limitations
The central thrust of Massumi’s theory of affect is based on Bergson’s depiction
of non-spatialized time. Affect is pure movement unencumbered by spatial conditions,
but Massumi retains movement as a sense of time. This will turn out to be important in
his reconfiguration of subjectivity and the body, for traditionally the subject was
understood as a stable identity that endured through time. Massumi uses time to
challenge this account of subjectivity. It cannot be pinned down by concepts or put to use
for purposes that do not directly emerge through it. In other words, affect cannot be
mediated in any way without losing the qualities which make it what it is. Affect is
inaccessible under spatial conditions. It is an autonomous source of existence that cannot
assimilate into the world of linear causality (spatialized time) and quantifying perceptions
(space) without changing its fundamental nature. The existent world as we know it
consists of affect that has been captured and coded through the structured formations of
subjectivity, language, rationality, and capitalist relations. It is a world understood and
constructed through the conditions of space as Bergson defined it. Massumi refers to
these structured formations as “functional limitations” of affect that are necessary for
everyday existence. This is a significant point. The functional limitations of affect are
not arbitrary or simply fortuitous; we cannot exist without them. Nobody lives in pure
affect.
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And yet, it is not possible to conceive of affect without relying on the structures of
capture that affect is the condition for. I argue that this dependence of affect on the
actualized objects that emerge from it is one of the reasons that affect is not autonomous
as Massumi claims. Just as Kant’s transcendental subject is inconceivable apart from the
empirical subject and from the traits traditionally attributed to the objects (enduring
identity) it is a condition for, the ahistorical autonomy of affect cannot be conceived of
outside of the capacities that are indispensable to neoliberal capitalist exchange relations.
Massumi’s preoccupation with the new, the productivity of becoming, and the autonomy
of affect, coincides with the vaunted self-sufficiency of the entrepreneurial subject, but
Massumi argues this is precisely what makes affect theory a formidable force for change.
Adorno would be highly critical of this elision, pointing out any number of
contradictions. For instance, what counts as creativity in an exchange society is that
which reproduces more of the same under the guise of difference. Entrepreneurs seek out
new market sectors comprised of differences that resist commodification but stimulate
consumer interest, not in spite of their resistance but because of it. However, Massumi
insists this is precisely why theorizing affect instead of critiquing ideology meets
capitalism on its own terrain because it has more potential to redirect the way power
operates if it engages the same field of tendencies. Affect modulates affect. Processing
contradiction may transform symbols and meaning (spatialized reactions to time), but it
has as little chance of impacting the ceaseless becoming of time as the possibility of
tasting food through watching the cooking channel. This is not an exaggerated analogy.
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Massumi insists that critique is indeed this far removed from the fundamental workings
of reality. Bergson warns:
Just as nothing will be found homogeneous in duration except a symbolical
medium with no duration at all, namely space, in which simultaneities are set out
in line, in the same way no homogeneous element will be found in motion except
that which least belongs to it, the traversed space, which is motionless.151
The autonomy of affect, which for Massumi marks the decisive turning point for
cultural theory, is established through the distinction between time and space, of no
longer mistaking the illusion of movement in terms of the space traversed for the pure
movement/becoming of time. The definitive trait that affect shares with time is
uncertainty. Affect is always in a state of becoming, of moving, unactualized potentiality.
Massumi often refers to it as barely perceptible, or “smaller than the smallest perceivable
moment” because it cannot be accessed by objectifying structures of perception.
However, this does not make affect any less real. In fact, Massumi’s book, Ontopower:
War, Powers, and the State of Perception, is an examination of how the United States
military has found a way to tap into affect’s ontological power of becoming to fight the
war on terror. By transforming the habitual powers of perception that can only operate
under the conditions of space (as Bergson defines it), the military has developed
strategies to change perception based on the evasive, always-on-the-move nature of
affect. The uncertainty that lies at the heart of affect paradoxically becomes the objective
primary reference point for the war on terror and has created a sea change in what counts
as threat. Empirical evidence of a threat means that it has already actualized, but what if
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the threat can be perceived before it actually emerges? If it has not yet emerged how can
it be considered a threat? These are the questions that a theory of affect is equipped to
address. The following section presents Massumi’s analysis of the logic and strategies
introduced by Bush and Rumsfeld, and continued into the Obama administration, to
legitimize and implement their war on terror. The crucial part of his argument centers on
the affective realm of uncertainty and its power of ontological becoming that drives
military operations. It also sets the stage for similarly analyzing neoliberalism as
powered by affective uncertainty and risk in a way that previous forms of capitalism were
not.

Ontopower
In his work, Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception, Massumi
explains how Bush’s war on terror operated through the affective principle of uncertainty
and transformed it into the most powerful operative logic of our current political era:
preemption. This approach to stopping terrorism was based on the premise that by the
time a clear and present danger could be detected, it would already be too late. The Bush
administration developed a policy which effected a qualitative shift in military strategy to
perceive and take out threats before they emerged. This had the added benefit of never
being wrong, because perceiving the potential of a threat did not require objective
evidence. For instance, even after it was an established fact that Suddam Hussein was not
in possession of weapons of mass destruction, Bush never admitted that the decision to
invade Iraq was wrong. Although the objective reason given for the war in Iraq, the
existence of weapons of mass destruction, turned out to be untrue, Bush refused to
89

acknowledge that it was a gross mistake to have invaded a country based on empirically
false information. His reasoning was that if Saddam Hussein had had the opportunity to
own weapons of mass destruction he would undoubtedly have used them, so it was
necessary to invade Iraq given the potential of this threat. This created a sea change in
the definition of what constitutes clear and present danger. Danger is already present.
Threat hovers over the horizon, unseen and unactualized.
From a preemptive standpoint, if you feel a threat, then it is a threat, and the best
way to fight it is to incite its emergence from its indeterminate state of potentiality into an
active form. Rumsfeld’s famous distinction between the “known unknown” and the
“unknown unknown” is crucial for the operative logic of preemption. The unknown
unknown refers to the nature of terrorism as a proliferative but unspecified threat. “The
most effective way to fight an unspecified threat is to actively contribute to producing
it,”152 Massumi explains, so that the threat can emerge and be detected in a determinate
form that can be dealt with. Terrorism operates through a decentralized network (there is
no identifiable national army), and the form of attacks are always changing – anthrax,
bombs, mass shootings, vehicular terrorist attacks. Therefore, the best way to detect the
next attack is to incite the conditions of its emergence and stop it before it actualizes.
Although this may actually be a more effective way to fight terrorism than the traditional
approaches of mobilizing a large military with better weapons, it requires that the state
adopt terrorist tactics. Massumi writes, “You cannot engage the enemy if the situation is
so asymmetrical that there is no ground in common to serve as a battlefield. You have to
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become, at least in part, what hates you and what you hate back. You have to undertake a
becoming-terrorist of your own.”153 This is the operative logic of preemption, a
conditional logic of ‘could-have, would-have’. Importantly, it does not rely on objective
evidence (empirical proof of possession of weapons of mass destruction) but rather on
objective uncertainty. The terrorist may or may not possess weapons for an attack, but if
he could have access to them, he would use them. This could-would logic of pre-emption
is not confined to military strategy. It seeped into the domestic realm through Bush’s
color-coded terror alert system which kept the population affectively primed through fear.
Massumi notes that the colors which signaled low threat – blue and green – were rarely if
ever used, orange being the most commonly presented color. This had the effect of
instilling enough fear to keep the population in “affective attunement”, without being
provided with any content. “A threat is only a threat if it retains an indeterminacy.”154
Massumi continues, “When a government mechanism makes threat its business, it is
taking this virtuality as its object and adopting quasi-causality as its mode of operation.
That quasi-causal operation goes by the name of security. It expresses itself in signs of
alert.”155
Preemption combines the epistemological and ontological realms, creating a way
to perceive a threat before it emerges by catalyzing or flushing it out of its state of
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potential. Preemption is a form of ontopower – the power to incite the emergence of
what needs to be contained.
Ontopower is not a negative power, a power-over. It is a power-to; a power to
incite and orient emergence that insinuates itself into the pores of the world where
life is just stirring, on the verge of being what it will become, as yet barely there.
It is a positive power for bringing into being (hence the prefix “onto”).156
Preemption is not prevention because it does not rely exclusively on the ability to analyze
empirical data in order to determine a linear cause of the problem. Massumi remarks that
prevention does not have its own ontology and consequently runs on “borrowed
power.”157 It is a retroactive engagement with an object that already exists determinately.
For instance, the prevention of homelessness works on a fully determined object. If the
predominant cause of homelessness is determined to be unemployment, then preventative
measures will involve political programs designed and implemented by the logic of
specific domains, such as labor and education. Prevention and preemption both aim to
stop something, but preemption works by intervening at the level of emergence, and
prevention must apply external measures from pre-existing fields. One brings something
into being, the other manipulates what is already in being.
Massumi argues that the general concept of preemption is as old as war itself. But
whereas the nature of danger is that it is already present, as in “clear and present danger”,
the nature of threat is unactualized potential. It is a “futurity” that acts in the present
through the perception/action of threat that has not yet even emerged. “The preemptive
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problem of how to perceive change, and how to do so in potential – which is to say, in an
interval smaller than the smallest historically perceivable – is disturbingly fresh.”158 The
disturbingly fresh element here is time as Bergson defines it: distinct from space, but not
from the movement of becoming. The operative logic of preemption weaponizes time,
because “it is necessary not only to perceive potential, but to perceive it before the enemy
perceives your perceiving it – or even perceives itself on the verge of an event. A
perceptual arms race ensues.”159
The capacity to perceive potential that is on the verge of actualizing requires a
speed of engagement that is not possible with conscious cognition. Only the body can
process this kind of movement, occurring in an interval smaller than the smallest
perceivable. Only the body can be primed for “readiness potential”160 or “embodied
unknowing”161 that operates in the affective field of becoming. The body however, is
already a problematic concept. What counts as a body figures into what counts as a
subject, which is almost always entangled with the concept of agency. Massumi argues
that the kind of body needed for the perception/action of incipience does not match the
modern notion of the human body as a substantial entity that acts on intention. Massumi
prefers to think of the body as “bare activity” that is astir before actualizing into a subject
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or individual capable of conscious intention. The question of affect asks not what a body
is, but what it can do. How can the body become a perceiving of change? The military’s
mission “to contract all of war into the micro-interval of perception, in order to re-factor
its power potential,”162 requires a reconceptualization of what a body is and what a body
can do. Massumi’s examination of two military documents published at the turn of the
millennium, Network Centric Warfare and Power to the Edge, illustrates the
transformation of military strategies towards the priming of non-conscious perception in
military bodies.163 Ideally, this would transform the military itself into a selfsynchronizing body capable of engaging in network-centric warfare, where the hierarchy
between command and control is so flattened that decision-making and execution can
occur at the level of ontogenetic movement. Those typically placed at the bottom of the
hierarchy (human and non-human) who await orders, are empowered to act as quickly as
a threat is perceived, effectively blurring the lines between action and perception.
Network-centric strategies enable rapid, horizontal reconfigurations that can
communicate as quickly as they act. This marks a qualitative shift from platform-centric
warfare which relies on the mobilization of large sections of the military. This “frictional
force-against-force”164 assumes a symmetry of battle amongst nation-state entities that
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does not apply to the battle against terrorism. The asymmetrical warfare of terrorism
requires bodies that can operate directly in the interval behind or beneath (spatial terms
are always problematic but unavoidable) or before (spatialized term for time) empirically
actualized historical moments. Massumi defines the animating force of this interval as
“transhistorical” and “nonlocal” to emphasize the difference between becoming and
history, or time and space.
Ontopower, the power to bring into being, is activated through perception.
Perceptual cueing, micro-perceptions, perception attacks, perception/action – all of these
rely on the capacity to engage with the interval between becoming and being. The
smaller than the smallest perceivable does not refer to size but to speed. The interval is
barely perceivable because it is a becoming-movement that is nearly impossible to detect
and requires capacities of somatic sensing that contradict habitual perceptions of space
and immobility. In a world that privileges quantification and classificatory logic rooted in
spatial conditions, this kind of movement is not even on the radar. This is why
perception of the smallest perceivable interval requires, as Massumi puts it, a capacity for
“embodied unknowing” – a task, I will argue, that is significantly more challenging than
Massumi acknowledges. (The difficulties encountered with this will be explained later
on.) Nonetheless, it is this kind of perception that holds the potential for resistance to
neoliberal capitalist power. Ontopower is not a power-over but a power of bringing to
be. The war on terror and the operative logic of preemption is one example of how
ontopower works. It also illustrates Massumi’s larger point that ontopower can only be
transformed or resisted by another ontopower. The workings of neoliberalism are
ontogenetic, inciting the emergence of differences that can be commodified. Massumi
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argues that this account of neoliberalism diverges from critiques that focus on the
homogenizing powers of capitalism which assume a power-over model of conformism.
Resistance can only emerge through a counter-ontopower. Tapping into the confused
multiplicity of temporal becoming could invoke new ways of being that lie outside of
capitalist relations.
Every ontopower has its own logic. The operative logic of preemption is a selflegitimizing process. The invasion of Iraq was not wrong because it was based on
affective facts instead of objective empirical facts. Saddam Hussain would always pose a
threat to American security because if he were presented with the means to attack the
United States, he would use it. He would if he could. Just because he did not have the
means did not eliminate the threat he posed. That is an affective fact. Preemptive logic
has justified other actions such as the Patriot Act, mass surveillance of U.S. citizens, and
domestic policing techniques. These all engage in the self-legitimizing logic based on the
affective fact of threat. Massumi argues that preemption and neoliberalism have a
symbiotic relationship. They share a common goal of American security, and they pursue
this through using the affective power of uncertainty. A counter-ontopower would bring
about different affective facts and require a different logic. Preemption is selflegitimizing and weaponizes time. Neoliberal capitalism commodifies everything,
including and especially dissent. A counter-ontopower would operate at the level of
emergence, placing perception in the smaller than smallest perceivable interval to foster
certain potentials and not others through the quasi-causality of priming. Any tendencies
that emerge and remain self-affirming, in other words, are not put to work to extract
surplus value in the form of capital, pose a threat to neoliberal ontopower: “You could
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even say that every tendency arising in the capitalist field is adventitious to the extent that
it affirms itself…Such tendencies are passional: that is the best word for a movement that
affirms its own occurring.”165 This does not make them invulnerable to the apparatuses of
capture – some may seem more amenable to appropriation than others – but fostering
these potentials at the level of emergence engages “the battle on the only terrain there is:
becoming.”166 Seen from the theory of ontopower that operates directly in the register of
affect, neoliberal apparatuses of capture seek the emergence of difference, even if it
comes in the form of crises. In contrast, conformity feeds off of what has already taken
determinate form.
If affect is the ground of our existence, the source of ontopower, how can we
place ourselves in this interval smaller than the smallest perceivable? If that is where the
real power of existence lies, how can it be accessed? Massumi claims that “priming” the
conditions of emergence is the predominant, perhaps only, method for doing so. Priming
relies on the capacity to directly perceive time, to sense the movement that moves too
rapidly for conscious cognition but not for the body. Massumi uses the terms “priming”
and “affective attunement” interchangeably because they both involve a concept of
perception that is more powerful, but also more nebulous, than the consciousness of the
subject. In order to understand how exactly perception works in Massumi’s theory of
affect, we will once again turn to the writings of Bergson.

165

Massumi, The Principle of Unrest, 26-27.

166

Massumi, Ontopower, 244.
97

Perception is Subtractive
Bergson defines perception in terms of action, not knowledge. The debate
between idealism and realism is about knowledge. How do we know what we know?
How do we do know if what we know is true? How is knowledge justified? When we
perceive an object, are we perceiving the actual object or a representation of it? What is
the nature of matter? The question about perception is rooted in a dualistic impasse
between mind and matter that has only been able to be addressed thus far by privileging
one over the other. According to Bergson, realism reduces mind to matter, and idealism
reduces matter to mind. As long as perception is assumed to be about knowledge, this
impasse will never be resolved. Bergson argues that the problem itself is a badly posed
question and needs to be restated. Instead of using the epistemologically laden terms
traditionally employed in reference to perception - thing, appearance, representation Bergson proposes the term ‘image’. “And by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence which
is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the
realist calls a thing; an existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the
‘representation’.”167 Everything is an image. Matter is an aggregate of images. The body
is an image. The brain is also an image. Interiority and exteriority concern relations
among images.
Using the concept of ‘image’ allows for a conception of perception in terms of
action instead of conscious reflection or representation. “Perception, understood as we
understand it, measures our possible action upon things, and thereby, inversely, the
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possible action of things upon us.”168 Notice there is nothing in this statement that relates
perception to truth or the reality of objects. The totality of matter consists only of images.
Each image “gathers and transmits the influences of all the points of the material
universe.”169 The body, however, is a privileged image because while it can transmit
movement like all other images, it has the capacity to react to certain images or parts of
images and remain indifferent to others which hold no interest for it. Generally, the
influence images have on one another is determined by the laws of nature. But the image
of the body can execute eventual reactions/movement on the objects surrounding it; the
images within the body’s horizon reflect the body’s virtual but not pre-determined action
on them. The important point here is that nothing is added to the images. Perception
isolates or subtracts certain parts of the totality of given images. “For it is possible to sum
up our conclusions as to pure perception by saying that there is in matter something more
than, but not something different from, that which is actually given.”170 The body, as the
center of action, receives and gives back movement. The brain, also an image, cannot add
anything to the stimuli it receives from the channels of the nervous system. Bergson
compares the brain to a telephonic exchange. Its only function is to transmit movement
either by delaying or redirecting it centrifugally through the nerves back to the periphery.
In reconceptualizing perception as action, the brain is no longer seen as the place where
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representations reside. Pure perception, “whereby we place ourselves in the very heart of
things”171 is “a system of nascent acts which plunges roots deep into the real.”172
The subtractive element of perception is a major theme in Massumi’s work and
has far-reaching implications for concepts such as volition and agency that are often
associated with the subject. Agency, Massumi argues, is overrated because it is added on
after the fact, occurring first in the body, as Bergson’s account of the body shows, and
only later as conscious thought. Massumi illustrates this point by citing the results of
Libet’s neuroscientific experiment that identified a half-second lapse between physical
stimulation of the body and conscious awareness. Subjects were instructed to flex a finger
and then indicate the moment when they chose to do so. The readings from the EEG
machine they were hooked up to displayed brain activity for this action a half-second
before it reached consciousness. Libet concluded that conscious decisions are preceded
by brain activity that suggests the decision was already made before it reached the
threshold of consciousness. The results of this experiment corroborate Bergson’s theory
that perception is subtractive.173 In order to be functional, something must be selected
from the totality of images and movements. For Libet, conscious decision is not additive;
it is an expression or response to a movement already underway. The response can
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consist either of a veto or agreement to the work that has already been performed through
the body/brain. Conscious intention is secondary to this process.
It should be noted in particular that during the mysterious half second, what we
think of as “free,” “higher” functions, such as volition, are apparently being
performed by autonomic, bodily reactions occurring in the brain but outside of
consciousness, and between brain and finger but prior to action and expression.174
Massumi explains, “Will and consciousness are subtractive. They are limitative,
derived functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed.”175 The
half-second experiment attests to the imperceptible movement of the body that occurs too
quickly to be registered. The non-conscious perception that military bodies are being
primed to experience – the smaller than smallest perceivable interval – is based on the
principle of perception as movement and as subtractive action. Bergson states, “What you
have to explain, then, is not how perception arises, but how it is limited, since it should
be the image of the whole, and is in fact reduced to the image of that which interests
you.”176

Affective Critique of Neurotypical Perception
The strong emphasis on the body in affect theory, and Massumi’s goal to put what
seems “most directly corporeal back into the body,”177 has elicited responses from a wide
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variety of disciplines that focus on theorizing the body. I will explore one area in
particular that has developed through dialogue with Massumi’s concept of the body
which is the critique of neurotypicality in disability theory. Similar to Massumi, this area
of study addresses the ontological priority of the body and explains perception in terms of
movement rather than representation or discourse. It also views neuroscience as an
important interlocutor. The critique of neurotypical perception, which is perception
conditioned for space rather than time, is presented in The Minor Gesture, written by Erin
Manning, a longtime colleague and collaborator with Massumi and affect theorist in her
own right.
Manning describes neurotypicality as a form of foundational identity politics that
fixes the body in alignment with a world pre-defined through space, a world already
“chunked” into individuals and discrete objects. Neurotypicality assumes a determined
form of the subject as sovereign, rational, and most importantly, as the source of agency.
Manning asks, “What if instead we approached this question of how body and world cocompose from the perspective that “finding” the body in time and space is a learned
experience?”178 Massumi’s definition of affect as a bodily capacity to affect and be
affected is based on the inseparability of the body from the ontological becoming of time.
The inherent relationality of the body makes it a center of indetermination that can
perceive/act before it molds to the imperatives of a neurotypical world.
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Manning follows this question with another that references Bergson’s
conception of movement. “What if we followed Bergson’s account…concerning the
functioning of “continuous movement,” thereby questioning our presuppositions about
what is voluntary?” (Manning, The Minor Gesture, 113).
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Autism is now commonly characterized as a mode of being that is neurodiverse.
This is a pointedly more neutral, less tragic way of describing autism than the standard
account given in neuropsychology that classifies autism as a pathology. It is a pathology
marked by the inability to affect and be affected in normative ways in relation to other
human beings, manifesting in antisocial behaviors that range from a discomforting
avoidance of eye contact to violent outbursts that result in injury to self and others.
Individuals with autism display what is commonly interpreted by neurotypicals as a
disturbing lack of empathy that is detrimental to daily functioning and relationships.
Manning however, contests this account of the affectless body of the autistic.179 If
anything, autistics are too relational - with everything. This often results in privileging
objects or the environment as much as or more than, humans. In autistic perception there
is, initially, no separation of the self from the environment, because it “foregrounds
mobility, and to cut into this mobility is singularly difficult.”180 Already we can see why
this account of autistic perception offers a way of thinking through the ontological
priority of time/movement as constitutive of perception. Massumi insists that while
affect is pre-individual it is not asocial. “Affect, as the openness to being affected, is
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directly relational. It is pure sociality, in the sense of the social in the openness of its
incipiency, ready to become all manner of social forms and contents.”181 In autistic
perception, there is a hypersensitivity to the field of relationality and the co-composition
occurring through body and world. It is extremely difficult for autistics to translate, for
instance, movement across contexts. This is not hard for neurotypicals because they
habitually parse and generalize experience in order to repeat it. But autistic perception is
movement of “experience in the making.”182 It does not halt and reflect; it does not act
like a subject with volition. It is, as Bergson explains pure perception, a movement
“whereby we place ourselves in the very heart of things.”183 The reason this is so
disconcerting for neurotypicals is that placing oneself in the very heart of things entails a
way of being that is non-voluntary and compulsive, a body acting in ways not directed by
a conscious, rational subject. A common neurotypical complaint is that autistic bodies
move too much and often programs are implemented to minimize these movements. In a
neurotypical world, autistic movement appears as a lack of agency and is therefore at best
not taken seriously and at worst treated as pathological behavior.
Autistic perception troubles the concept of agency and autonomy. In the moment
of stimulus, there is just the agency of the event, or as Manning calls it, “agencement”.
What is viewed as inattention and poor impulse control by neurotypicals is described by
autistics as a feeling of aliveness and intensity. It is not a coincidence that Massumi
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frequently defines affect as intensity and relation. “I think there can be another notion of
autonomy that has to do more with how you can connect to others and to other
movements, how you can modulate those connections, to multiply and intensify them.”184
Put another way, Massumi refers to affect as “being right where you are – more
intensely.”185 In autistic perception there is no sense of individual volition because there
is no feeling of “where the body ends and the world begins.”186 It is more intimately
caught up in pre-conscious activities, moving on the cusp of the virtual and the actual.
The autistic is not constantly trying to manage experience because she is openly engaged
in the making of it. “This makes the field lively with attention, an attention that affects
the you you are becoming.”187

The Need for Memory
The body is always in movement, or in passage, and as such is constitutionally
indeterminate. However, this does not answer the question of why some movements pass
without delay through the nervous system and the brain and then back out onto the
images that provoked the stimulus, and why other movements are delayed. According to
Bergson, the gap between stimulus and response created by the temporary delay of
movement by the brain, is what makes bodies “centers of indetermination”. The higher
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the complexity of the nervous system in an organism, the wider the gap between stimulus
and reaction. Bergson argues this is why humans have a greater potential for different
responses to stimuli than jellyfish. When a jellyfish is poked, the reaction is
instantaneous. There is practically no difference between stimulus and response. The
reason humans have the ability to choose what action will follow the reception of a
stimulus is because there is a more significant gap in between.
The answer to the question of how movement or perception is directed is provided
through the concept of memory. It is memory that comes forward to meet perception in
the gap. Bergson explains that there is in fact no such thing as pure perception. This is a
theoretical construct Bergson employs to develop an understanding between the
difference in kind between perception and memory. It counteracts the traditional account
of memory that relegates it to faded version of perception, a difference in degree.
Perception is always oriented toward action and not knowledge, but it needs memory to
guide how movement is returned or redirected. The body is a center of indetermination
because it is the gap where the virtuality of memory and the action of perception meet.
Pure memory is the storehouse of all past experience. It is not located in the brain
because it is not an image and cannot be contained by an image. Its virtual status is
different in kind from the actuality of matter or images and therefore cannot be abolished
or compromised if there is damage to the brain. Because memory is usually thought of as
a weaker version of perception, it is difficult to fully appreciate the crucial role that
Bergson gives it in our moment-to-moment existence. A common obstacle to accepting
that memory has as much ontological reality as perception is that memory is never fully
present in our consciousness. Why, Bergson asks, is there no difficulty attributing
106

existence to objects that are not within our perception, (I know that my front yard exists
even when I am at work thirty miles away), but we cannot attribute the same weight of
reality to memories and the past? Reframing the question of memory in terms of time
and space eliminates this problem. This is a crucial point for Massumi as well. Affect
theory posits that it is the unseen, non-spatial, pre-conscious, realm that holds the
strongest potential for change and is therefore the realm that we should strive to connect
with to effect political change and to simply feel more alive. Confining reality to what is
present and actualized through the conditions of space is a prison of our own making.
Because perception cannot add content, it must rely on memory to direct its action.
Perception is always already poised toward the future –each movement measuring our
possible action on things – and is always already engaged in the past. In this sense, the
present does not hold the kind of weighty significance that is habitually assumed by
common sense notions of the present and contemporary calls to “be in the now”.
Bergson’s reframing of memory and perception in terms of time and space rejects this
valorization of the present. “You define the present in an arbitrary manner as that which
is, whereas the present is simply what is being made. Nothing is less than the present
moment.”188 Perception is so crucially engaged with the past that it begs the question not
of how can we can account for memory, but rather how is it that we forget?189 The role of
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memory cannot be underestimated. Perception, Bergson concludes, is really just an
excuse for memory.
Memory, however, must become entangled with the movement of perception in
order to actualize, to become embodied in the world. Unlike perception, memory cannot
act, because “it is from the sensori-motor elements of present action that a memory
borrows the warmth which gives it life.”190 Memory needs perception for life, vitality. It
needs a body. Bergson explains that memory “is continually pressing forward, so as to
insert the largest possible part of itself into the present action”.191 Without the action of
perception, memory is useless. However, its impotence in relation to action in the world
is what allows the whole of memory to be perfectly preserved in its absolute singularity,
because it is not determined by utilitarian needs of survival and daily functioning. Every
moment/movement of duration passes (such is the nature of the becoming of time) but the
past is never abolished. Bergson states that “its essence is to bear a date, and
consequently to be unable to occur again.”192
This leads to a crucial question. If the past is incapable of repeating, and
perception wholly relies on memory to direct its action, how is it that memory and
perception interact at all? How does the past repeat itself in the present? Perception
needs memory and the “lessons of experience” to guide its movements and ensure
survival. How does perception call forth memories (which in their virtual state are by
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nature useless,) that will become useful in the present moment? How do two dimensions
that are different in kind remain in active relation?
Bergson posits that the mutual engagement of perception and memory is based on
recognition. The figure sketched by the movement of perception attracts memories that
most effortlessly fit its shape. The memory that most closely resembles the image
outlined by perception will come forward to “graft itself on an attitude or a
movement.”193 If there are aspects of the image that are not adequately responded to,
then other planes of memories will be drawn forth to insert themselves into the
perception, enlarging and enriching the perception, which in turn calls upon more
detailed memories. Bergson describes this circuit of perception and memory in terms of
tension. The more a plane of memory contracts to fit into a perception, the less of its
qualities, tones, or contextual nuances are able to come through. In other words, the
tighter the contraction the more generalized and impersonal the form of memory becomes
and therefore the more amenable it is to materializing into action. Bergson explains that
“to act is just to induce this memory to shrink, or rather to become thinned and
sharpened, so that it presents nothing thicker than the edge of a blade to actual
experience, into which it will thus be able to penetrate.”194 Largely dilated planes of
memory are the most fugitive and obscure because they are farther removed from the
demands of action and utility. Bergson concludes that these memories require a greater
arrestment of movement to come forth. The dreaming that occurs during sleep is the
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most extreme example of this. “To call up the past in the form of an image, we must be
able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to
value the useless, we must have the will to dream.”195

Priming
The interaction of memory and perception is foundational for affect theory
because it provides the conceptual framework for understanding the method of priming.
Massumi identifies priming as the method of ontopower in that it cultivates the capacity
to perceive the smaller than smallest perceivable moment before potentialities actualize.
“Priming is the royal way to the modulation of events before they happen.”196 Priming is
where affect theory is enacted. But what is it exactly? What gets primed? Is it the mind,
the body, thoughts, emotions, or physical environment? Massumi’s claim that there are
countless pre-conscious primes in every instant seems to equate primes with virtual
tendencies, but priming is supposed to work on these tendencies, not be them. Massumi
puzzlingly also describes primes sometimes as conscious maneuvers. Given that preconscious and conscious dimensions are differences in kind, priming becomes an
inherently ambiguous concept. However, what priming does is less ambiguous than what
counts as priming. Priming inflects the parameters or context in which tendencies arise.
It is essentially concerned with “situational emphasis” and indirect forms of influence.
Another term to express this indirect approach is cuing. Cues operate in an open-ended
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situation which does not shut out the complexity of underlying tendencies. Cuing pokes
the event but does not determine it. While this results in less control over the outcome,
the payoff is that it “brings something to life in the situation rather than carving away at
life to make it conform or mold.”197 Priming does not impose, it cultivates. Direct
intervention operates externally as a negative control, but priming constitutes an
affirmative approach that is immanent to the true potential(s) of the situation. In this
sense, priming is a “mechanism of ontopower”198 because it moves within the incipiency
of actions and indeterminate objects taking form. It cues the field of emergence.
Massumi has identified priming as the royal road to inciting the only kind of change that
matters. Where is the true potential for change? It is not located in the realm of space
where everything is already actualized and subversive acts have been pre-coded by the
conditions of emergence. Qualitative change can only occur from the zone of
indeterminacy where potentials can still be modulated because they have not yet taken
form.
As the method of ontopower, priming gives a sort of ontological nudge to the
field(s) from which potentialities emerge and eventually actualize. Because it does not
move linearly, its power is quasi-causal or modulatory. It inflects, tweaks, and fosters in
order to move within the ontological uncertainty of the gap between the virtual and actual
fields. Reducing the zone of indetermination to a passive-active relation presupposes
some very limiting concepts about relationality and causality, mainly that entities pre-
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exist their interaction. Karen Barad’s concept of “intra-action” offers a helpful
framework for thinking through the nature of relationality that characterizes affect. It is
worth quoting at length.
That is, in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which assumes that there are
separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intraaction recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through,
their intra-action. It is important to note that the “distinct” agencies are only
distinct in a relational not an absolute sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in
relation to their mutual entanglement; they don’t exist as individual elements.199
The ontological entanglement of intra-action enacts a causality that is not linear; it does
not depend on a causality that operates with distinct, isolated entities in passive-active
relation, distinguished by concepts of absolute exteriority and interiority. Intra-action
directly relates to the performative nature of change: “…matter is a dynamic
expression/articulation of the world in its intra-active becoming. All bodies, including
but not limited to human bodies, come to matter through the world’s iterative intraactivity – its performativity.”200 Because nothing is pure cause or pure effect, there is no
center to agency, and what comes to matter literally is the doing or becoming of matter.
Intra-activity is performative all the way down.
To be clear, the zone of indeterminacy is not the entirety of virtual reality even
though the virtual realm is by definition indeterminate. The zone of indeterminacy is the
gap between the actual and virtual, perception and memory, conscious and pre-conscious,
but more importantly, and as a starting point that should not be overlooked, the zone of
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indeterminacy is Bergson’s depiction of the gap between stimulus and response. This last
understanding of the zone must be met with cautious qualification. I share Massumi’s
concern that the stimulus-response model risks presenting an oversimplified account of a
highly complex and always changing relation between affecting and being affected. But
inasmuch as human beings have the capacity to delay the movement between stimulus
and response, they have the potential to change the course of action. When Bergson
speaks of the ability to “withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment”, he is
referring to this delay of movement between stimulus and response that ultimately can
evoke a flow of fugitive memories that come to life and enrich perception in new ways.
However, Massumi’s enthusiasm to engage the creativity and openness that lies at the
heart of affect underestimates the initial interruption of perception that makes the delay
between stimulus and response possible in the first place. The rhetorical effects of
Massumi’s writing on affect theory generate a dizzying sense of a reality brimming over
with microshocks, the ceaseless movement of pre-conscious forces, and intense flashes of
the Real occurring at imperceptible speeds.201 What gets lost in the allure of the reeling,
imperceptible present that has become so central to affect theory is the inaugural
withdrawal from the action of the moment. It is difficult to imagine how stepping back is
even possible when the present that has already passed in the mysterious half second is
forever out of reach. “For the present is lost with the missing half second, passing too
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quickly to be perceived, too quickly, actually, to have happened.”202 How does one
withdraw from the action of the moment that has already happened? Priming is able to
operate within this paradox of time because it does not rely on linear causality. For
Massumi, stepping back from the action of the moment entails stepping into flows of
becoming that are already underway.

Priming and Subjectivity
Massumi states that the effectiveness of priming as a method of ontopower is
based on “the individual’s susceptibility to its own tendential infra-churnings and, on the
other, on its openness to the situation - the individual’s bipolar affectability.”203 This
statement highlights an issue that is central to both affect theory and critical theory – the
formation and role of subjectivity. Some theorists argue that the posthuman turn in
cultural theory has troubled the concept of subjectivity so radically that it is no longer a
relevant tool for analysis in contemporary discourses addressing issues such as
globalization, technology, new materialism, or critiques of capitalism. The autonomous,
rational subject of modernity is unable to engage with the vitality of matter (resulting in
irreversible damage to the environment), and it refuses to acknowledge its ontological
entanglements with non-human natures (animals or other humans who are deemed less
human because of disability, race, gender, etc.). From this perspective, the modern
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subject is generally considered to be a cultural dead-end, obstructive to both creativity
and an affective openness to life.
Massumi identifies with these critiques of the subject and states that the
explanatory power of affect theory is based on a rejection of human-centric subjectivity
and its supporting dualisms of mind/body and nature/culture. The potential for political
and social change that affect theory offers requires a subjectivity-without-a-subject.204
Massumi’s subject is flattened out; it has no psychological interiority that anchors the
subject as a unified center of experience. Any conventional attributes of subjectivity are
mechanisms of capture and closure of affect. Feelings, for example, are too personal, too
bounded by a private interiority to accommodate the transversal flows and intensities of
affect. An emotion is a meaning-making activity, Massumi explains, a qualification of
affect, a “sociolinguistic fixing of an experience.”205 “It only draws on a limited selection
of memories and only activates certain reflexes or tendencies…”206 Affect, on the other
hand, operates through a different logic. Massumi repeatedly states that “it is crucial to
theorize the difference between affect and emotion. If some have the impression that
affect has waned, it is because affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable or
recognizable and is thus resistant to critique.”207
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Another attribute traditionally belonging to the subject is cognition. According
to Massumi, cognition and volition arrive too late. Like emotion, cognition and volition
also must be understood as different in nature from affect. They are not the agential
forces that the individual subject believes them to be, as demonstrated by Libet’s halfsecond delay. Decisions do not originate in these higher faculties but are reactions to
movements already underway. “Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes
confinement,”208 and subjectivity is the most basic and tenacious form of the confinement
of affect. In this sense, the development of a theory of affect cannot escape its
centeredness around subjectivity. The goal is to flatten the humanist subject by showing
that agency is not confined to intentionality. The capacity to affect and be affected is
shared by human and nonhuman entities. If intentionality is subtracted from the definition
of agency, then agency extends to all of material reality. Libet’s half second has
debunked the myth of intentionality and has dissolved epistemological processes into
ontologies of becoming.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

Neoliberalism and ‘Genuine Pleasure’
Massumi’s concept of affect aims to provide an alternative explanation of
neoliberalism that does not focus on ideology and policy but rather on the affective
tendencies that underlie political events and capitalist relations. It is my contention that
affect theory is indeed responding to a unique phenomenon of neoliberalism that was not
fully manifest during Adorno’s lifetime, but I am not convinced it is so different that it
resists critical examination through the framework of negative dialectics. The power of
neoliberal processes to expand market rationality in unprecedented ways through the
management of subjectivity, and the entrepreneurial ethos of neoliberalism that places
more value on creative differentiation than passive consumerism, presents contemporary
dilemmas around power, pleasure, and subject formation. For Foucault, this marks a new
kind of power that changes the role of government, economic value, and human nature,
and replaces the subject as exchange partner with the subject as entrepreneur. This results
in technologies of the self from which individuals derive genuine pleasure. Although the
term ‘genuine pleasure’ will require some unpacking, it generally connotes a qualitatively
different form of pleasure than the relief provided by compensatory consumerism.
Massumi claims that neoliberal subjectivity and pleasure is more complex and
ambiguous, but I maintain that the constitutive role of identitarian thinking retains its
117

primacy even in the production of difference because it serves the same function,
analyzed by Adorno, of masquerading as an escape from oppression when it is actually
flight from the last remaining thought of resistance. Massumi depicts Adorno’s capitalist
subjects as dupes, but neoliberal subjects as paradoxical. While there are important
differences in how subjectivity develops under forms of capitalism that emphasize
standardization and stigmatize difference verses the neoliberal form of capitalism that
appears to promote autonomy and individualization, I interpret these divergences as
different styles of reification that obscure the mechanisms of domination that individuals
are subjected to. Because neoliberal forms of fungibility produce the pleasure of personal
fulfillment and growth, it may be more difficult to parse out the relations of domination
that inhere in certain affective structures, but the material contradictions they emerge
from continue to endure.
Massumi’s theorization of the body in affect theory is timely and necessary to
address the duplicitous production and capture of affect. Adorno also privileges the body
by anchoring critique in suffering, but Massumi’s attention to the more nuanced aspects
of perception based on Bergson’s concept of perception as sensori-motor, provides a
theorization of the body that expands its boundaries and potentials. However, bodily
affective attunement is not enough by itself to resist subjugation to forces that, as Adorno
warned, would lead to “Auschwitz or anything similar to it”. The body and suffering
always contain a non-conceptual dimension, but they require negative dialectical
interpretation to understand their participation in coercive relations.
The overuse of the term neoliberalism can have the unfortunate consequence of
rendering it a meaningless category for analysis, especially when it is used as an empty
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placeholder for all the ills of the world. The use of the term neoliberalism in this present
work is grounded in two specific perspectives. The first view is derived from David
Harvey’s work A Brief History of Neoliberalism, which presents a study of the historical
and institutional processes that established neoliberalism as the dominant political
economic reality. Harvey’s Marxist analysis portrays neoliberalism “as a failed utopian
rhetoric masking a successful project for the restoration of ruling-class power.”209 The
second perspective is grounded in Foucault’s series of lectures given at the Collége de
France in the late 1970s in which he examines the self as enterprise.
Harvey’s account of neoliberalism is as follows:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.210
Neoliberalism is not just an economic policy; it is a theory of human freedom. However,
according to Harvey, it is really a project for the restoration of class power disguised as a
path to equality and prosperity for all. When analyzed as a political movement,
neoliberalism is associated with the ideas generated by a small group of intellectuals
known as the Mont Pelerin Society (1947), which included Friedrich von Hayek, Ludvig
von Mises, Karl Popper, and Milton Friedman. “Liberal” refers to their ultimate concern
for individual freedom. “Neo” signifies the belief in free markets as the means to realize
that freedom. Neoliberalism did not come to dominate public policy until the 1980s in
response to various crises attributed to the failures of Keynesian economics such as the
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OPEC oil crisis, stagflation, high unemployment, and slow economic growth. Its most
powerful proponents, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, promoted deregulation,
privatization, financialization of capital, low taxation, and the dismantling of organized
labor. Thatcher famously announced there was “no such thing as society – only
individual men and women.”211 “Economics are the method, but the object is to change
the soul.”212
Thatcher’s assertions reflect the neoliberal requirement that in order for
individuals to realize their entrepreneurial freedom, the role of the state must take a back
seat to the structuring forces of the market. The state’s primary function is to enforce
private property, contracts, and freedom of exchange, including the creation of new
markets. However, this is not as innocuous as it sounds, because enforcing these rights
often requires a coercive state. It is not a coincidence that neoliberal states increasingly
lean towards authoritarian practices, relying more on the courts and military, defending
corporate interests even when this means suppressing dissent, forcing open markets
where there are none, and relying heavily on public/private partnerships that erode
democratic processes.
The difficulty in challenging the contradiction between the neoliberal distrust of
democracy and its commitment to individual freedom, lies in the ideological fusion of
freedom with entrepreneurial freedom that has been so widely disseminated through think
tanks, universities, media, politicians, corporations, and other civic institutions, and has
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achieved the status of common sense. And yet the implementation of neoliberal policies
creates so many contradictions with the theory, it is perplexing why it remains largely
unchallenged. How, Harvey inquires, do financial bailouts or the break-up of monopolies
fit with the foundational belief in a non-interventionist government? Can the
unprecedented inequality of wealth continue to be rationalized as part of the larger
movement towards freedom for humanity?
From a certain Marxist perspective neoliberalism is not new. The conditions that
Marx identified as constituting the fundamental capitalist relation are still prevalent in the
twenty-first century. Harvey argues that the elements of primitive accumulation outlined
by Marx in the twenty-sixth chapter of Capital Vol.1, also characterize neoliberal
processes of accumulation through dispossession. Overall, neoliberalism has not been
successful in stimulating economic growth globally. “Its actual record turns out to be
nothing short of dismal.”213 Its greatest success has been the redistribution rather than the
generation of wealth, and it has achieved this through enclosure of the commons with
extensive privatization, the predatory and fraudulent practices of financialization,
creation of debt crises in developing countries, and state redistribution of wealth from the
lower to upper classes through corporation-friendly tax structures.214 In assessing
neoliberalism, “the first lesson we must learn, therefore, is that if it looks like class
struggle and acts like class war then we have to name it unashamedly for what it is.”215

213

Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 154.

214

Ibid., 160-164.

215

Ibid., 202.
121

The challenge in naming neoliberalism as the restoration of the ruling class, is that it is
“one of the primary functions of neoliberalism that class is a fictional category that exists
only in the imagination of socialists and crypto-communists.”216
From Foucault’s perspective, neoliberalism ushers in a new production of
subjectivity. In The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault draws a distinction between classical
economic theory that views the worker as homo oeconomicus, a “partner of exchange”,
and neoliberal theory of homo oeconomicus as human capital, the entrepreneurial self.
The transformation occurs through the identification of the individual as
worker/consumer to human capital that must be invested in, accrued, and subject to the
competitive laws of innovation. This change in the conception of homo oeconomicus
marks the shift from a society of standardized commodities and mass production to a
constant drive for differentiation. Difference overrides homogenization and is seen as a
way to pursue freedom from conformism. The income a worker earns is seen as a return
on investment that the worker has made in herself as capital and will become the source
of future income. In this context, individuals are more accurately conceived of as
“enterprise-units” rather than laborers. The logic of exchange is replaced by the principle
of competition. This has significant implications for the constitution of subjectivity.
The ‘genuine pleasure’ derived from neoliberal processes of self-management is
confusing because it involves cultivating desirable emotional and social competencies
such as compassion, resiliency, and creativity. It is difficult to make the case that
increasing the individual’s range of coping skills in a volatile job market is a form of
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suffering. It is not. It is however, evidence of the power of capitalism to absorb critique,
for these were the qualities that earlier critiques identified as antithetical to capitalism.
Greed-is-good capitalism has been replaced with caring capitalism, rampant materialism
with ethical consumerism, the calloused zero sum logic of the market with the win-win
mantra of socially conscious business practices. Are these changes examples of
capitalism’s potential for true change or of its capacity to respond to critique by making it
profitable? The lines between capitalism and resistance have become increasingly blurred
under neoliberalism. Massumi confesses that one of the catalysts for his work on affect
theory was the alarming resemblance between the language of critique during the May
’68 revolution and neoliberal discourse. What is the difference between the affectively
attuned individual that Massumi equates with emancipatory potential and the neoliberal
subject who is sensitive to others and responsive to changing environments?
If the individual is the object of investment, then the imperative to always be
increasing one’s economic value becomes deeply internalized. There is no aspect of life
that cannot be monetized. To invest in oneself as human capital requires a perpetual
commitment to self-improvement, to developing techniques that increase productivity
and employability in a hyper-competitive and inherently unstable job market: learning to
brand and re-brand oneself, practice resilience in the face of adversity, be flexible with
layoffs and frequent job changes, to have near constant availability for cost-cutting
measures like dynamic scheduling or the gig economy. There is no realm of existence
that is off limits to the imperative of unending self-improvement and self-regulation
required to increase one’s economic value as human capital. This profit-oriented outlook
effectively erases the lines between work and leisure, making it easier to conflate
123

techniques to improve employability with self-worth and a meaningful existence. The
assimilation of spirituality becomes normalized under these conditions.
One example of the neoliberal conflation of human capital with the therapeutic
self is the increasing popularity of the mindfulness movement in North America.
Although mindfulness practice is a contemporary form of Buddhist meditation, it is
marketed through TED talks and workplace trainings as a form of secularized Buddhism
without the cultural trappings, offering techniques that can alleviate stress, increase brain
power and productivity, discover personal bliss, improve sexual performance, increase
memory and creativity, and countless other benefits. Consumers of mindfulness trainings
are assured of its scientifically verified results, citing MRI scans of meditating monks and
studies of increased brain plasticity in long-term practitioners, touting meditation as the
new science of the mind. In his work, The Making of Buddhist Modernism, David
McMahan observes that “crossing over from meditation as an object of scientific
investigation to characterizing it as itself a science, however, is not without problems.”217
Which parts of Buddhist practice are taken up by science and why do some aspects have
more cultural currency than others? When disembedded from its traditional
soteriological and social role, “its ends are no longer determined solely by the authority
of Buddhist tradition but also by modern psychology, which in turn is embedded in the
broader discourses of modernity that stress autonomy, self-direction, and selfdiscovery.”218 The genuine pleasure derived from self-transformation cannot be entirely
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written off as false consciousness, but its compatibility with neoliberal principles and
treating the human being as capital is not a coincidence. It also cannot be relegated to the
private sphere, because in neoliberalism there is no longer a meaningful separation
between private and public domains, leisure and work. A recent PBS special,
“Mindfulness Goes Mainstream”, explores the psychological and medical benefits of
meditation “now embraced by millions of ordinary people” (although it is always
accompanied by celebrity testimonies – in this program it is the singer Jewel). One of the
ordinary individuals interviewed in this episode was the owner of a midwest insurance
company whose life-changing experience with mindfulness practice led him to ‘offer’
this practice to his employees. He established “Mindfulness Mondays” where employees
are encouraged to participate in mindfulness practice, and workplace hallways are
adorned with mindfulness aphorisms. In the interview, he boasts about the increase in
employee work productivity levels - calculated to an exact percentage - since introducing
meditation practice to the workplace.
From a business perspective, this is seen as a win-win situation for all. The
worker must bear the burden of the stress caused by the structural instability of
neoliberalism. Mindfulness practice offers a remedy that is not threatening to employers
(its focus on inner transformation does not tend towards collective solidarities), and
employees can feel meaningful about their lives and be less consumed by negative
emotions. The management of subjectivity in this way depoliticizes the structural
tensions produced by a neoliberal economy and makes critique of historical and social
conditions antithetical to spirituality and its focus on the present moment.

125

Complicity
This dissertation began with two questions. How and why do subjects participate
in their own repression? Even more, why do they desire it? Affect theory and negative
dialectics overlap in their shared concern over the nature of complicity with duplicitous
forces of domination that generate personal fulfillment, thereby making pleasure a
political issue. Massumi claims that “complicity is an ontological condition under
neoliberalism,”219 because oppressive forces and resistance to those forces emerge from
the same ontological field of affect. He writes: “It’s very troubling and confusing,
because it seems to me that there’s been a certain kind of convergence between the
dynamic of capitalist power and the dynamic of resistance.”220 For Massumi, this
confusion is not a mistake. Inevitably, resistance resembles the dynamic it opposes
because it dips into the same virtual realm that capitalist power does; both movements
access the virtual realm of becoming rather than being confined to the actual realm of
determined entities. The difference is that capitalist movement primes virtual tendencies
which are put to work for the generation of surplus value, and resistance ideally primes
virtual tendencies that are incited to generate surplus values of life. Resistance to the
capitalist agenda requires an affective attunement to the “bare activity” of life-making
processes so they can be modulated before emerging in ready-made form for enterprise.
Effective priming strategies and keen affective attunement open the possibility for self-
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affirming intensities to emerge. “Intensity does not ‘have’ value. It is a value.”221
Massumi refers to this kind of intensity as a surplus-value of life because while it may not
be invulnerable to the influence of capitalist processes that generate surplus value, it is at
least less amenable to them. There is no guarantee that a surplus value of life would not
dissipate as soon as it emerged or would not be captured within a capitalist movement.
But it could also become a prime that attracts future intensities. Ontological complicity
means that there is no outside because the outside is already the most immanent inside, or
as Massumi puts it, the most “immanent outside.”222 Affect is everywhere but cannot be
found anywhere since it disappears the moment it is perceived by the knowing subject.
Massumi means this to be a fruitful paradox that complicates rigid divisions between
subject/object, nature/culture, human/animal, representation/non-representation, and
material/immaterial. To the extent that affect evokes new ways to think about agency
and change unmoored from these dichotomies, it warrants consideration. But it is not yet
clear how grounding cultural theory in an ineffable vitality that eludes critique can offer
an alternative to capital as the dominant organizing principle of life.
Recall that in Massumi’s analysis of Bush’s operative logic of preemption,
ontopowerful strategies require a “becoming-terrorist of your own.”223 Guns and armies

221

Massumi, Politics of Affect, 99.

222

The Mobius strip offers a helpful starting point for conceptualizing the
inseparability of interiority and exteriority, but it is limited because it relies on the spatial
condition of Euclidian geometry. Topological movements capture the complex dynamics
of indeterminacy and determinacy, which is why Massumi describes the workings of
affect in terms of enfoldings and infra-churnings.
223

Massumi, Ontopower, 11.
127

cannot catch terrorists because they do not operate on the same battlefield. Massumi
similarly concludes that using critique to resist complicity with capitalist power is the
equivalent of mobilizing large armies that can only capture terrorists once they have
committed their acts of destruction. Critique always arrives too late because it does not
recognize the asymmetrical battlefield it is fighting on. A becoming-capital of your own
levels the playing field. Because we are ontologically complicit, resistance must
“embrace creative duplicity: emergent ways of strategically playing the ontological
condition of complicity, to tendentially postcapitalist effect.”224 Saying ‘Yes’ by priming
new flows of self-affirming intensities offers alternative modes of experiencing the world
that, importantly for Massumi, are beyond the human.
For Adorno, the issue of complicity is thoroughly entangled with suffering, but to
say it is ontologically established as Massumi claims, is to attribute the status of second
nature to a social-historical phenomenon. Any analysis of oppression must begin with the
premise that “the mechanism of domination is to forbid the recognition of suffering.”225
Complicity rationalizes suffering and obscures the social-historical memory of how it
came to be. Given the confusing and ubiquitous nature of capitalist power, finding respite
from the normalization of suffering constitutes a break with complicity. To
underestimate this break is to underestimate the effectiveness of capitalist power to
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normalize exchange relations as the only rational way of life.226 The key then to resisting
domination begins with the recognition of suffering. This requires interpretation,
especially when engaging with affective structures that produce genuine pleasure. A
world where most forms of suffering are transparent is not a world constituted through
capitalist relations. Adorno’s attention to sensuous critical thought reveals a contradiction
between what we are experiencing and what we think we are experiencing. Noticing this
gap gives expression to suffering and breaks from the domination that forbids the
recognition of suffering it produces. While Massumi argues that thought is not quick
enough to catch on to the moment before becoming turns into being, Adorno contends
that negative dialectical thought ‘primes’, to use Massumi’s term, the subject to entrust
its own experience without reifying it. Complicity occurs through reification; theory
names this process and aids in the expression of suffering. “Theory does not contain
answers to everything; it reacts to the world, which is faulty to the core. What would be
free from the spell of the world is not under theory’s jurisdiction.”227 Suffering is
theory’s jurisdiction. Without negative dialectical interpretation, which is not the same as
rationalization, it would be difficult to discern between true experiences of respite from
suffering and experiences of increasingly alluring forms of complicity. Saying ‘No’ is to
recognize suffering for what it is. The question of whether this qualifies as theory or
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practice I think is one that Adorno never fully answered and it is easy to mine his work
for textual citations to support either side. However, Adorno was unequivocal in his
denouncement of practice that bypasses or conflates with theory. He was
uncompromising on the emancipatory value of grounding theory/practice in suffering.
Practice that presumes the irrelevance of critique simultaneously presumes the
irrelevance of suffering. It is therefore crucial to reveal the conditions that make critique
seem unnecessary or even ridiculous.
Affect theory openly promotes the conditions that minimize the relevance and
effectiveness of critique. It does so through the intentional conflation of theory and
practice. Massumi is very critical of critique. At its best critique only debunks what it
aims to eradicate, but it does not add anything to the world. At its worst, critique becomes
part of the problem it is meant to deconstruct because it obstructs creative thinking and
practice that could incite change. Massumi states: “However strenuously it might debunk
concepts like “representation,” it carries on as if it mirrored something outside itself with
which it had no complicity, no unmediated processual involvement, and thus could
justifiably oppose.”228 Massumi attributes the “intemperate arrogance of debunking” to a
reactive mode akin to Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment.
However, any account of Massumi’s critique of critique must begin with his
troubling generalization of critique. Significant differences among critical theorists are
ignored in Massumi’s works in order to exaggerate certain problematic traits that affect
theory can then rectify. Part of his methodology entails the creation of new concepts and
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terminology in order to shed unwanted conceptual baggage. It can be argued that the
work of positing a new theory, developing the terminology and conceptual frameworks
that can facilitate discussion about affect, takes precedence over addressing specific
thinkers whose work assumes, according to Massumi, similar problematic conceptual
parameters. “The problem is that there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to
affect. Our entire vocabulary has derived from theories of signification that are still
wedded to structure even across irreconcilable differences.”229 Massumi is concerned
that due to the “absence of an asignifying philosophy of affect, it is all too easy for
received psychological categories to slip back in.”230 Creating new concepts requires a
clean slate, terminology that is unburdened by philosophical assumptions from poststructuralism, psychology, semiotics, or ideology critique. It can also be argued that
exaggerating the shortcomings of previous theories serves as a strategic overcorrective to
unchallenged dominant concepts. Adorno confessed that he employed this strategy to
replace the idealist subject with the primacy of the object. “It [the object’s primacy] is the
corrective of the subjective reduction, not the denial of a subjective share.”231 Adorno
engaged with specific thinkers, but this is critique and Massumi is not interested in
tearing down others’ work. He states, “Foster or debunk. It’s a strategic question,” and
he adds, “it is simply that when you are busy critiquing you are less busy augmenting.”232
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If helpful insights from other theories are overlooked in the process of augmenting,
perhaps it is safe to assume that there will be no shortage of critiques, like the present
work, to address these gaps.
That said, by avoiding substantial engagement with theories from the traditions he
has rejected, Massumi runs the risk of committing some of the same mistakes he holds
responsible for cultural theory’s dead-end. Despite his adamant rejection of the
uninventive and destructive nature of theories of critique and the academic culture that
endorses such methods, Massumi does not escape his own complicity with this form of
objectifying judgment. He dismisses epistemology and any theories that privilege the
knowing subject as irredeemably disembodied and then opposes it to an unmediated,
autonomous ontology that is the true source of freedom located in the corporeality of the
body. But this critique of critique relies on a very limited and narrow understanding of
the mind and consciousness which not only Adorno, but also feminist theorists, queer
theorists, critical race theorists, and disability theorists do not endorse. In her response to
Parables of the Virtual, feminist theorist Clare Hemmings comments on the tendency in
academic disciplines to objectify the old in order to usher in the new. “In the search for
‘the new’ that bears no resemblance to the past, the identifying features of that past are
inevitably overstated, and the claims for that new embellished in ways that must at the
very least fall short of rigorous.”233 When positing a new theory, Hemmings observes,
there is a “vested interest in reading for generality instead of complexity.”234 Massumi is
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no exception to this practice. Perhaps this is unavoidable to a certain degree, which is
why putting new theories into dialogue with specific theorists from the rejected traditions
is a necessary stage in the development of the new. Putting Massumi in dialogue with
Adorno subjects affect theory and its claims of emancipatory potential to a more rigorous
interrogation than its initial presentation against the proverbial straw man Massumi has
created out of “critique”.
I will first present Massumi’s argument against critique and then examine how
these concerns can be addressed through the concept of non-identity and the primacy of
suffering that constitute negative dialectics. Massumi argues that critique always arrives
too late because it does not operate pre-emptively at the level of ontological
indeterminacy. There is no capacity to incite the new because critique is unable to “go
kinetic.”235 Massumi claims that he is advocating for a form of critique that does not
succumb to the self-defeating cycle of traditional critique because, he claims, it is
immanent. When immanent critique is grounded in affect theory, it goes kinetic by
assuming the primacy of movement and becoming attuned to the stirring field of
emergent potentials. Immanent critique is “active, participatory critique….it actively
alters conditions of emergence. It engages becoming, rather than judging what is.”236
There is no outside to capitalism because capitalist movements regenerate directly in the
register of affect. For critique to be effective, it must acknowledge there is no choice
other than immanence and so it must “modulate the constraints at the constitutive level,
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where they re-emerge and seriate.”237 Massumi’s motto is: “Don’t mediate. Modulate.”238
The affective fact that we are unavoidably ontologically complicit means that operating at
the threshold of the virtual and actual realms provides a better chance, but not a
guarantee, of effecting real change. The assumption that the most immanent parts of the
world are thoroughly mediated confines critique to a limited jurisdiction of already
actualized tendencies.
Massumi presents an analysis of the limitations of identity politics to illustrate the
ineffectiveness of critique and its potentially damaging effects. He argues that while it is
an effective strategy initially to mobilize anger in response to the disenfranchisement
experienced by individuals who share a common identity, this is ultimately a limiting
condition for change because anger is “the most active of “sad” affects. Despite its
intensity, anger remains on the reactive spectrum. What has been achieved is “a
becoming-active of the reactive.”239 Critique plays a pivotal role in the cycle of reactivity
or ressentiment because it provides compelling analyses of systemic oppression that feeds
off of anger. There is movement, but it remains trapped in a closed circuit of pain,
reaction, and negative critique. “Capacitation is arrived at, but its reaccess is always via a
detour through reaction, raised to a higher power by negative critique.”240 “Critique is
immobilizing”, because it reduces the open-ended, affective field of relational
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singularities (potentials) to a single oppositional relation between active and passive.
This effectively separates a body from what it can do because it only acts after something
has been done to it. Its potential for action is pre-determined by the postural assumption
of fear. Only when the qualitative multiplicity of the affective field has been reduced to a
one-dimensional relation of opposition is critique able to engage.
Critical practices aimed at increasing potentials for freedom and for movement
are inadequate, because in order to critique something in any kind of definitive
way you have to pin it down. In a way, it is an almost sadistic enterprise that
separates something out, attributes set characteristics to it, then applies a final
judgement to it – objectifies it, in a moralizing kind of way.241
If critique could enable the body to be poised for “readiness potential” before
perception becomes predominantly organized around reaction, then critique would
become unrecognizable as such.
Negative dialectics does not engage in this “sadistic enterprise” described by
Massumi, because cultivating a consistent sense of non-identity troubles the reified
relation between active and passive that must be assumed in order to objectify and
moralize. Adorno’s fearlessly passive subject is not passive in a reactionary way, and as
the object’s agent, it is active in its openness to the unfamiliar and uncomfortable aspects
of the object. A consistent effort is required to say ‘No’ to impulses that solidify
experience into a subject which only knows what it can control. The linear active-passive
relation that Massumi associates with critique would obstruct the mediated relation
between subject and object. By Adorno’s account, the truth of constitutive subjectivity
consists of its fundamental passivity in conforming with the given. There is a
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tremendous amount of experience locked up in the reifying processes that occur with
deceptive naturalness in everyday life. The fearless passive subject is active in unlocking
these processes through trusting its own experience of the object’s dissonance.
What are the material-social conditions that confine thought to the kind of sadistic
enterprise described by Massumi? What kind of suffering does this sadistic thought
mask? Finally, what kind of thought can resist this reifying function? Adorno writes:
“Prior to all particular content, thinking is actually the force of resistance, from which it
has been alienated only with great effort.”242 Negative dialectical thinking is an open
thinking because it is attuned to cognitive and somatic dissonance that arises from the
object’s truth content that contains its own untruth. The pinning down of an object for
final judgement can only be met with thinking that is a force of resistance to the façade of
objectivity produced by the identitarian thinking that Massumi calls critique. Adorno
sometimes portrays a bleak world, but this is not the same as the sadistic ressentiment
that can only understand the world in order to dominate it. Thinking should not be
reduced to a psychological process or to a “timelessly pure, formal logic.”243 Thinking
also should not render the subject’s role irrelevant or dispensable. Finally, and most
relevant to the examination of the role of thinking in developing affective attunement,
Adorno writes, “Thinking is a mode of comportment and its relation to the subject matter
with which it comports itself is indispensable.”244 Adorno understands the nature of the
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concept and its universalizing, identity-oriented activity which is why the non-conceptual
part of the concept is a significant part of negative dialectics, but not in the same way that
it is for affect theory.
Massumi’s call to go kinetic reflects a performative approach to knowing that
conflates theory and practice in a way that Adorno views as highly problematic. The
suspicion with which Adorno views practice is a response to the conflation of theory and
practice by those who view theory non-dialectically as passive. Adorno was particularly
suspicious of the compulsion for putting theory into practice because this was rarely if
ever separated from the compulsion to identity. The coercion of identity in thought and
action is at the base of all violence. “Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure
identity as death,”245 and yet, post-holocaust philosophers and activists failed to learn this
tragic lesson. “One continually finds the word critique, if it is tolerated at all,
accompanied by the word constructive. The insinuation is that only someone can practice
critique who can propose something better than what is being criticized.”246 Adorno
continues, “By making the positive a condition for it, critique is tamed from the very
beginning and loses its vehemence.”247 Requiring that critique include an account of a
better world obstructs the opportunity to observe the problem that generates a need for a
better world. This is not a view generated from a sadistic mode of thought but rather from
a comportment of thought to the pain and loss of the suffering subject.
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The prescience of Adorno’s observation as it applies to contemporary American
society in 2019 is as brilliant as it is unsettling. In Winners Take All: The Elite Charade
of Changing the World, journalist and author Anand Giridharadas examines the role of
the rich elite who have benefitted from neoliberal policies and want to use their wealth
for social change, but only if it can be achieved in market-friendly ways. The belief that
social problems can be solved more efficiently and “at scale” through better business
deals and market consensus rather than the work of participatory democracy, goes
unchallenged. The values, vocabulary, assumptions, and entrepreneurial spirit of the
business world are promoted as the universal tool kit for social change. The belief that
those who have become successful in this world are considered the most competent to
change it, ignores a significantly inherent conflict of interest. “The people with the most
to lose from genuine social change have placed themselves in charge of social change,
often with the passive assent of those most in need of it.”248 This plutocracy of economic
elites who consider themselves leaders of social change are also the sponsors of
intellectual production, including public ideas events like TED, PopTech, South by
Southwest, Aspen Ideas Festival, the World Economic Forum, or “anything sponsored by
the Atlantic”.249 Daniel Drezner, foreign policy scholar and author of The Ideas Industry,
distinguishes between public intellectuals and thought leaders. Public intellectuals
question apparatuses of power and will point out “when the emperor has no clothes.” 250
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Thought leaders “know one big thing and believe that their important idea will change the
world.” 251 “The former are skeptics; the latter are true believers. The former is a critic;
the latter is a creator.”252 The popularity of TED talks is an unsurprising outcome of
neoliberal principles that frame critique as an out of date and resentful response to the
speed and innovation of technology and globalization. TED talks are twenty-minute sales
pitches, often ending with standing ovations and no forum for question/answer dialogue.
This is a perfect venue for unbridled optimism and win-win initiatives that are not
subjected to the scrutiny of intellectual debate. What is conspicuously absent in the Big
Ideas events is discussion of inequality and injustice. The “thought leader three-step”
consists of focusing on the victim rather than the perpetrator, personalizing the political,
and being “constructively actionable”. The only problems allowed to be presented are
ones that can be followed by “digestible lists of tips on how to fix things”.253 The last step
in the thought leader three-step is only possible if preceded by the first two. Suffering
must be first be depoliticized and confined to the private sphere of the individual before it
can be addressed.
This is what Adorno meant when he argued that the ideals of freedom and
political change “can no longer be read out of reality as a concrete tendency.”254 What are
the conditions that make critique seem irrelevant or obstructive to change? Drezner and
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Giridharadas answer this question by analyzing the conditions that promote the
ascendancy of thought leaders and the phenomenon of TED talks, that promote the belief
that in order to change the world one must first financially master it, and that obscure the
contradiction of changing the status quo by profiting from it. In short, the conditions that
value practice, action, and measurable outcomes coincide seamlessly with the rejection of
any theory that is not already the same as its practice.
Massumi’s argument that critique must go kinetic certainly is not promoting
anything close to a thought leader three-step, but his dismissal of critique because it does
not meet his conditions of performativity is concerning given the neoliberal priority for
action over thought. And yet, Massumi insists that resistance is not thought. “Resistance
cannot be communicated or inculcated. It can only be gestured. The gesture is a call to
attunement.”255 The concept of attunement is crucial in affect theory. Change emerges
from affect because all of existence emerges from affect, so resistance necessarily is
attunement to this non-conceptual reality. Understanding this involves cognitive activity,
but Massumi argues it is not the destructive thought of critique. It is thought that
identifies that which cannot actually be thought without eluding thought’s grasp. This can
only be truly appreciated once thought gets out of its own way and is replaced with a
bodily attunement to affect. Massumi expands the definition of the body so that it is not
confined to the knowing subject and consists instead of a bundle of capacities that are
always in flux and ready to perceive pre-conscious change. However, this important
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reconfiguring of the body does not provide an answer to how one would discern whether
one is truly connecting to affect or to flows of affect already captured.
Neoliberalism encompasses an experience economy. This is a newer frontier than
the service economy or production of material commodities. The focus on customer
experience as the product profitably coincides with the transformative experiences valued
by entrepreneurial subjects. Neoliberalism ushers in an unprecedented blurring of
boundaries between the subject as entrepreneur, consumer, and citizen. It would seem
that critique is more relevant now than ever, but under neoliberalism and affect theory, it
is viewed as a worn-out model of change and caricatured as elitist and resentful.
Affect theory points to the possibility of experience not incited by capitalist
processes and that embodies self-affirming intensities, but it is more often than not an
ambivalent experience because of its fleeting quality. Affect lurks in the useless which,
because of its irrelevance is barely perceivable. “So if we’re interested in resisting
capitalist capture, an important element of that would be to find ways of re-valuing the
ephemeral.”256
The kind of affective experiences that generate a surplus value of life can and do
often overlap with capitalist surplus power and this fact of affect contains both the
problem and solution. For Massumi, complicity is the touchstone of affect. “Don’t
bemoan complicity – game it. Don’t critically lord it over others with your doctrinal
prowess – get creatively down and dirty in the field of play.”257 This quote is from
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Massumi’s most recent book, in which he grants slightly more value to critique than in
previous works, drawing a distinction between critique that arrogantly presents as the
only form of meaningful resistance and critique that knows its place as backup for
“assisting movements of escape”, for supporting “their primary task of self-affirming
their qualitative difference, of carrying themselves to higher, tendentially postcapitalist,
power. It [critique] cannot, and should not, direct them.”258 Critique may prove helpful in
some situations under limited conditions, but it can never play a significant role in the
incitement of counter-ontopower. However, what counts as priming for a counterontopower is frustratingly vague because the target is always on the move. Massumi
explains that “under neoliberalism, priming goes feral.”259

Not Negative Enough
The way forward is not clear. Affect theory and negative dialectics are not
prescriptive, but for different reasons. For Massumi, affective attunement requires an
experimental approach. In response to the criticism that valuing the ephemeral and
decentering the human depoliticizes and obscures the mechanisms of capitalist power,
Massumi explains that the constitutive relationality of affect already invokes the political
albeit not in traditional terms. Given its “proto-political”260 nature, affective
experimentation would orient away from established interests and toward a coming
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together of different tendencies of becoming that collectively emerge in a singular event
that could never have been consciously engineered. Because “the concept of affect is
politically oriented from the get go,”261 a politics of affect starts in the middle, from the
zones of indetermination between virtual tendencies and their actualization. A politics of
affect requires a capacity to perceive change in the making. “To affect and to be affected
is to be open to the world, to be active in it and to be patient for its return activity. This
openness is also taken as primary. It is the cutting edge of change.”262 The postcapitalist
future that Massumi envisions will not be ushered in by re-positioning and re-signifying
actualized entities and relations within a structural matrix that admits of no openings.263
Processual entanglement is primordial. We just need to perceive it. Capitalism is not
constituted through structures and systems because its nature is fundamentally
processual. Unlike a system,
a process is in touch with a great outside. It is defined by its openness to that
great outside: by how it dips into and captures the tendential potentials stirring
there. These potentials are unlimited….Rather than any in-itself of things, we’re
talking about the of-itself of the world, the giving-of-itself of the world’s
potential….264
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Affect is more immanent to capitalist processes than structures because it is the source to
which capitalist relations repeatedly return to for renewal and re-emergence, always in a
different form (no repetition without difference even if the difference is barely
perceivable). Resistance to capitalist power is a confusing relation, but it is meant to be
because capitalism is not a structural monolith. It is, as Massumi describes it, always
outrunning itself, spilling over its limitations and dipping into the world’s potential for
new frontiers of production of surplus-value. By situating political change in the “felt
excess of potential,”265 affect theory embraces a robustly affirmative approach to how it
characterizes capitalist relations and the productive value of escaping those relations.
Resistance primes the field of emergence toward “the production of self-affirming
surplus-values of life that answer to a purely qualitative economy, multiplying and
accelerating that escape from capitalism, that leak from it.”266 The production of surplus
value is countered by the production of surplus-values of life. Ontopower and counterontopower do not move through or from critiques of reification. “Reification is just a
passing phase in a process of continuing variation. Contemporary capitalism is more
moving than it is reifying.”267 However, what is at stake in assuming that “things don’t
stand still long enough to become fixed,”268 is the capacity to contest material blockages
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that do become objectified and that impose serious restraints on an individual’s ability to
move more freely, that is, to move ontogenetically. Yet, even if increased access is
granted to the productive processes of affect, being more intensely in relation (one of the
ways Massumi describes affect) does not necessarily provide a way of discerning who or
what is excluded from or harmed by that relation. It is not clear how the suffering caused
by persistent structural violence can be alleviated or given a voice through forces of
becoming without first recognizing the forces of endurance that are deeply imbedded in
ordinary life. But Massumi insists that resistance to complicity is not about being right
(affect transcends such moralizing positions) but living more intensely, of inciting
surplus-values of life “that makes the event worth living for its own intensity – where,
instead of being right, it becomes beautiful.”269
By comparison, Adorno is an affective killjoy. He states:
There is no way out of entanglement. The only responsible course is to deny
oneself the ideological misuses of one’s own existence, and for the rest to conduct
oneself in private as modestly, unobtrusively and unpretentiously as is required,
no longer by good upbringing, but by the shame of still having air to breathe, in
hell.270
I select this grim quote to highlight a crucial aspect of Adorno’s negativism that I think
becomes lost on both his critics and advocates. The problem with negative critique is not
that it fails to locate a redemptive element immanent to social reality, or that it shuns
political practice, or as Massumi claims, that it tears down the world instead of
augmenting it. According to Adorno, if there is a problem with negative critique it would
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be that it is not negative enough. The desire to instrumentalize non-identity in order to
seek normative foundations despite Adorno’s anti-foundationalism, is intricately linked to
the compulsion, however subtle, for identity. Even readings that interpret negative
dialectics through the lens of negative theology, as I will examine below, reifies rather
than accepts the negativity of negativity. “Against this, the seriousness of unswerving
negation lies in its refusal to lend itself to sanctioning things as they are. To negate a
negation does not bring about its reversal; it proves, rather that the negation was not
negative enough.”271
I turn now to a reading of Adorno by political theorist Jane Bennett that situates
the dialogue between Massumi and Adorno within a similar contemporary dialogue
between new materialist approaches and the historical materialist traditions. Bennett’s
vital materialism shares with affect theory a rejection of traditional notions of matter and
subjectivity, and replaces epistemological models with ontological modes of knowingbeing. Bennett engages specifically with Adorno’s philosophy of negative dialectics
which is rooted in the historical materialism of Marx (even though Adorno rejects some
Marx’s major tenets). In her book, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things,
Bennett provides a new materialist approach to reconceptualizing matter as a vital agentic
force and concludes, like Massumi, that the demystifying activities of critique assume a
narrow definition of political agency as human agency. This precludes the consideration
of matter as generative, dynamic, and emerging through intra-actions rather than the laws
of linear causality. Understanding matter in this way challenges well known binary

271

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 159-160.
146

distinctions between human/non-human, organic/inorganic, and life/matter. Crucially,
Bennett focuses on man-made items and other objects that seem most devoid of life: a
plastic bottle cap, a dead rat, a black work glove. Despite their passive and inert
appearance, these material objects manifest a vibrancy or “thing-power” that exceeds
their ordinary status as inanimate matter. Bergson’s concept of élan vital is invoked as an
example of vital materialism that is worthy of engagement because it offers a critique of
mechanistic models of nature that does not shun science. Bennett concludes that Bergson
fell short of a full-fledged vital materialism because élan vital supplements matter rather
than understanding materiality as a life force in itself. Thing-power serves “to raise the
status of the materiality of which we are composed”272 and, “if matter itself is lively, then
not only is the difference between subjects and objects minimized, but the status of the
shared materiality of all things elevated.”273 Bodies are assemblages of interpenetrating
forces which interact with other assemblages, which is to say that the idea of human
agency is misleading when it is extracted from the larger network of assemblages that it
is ontologically always entangled with.
Bennett anticipates that affective attunement to the constantly shifting boundaries
of the body will cultivate ethical accountability to the open-ended field of human,
organic, and inorganic things; it will radically transform the notion of self-interest
through the realization that caring for the self requires caring for the assemblages in
which it is imbedded. This ethical attunement is not possible without first coming to
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know the thing-power of everyday objects. Unlike Massumi, Bennett engages
specifically with a theorist from the critical tradition that she is providing an alternative
to.
Jane Bennett writes this about Adorno: “Negative dialectics has an affinity with
negative theology: negative dialectics honors nonidentity as one would honor an
unknowable god; Adorno’s “specific materialism” includes the possibility that there is
divinity behind or within the reality that withdraws.”274 Bennet then makes the claim that
“a vital materialism is more thoroughly nontheistic in presentation: the out-side has no
messianic promise.”275 This is a surprising conclusion because Bennett otherwise
demonstrates a firm understanding of significant aspects of negative dialectics, including
the primacy of suffering. She remarks that nonidentity “makes itself known with the least
distortion in the form of an unarticulated feeling of resistance, suffering, and pain.”276
Bennett also recognizes Adorno’s commitment to using the concept to understand the
non-conceptual and the idealist rage against nonidentity that can be countered by the
preponderance of the object. And yet, she argues that Adorno treats non-identity as an
“absent absolute, as a messianic promise.”277 Attributing an absolute status to
nonidentity reifies the very negativity that is meant to break through the veil of
reification. Referring to an unqualified negative theology further obscures the negativity
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of negativity that Adorno consistently invokes in response to affirmative approaches.
Adorno writes, “It lies in the definition of negative dialectics that it will not come to rest
in itself, as if it were total. This is its form of hope.”278
Bennett and Massumi are both committed to a radical reconfiguration of the
human as sovereign, intentional agent and advocate for a dissolution of the subject that
attributes agency to all human and non-human actants. And yet, both affect theory and
new materialism require a knowing subject that can transform dominant epistemological
models. I believe there is no way to avoid the human subject as the locus of knowledge
that undergirds the change that matters in affect theory and new materialism. Whether it
is Barad’s concept of agential realism that aims to replace representational knowledge
with intra-active mattering, or Massumi’s concept of the embodied knowing of
ontopower, or Bennett’s “careful course of anthropomorphization”279 to reinvigorate the
liveliness of matter, all of these approaches start with the subject that produces the right
kind of knowledge about the world, including an awareness of its own epistemological
shortcomings. Only after a new materialist epistemological stance has been established
can the understanding of the ontology of relation generate a self-evident ethical
responsiveness that is performative in nature.
Bennett inquires, “What are some tactics for cultivating the experience of our
selves as vibrant matter? The task is to explore ways to engage effectively and
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sustainably this enchanting and dangerous matter-energy.”280 All of three of these
theorists bemoan the lack of political strategies offered by critique. Barad states that “the
ubiquitous pronouncements that experience or the material world is “mediated” have
offered precious little guidance about how to proceed.”281 Massumi complains that
critique never adds anything to the world. Bennett argues that critique has value only if
followed by positive, utopian formulations, and that, “the capacity to detect the presence
of impersonal affect requires that one is caught up in it. One needs, at least for a while, to
suspend suspicion and adopt a more open-ended comportment.”282 How to discern
between the experience of commodity fetishism and thing-power is not addressed.
Bennett explains that her experience of the liveliness of the dead rat, plastic bottle cap,
and other debris that had collected in a street grate one morning was influenced
considerably by readings of Thoreau, Spinoza, and Merleau-Ponty. I consider these
sources to be forms of intellectual priming that cued Bennett’s “anticipatory readiness on
my in-side, by a perceptual style open to the appearance of thing-power.”283 I point this
out to reiterate that one cannot dispense with conceptual priming, especially if there is an
intention to break out of spatially oriented modes of perception. The difference between
the subject who senses the shimmering, vibrating nature of things and Adorno’s
fearlessly passive subject is significant. The subject that perceives thing-power
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foregrounds a sensuous aspect of the object that is interpreted experientially as an
unusual immediacy (and can often include a visual bias), that one gets “caught up” in.
Bennett describes it as a naïve ambition. In this regard, thing-power offers an alternative
relation between subject and object, but it does not necessarily minimize the difference
between them as Bennett claims, and it does not address and therefore resist the reified
separation between subject and object that makes the experience of thing-power so
unusual to begin with.
Recall Bergson’s claim that there is nothing less than the present moment.
Although Adorno ultimately rejected Bergson’s two forms of cognition, the enduring
influence of Bergson’s thought in Adorno’s work can be found in the constitutive role of
memory in every iteration of the subject-object encounter. Our obligation is to memory.
Change begins with confronting the norms of forgetting. This is the missing dimension in
Bennett’s (and Massumi’s) work, and so it is unsurprising that Adorno’s negativity would
be viewed by Bennett as an absolute; from the vital materialist’s perspective memory is
too bound up with subjectivity and the dialectical obsession with negativity that is all too
human. In her critique of demystification, Bennet remarks, “If we think we already know
what is out there, we will almost surely miss much of it.”284 But this is not the posture of
the fearlessly passive subject that is constituted through its unknowing openness to the
object. Just as the fearlessly passive subject is oriented to notice and value some things
(suffering, non-identity) more than others, the vital materialist subject resonates with
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some things (inorganic elements, nonhuman actants) and not others based on an
epistemologically informed perspective.
Thing-power counters the traditional separation between subject and object but
does not address the social and historical conditions that sustain this separation. When
things start to spark and shimmer what is being obscured? Asking this question presumes
a lack of engagement with the economic forces (of exchange) that require a conception of
nature and inorganic things as passive objects there for the taking. Adorno states: “For
our knowledge of nature is really so preformed by the demand that we dominate
nature…that we end up understanding only those aspects of nature that we can
control.”285 One of the issues that lies at the heart of new materialist approaches that
Bennett exemplifies is the hope that awareness of the vitality and relationality of matter
will catalyze ethical action. But it is not clear what political strategies or practices are
offered beyond an inner transformation of the self to be more open and attuned to the
non-human and inorganic forces it is entangled with. It is also unclear how, in the
absence of negative critique, this reconfigured materialism would not simply embolden
new strategies for control and diminish accountability.286
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While Bennet provides an example of reading negative dialectics in a reifying
way based on her philosophy of new materialism, John Holloway’s interpretation of nonidentity provides an example of reifying Adorno’s negativity from within the tradition of
historical materialism. Holloway writes:
Does Adorno actually say that we are non-identity? Not as far as I know. Perhaps
I am reading him in a non-identitarian way, against and beyond Adorno. But how
else can we understand non-identity? Non-identity can only be a force that
changes itself, that drives beyond itself, that creates and creates itself. And where
do we find a creative and self-creative force? Not animals, not god, not nature,
only humans, we. Not an identitarian we, but a disjointed, ill-fitting,
creative we. 287
It is tempting to read Adorno in this way, to see the work of non-identity as a selfcreative force. It stands to reason that the negation of identitarian thought (and all that it
negates) could invite an opening for creative activity. But for Adorno this only stands to
reason under conditions that presume identity. “Auch im Äußerstein ist Negation der
Negation keine Positivität.”288 Only a reified consciousness would fail to see that
“dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be
free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.” 289 Holloway provides a strong defense of
the difference between negative dialectics and traditional dialectical materialism based on
the former’s rejection of any form of synthesis. However, Holloway’s portrayal of nonidentity as more than the untruth of identity that could potentially provide respite from
suffering, hints at a different kind of synthesis that oddly resembles Massumi’s language
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around affect. Holloway states that, “The movement of non-identity is the movement of
creativity. Non-identity is an overflowing beyond what is, it is change and self-change,
creation and self-creation. To put non-identity at the center of philosophy is to put
negation-creation at the center.”290 This is a rather unsubtle instrumentalization of nonidentity as the means to the production of the new. Adorno was very clear on this point
that as the consistent sense of non-identity, negative dialectics requires an attunement to
the consistent guilt of one’s thinking which would lend a voice to suffering, not to
catalyze the creation of something new. Holloway’s belief that every break with identity
is an opening for revolutionary acts of creation is guilty of the “bad positivity” that
Adorno warned against. All reification is a forgetting, and what is being forgotten in
Holloway’s affirmative account of non-identity is the determinate negation of the
concrete particularity of objects. Adorno writes:
In other words, negativity of this kind is made concrete and goes beyond mere
standpoint philosophy by confronting concepts with their objects and, conversely,
objects with their concepts. Negativity in itself…is not a good to be defended. If
it were, it would be transformed into bad positivity.291
Autonomy
There is a political promise in affect theory that is based on the autonomy of
affect. The concept of autonomy is connected deeply and directly to the core of affect and
it cannot be compromised without breaking its promise of emancipatory potential from
neoliberal capture, not so much through acceptance and resistance but through the
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creation of surplus values of life. However, any engagement with the concept of
autonomy will be deeply entangled with the logic of exchange relations and the material
contradictions it is grounded in. Just as the separation of subject and object is both real
and illusory, the concept of autonomy must be understood through the dialectical relation
of its truth and untruth.
One consequence of the reification that occurs in contemporary capitalism is the
displacement of autonomy outside of human agency and into the immutable forces that
act upon humans. In a society constituted through exchange relations, a fundamental
disconnection occurs between the immediacy of what appears and the hidden aspects of
that appearance. The hidden parts can only be accessed through the dialectical relation
between the two. This idea is not original to Adorno. It is straight-up Marxism. In the
opening lines of Capital Volume I, Marx states “The wealth of societies in which the
capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an ‘immense collection of
commodities’; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form.”292
Commodities appear as discrete objects unattached to the matrix of social relations and
production from which they emerge and through which they are sustained. The
appearance of a commodity is not a false semblance because it is a material object that
can be sensed. It is just that what is being sensed is a very narrow aspect of the object; it
is unreflectively characterized as an autonomous entity. This allows it to be quantified
and used in the rationalized calculation of exchange. The success of capitalism rests on
this ‘phantom objectivity’ or autonomy that is not limited to objects. It extends to the
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relations between people and to consciousness itself. Lukács states: “Reification requires
that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity exchange.”293
This distorted form of autonomy as the immediacy of empirical facts that present as
natural and rational is the inevitable result of the constitutive role of exchange relations.
The social contradictions sedimented in the concept of autonomy are lived
through the subject-object relation. The subject is autonomous to the degree that it makes
of itself an object, i.e., to the degree that it is modeled after the commodity structure of
the object. In neoliberal capitalism this means the subject becomes both commodity and
human capital. In turn, objects and the social processes of their production appear to
possess an autonomy that is impervious to the actions of the subject. Whether it is the
subject taking on the status of an object or the object appearing to possess the active
powers of a subject, the truth of autonomy in contemporary capitalism is its coincidence
with the reifying structures of exchange. By subjecting them to these reifying processes,
subject and object become interchangeable with one another. This autonomy is more real
and grounded in material reality than any abstract concept of autonomy divorced from
social institutions and practices that permeate everyday existence. Therefore, the truth of
autonomy is its deceptive absence. The untruth of autonomy is the ideological
hypostasization of its commodity nature, its hardening into a norm that does not tolerate
tension between fact and value. What ought to be already is.
Massumi argues that affect cannot be perceived by the conscious mind because it
is thoroughly non-conceptual in nature and this is what constitutes its autonomy.
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Concepts cannot access affect without missing it. What are the historical-social
conditions for autonomy to be conceived of in this way, as barely accessible to the human
subject, as fleeting, ephemeral, and too quick to have been perceived? The autonomy of
affect is always there, the ground in fact of everything, but its virtual churnings and
conditions of expression are mysterious and elusive. What are the implications for
autonomy when agency and vitality are decentralized and distributed to all of matter,
human and non-human? Massumi’s use of Libet’s half-second experiment proved that
intentionality is a ruse and agency is not a property of the volitional subject. Massumi’s
subjectivity-without-a-subject means that the agency and autonomy traditionally
attributed to the sovereign modern subject is everywhere and perhaps arguably nowhere,
because what happens when this equality is naturalized ontologically in an exchange
society? The conditions of the limitations imposed on the concept of the modern subject
do not necessarily cease by locating autonomy in a non-conceptual reality. It is not at all
clear how analyzing material reality in terms of non-conceptual flows and intensities
addresses the necessity of reified dualisms such as subject/object, nature/society,
human/non-human that sustain capitalist modes of production. Massumi claims that
redefining autonomy through the concept of affect, as relational all the way down,
prevents it from being pre-social and in need of social mediation. “Affect, as the
openness to being affected, is directly relational. It is pure sociality....”294 By this account,
the meaning of autonomy opposes the traditional traits of sovereignty and enclosed selfsufficiency. The autonomy of affect has a vitality and agency that makes it have “an
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appetite for its own eventuation and final characterization.”295 But when affect does
eventuate, the subject seems to lose most if not all meaningful connection with it. Why is
this considered normal?
In light of these considerations, it seems that Massumi’s question of how “to
explain the wonder that there can be stasis given the primacy of process”296 needs to be
re-visited every time the solidity of objects is encountered. Given the flows of intensity
and the singularity of tendential becomings percolating in the field of affect, it truly is a
wonder that anything can appear stable and fixed. And yet the predictability of structural
inequality and the endurance of capitalist modes of production and accumulation make
the intra-action of affective intensities seem like the exception rather than the ground of
existence. It is first and foremost theory that provides a view of the world that is not
immediately obvious. Adorno’s statement that “truth is objective, not plausible”,
certainly applies to the truth of affect, but does not justify an exemption from the
examination of its untruth. One of the main inquiries in this dissertation concerns
oppressive beliefs and practices that are supported by affect theory. Can Massumi’s call
for a “revalued postcapitalist future”297 be fulfilled through an affective ethical
attunement to excess and materiality? Can microperceptions that sense the smaller than
smallest perceivable moments take on the reproduction of the status quo in all areas of
life, including the deeply entrenched psychological, structural, and political compulsion
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to convert qualitative differentials into exchange values? “Something as simple as a shift
in attention, even a blink, is a kind of microshock that forces us to re-establish focus, rejig our potential actions, refresh our relational field - re-chunk.”298 This kind of “minor
gesture” has the potential to effect real change because it is grounded in an autonomous
dimension of reality. The condition of this autonomy of affect is its non-conceptual
nature. There is more opportunity to access autonomy in the literal blink of the eye than
in any conceptual activity. If this is true, how would one know whether the nonconceptual experience of the blink is truly an unreified experience in excess of the
capture of affect? How can one be sure of the absence of any subtle conceptual
murmurings that may arise in having touched the gap between being and becoming?
Massumi might reply that there will always be an element of uncertainty, as this is the
nature of affect. This may be the case, but it is also a circular argument that does not
acknowledge the constitutive dependence of the autonomy of affect on its concept.
The truth of affect’s autonomy is that the attempt to establish a non-conceptual
form of knowledge is an attempt to manage the guilt of the concept. For Adorno, the guilt
of the concept can only be revealed by going through the concept. Massumi, following
Bergson, attempts to go around it. Adorno critiqued Bergson for positing another reality
free of the classificatory domination of the concept.
Bergson, in a tour de force, created another type of cognition for
nonconceptuality’s sake. The dialectical salt was washed away in an
undifferentiated tide of life…The hater of the rigid general concept established a
cult of irrational immediacy, of sovereign freedom in the midst of unfreedom.299
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What Bergson failed to realize, Adorno concluded, was that “every cognition including
Bergson’s own, needs the rationality he scorns, and needs it precisely at the moment of
concretion.”300 Similarly, Massumi’s theorization of affect’s autonomy needs the
mediation of the concept for its expression. Referring to both Bergson and Husserl’s
failure to break out of the subject’s dependence on classificatory concepts by positing a
truer form of cognition in “the concept of immanent consciousness”, Adorno observed
that “for all their lack of success, what they aspired to reflected a very profound
collective need.”301 Massumi is responding to the prejudice for perceiving in objects only
that which can be measured and compared to other objects. This mechanical, causal,
scientific use of reason and the “impoverishment of experience”302 it produces, motivated
Bergson to find a cognition of Freud’s dross or “dregs of the phenomenal world”303 that
slip through the net of conceptuality. But unlike Bergson, Massumi uses the concept of
the non-conceptual to analyze the operation of capitalist power and to experiment with
theorizing affect in relation to contemporary issues like cryptocurrencies or the war on
terrorism. To the extent that Massumi establishes the indispensability of the body and the
necessity of its radical reconfigurement in terms of what it can do rather than what it is,
affect theory offers helpful ways to think through some of the dilemmas of neoliberal
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capitalism. But it reaches its limit when it invokes a non-conceptual and unmediated
autonomy.
The role of emotion in affect theory provides an example of this limit. Emotions
share the same obstructive and derivative status as concepts. At times Massumi exerts
greater effort in establishing an unbridgeable divide between affect and emotion than
between affect and conceptuality. “It is crucial to theorize the difference between affect
and emotion.”304 He argues that the “narrativizable action-reaction circuits” of emotion
are incapable of autonomy. Emotions are too personal, too subjective, and too signified to
move the way that affect moves. However, the possibility of the idea of affect is
dependent on the nature of emotionality that affect is the constitutive condition for. The
definitive traits of affect coincide with the terms used to describe emotion. For instance,
Massumi defines affect as pure intensity untainted by content or meaning. However,
attributing a generic intensity to affect would defeat its nature as singular, intensive
becomings. The meaning of sadness is the feeling of sadness. The same goes for any
emotion, including anger. Emotions cannot be reduced to their socio-linguistic fixing,
although they cannot be separated from it either. According to Massumi, affect is the
vague sense of openness or freedom that lies at the edge emotion. “But no matter how
certainly we know that the potential is there, it always seems just out of reach, or maybe
around the next bend. Because it isn’t actually there – only virtually.”305 Massumi
continues, “But maybe if we can take little, practical, experimental, strategic measures to
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expand our emotional register, or limber up our thinking, we can access more of our
potential at each step, have more of it actually available.”306 On the one hand, Massumi
treats emotion as a gateway to affect. The larger and more nuanced the emotional
spectrum, the greater the chances are of perceiving the futurity or becoming in each
moment. On the other hand, emotions are inherently limited because they can only call
forth a limited selection of memories, thereby narrowing the scope of potentials to act on.
Affect is vastly open-ended and profoundly intense. By comparison, emotion is
claustrophobic and partial. “No one emotional state can encompass all the depth and
breadth of our experiencing of experiencing – all the ways our experience redoubles
itself. The same thing could be said for conscious thought.”307 If emotions are on the
same level as conscious thought, it is not clear why conscious thought which includes
critical thought could not also function as a gateway to affect. As I have been arguing
throughout, negative dialectical interpretation can also be a form of priming.
There is a long and rich history of feminists who have grappled with the nature of
emotion, negotiating a constantly shifting balance between arguing for its legitimacy as a
form of intelligence while avoiding being essentialized by it. Although Massumi
attributes a certain power to emotion, it is ultimately confined to the capture and coding
of affect and does not speak to the complex nature of emotion and its relation to power
that feminists have explored for years. Within this context affect seems suspiciously
unmessy and because of this it is considered to be a superior mode of being. In her book
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Ugly Feelings, Sianne Ngai explores the ambiguity of unwanted emotions that would
seem to shut down agency such as boredom or irritation. She also explores the
ambivalence of emotion. Envy, for example, could be an expression of insecurity and a
critical response to institutionalized inequality. It is not easy to determine the potential of
any given emotion because it can encompass bodily perceptions and intensities as well as
socio-linguistic content. Adorno states, “Once the last trace of emotion has been
eradicated, nothing remains of thought but absolute tautology.”308 Affect is characterized
by uncertainty, but it is not the ambiguous and sometimes ugly character that emotions
carry. It is a profoundly desirable and sanitized kind of uncertainty that can be
weaponized to catch terrorists and control populations, or it can be mobilized to resist
neoliberal capitalist power and live life more intensely. But just as Bergson needs the
conceptuality that he scorns, Massumi needs emotion to understand affect.

The Body
Adorno’s great contribution was to reveal how unforgiving this reality is and the
difficulty of sustaining a commitment to non-identity under conditions that do not tolerate
difference as negativity, much less a “ruthless criticism of all that exists.”309 The
importance attributed to the body in Adorno’s works is expressed dialectically in negative
terms by critiquing identitarian modes of thinking and feeling, (already a division of labor
reflected in the separation of mind and body), that depend on the erasure of the body that
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suffers. This is why an undiminished experience of suffering becomes the last line of
defense in the narcotizing absence of memory promoted by the culture industry and the
neoliberal confusion about self-enrichment. One of the most effective and enduring
strategies for ensuring complicity with capitalist power is the promotion of social
practices, theories, and stories that reify the body. “Anything that is not reified, cannot be
counted and measured, ceases to exist.”310 Unreified experience is not forthcoming to a
body that wards off perception of its own memory. Under the pressures of habit,
perception makes do with the immediate semblance of objects, but the suffering of the
body can express the contradiction of the object as long it resists the construal of positive
meaning from its pain. Adorno’s claim that “what hope clings to…is the transfigured
body,”311 means that the untruth of the body’s negation by identitarian thought can be
dialectically engaged to give expression to the repressed memory of the object. In order
to do so, one needs to relate to suffering similarly to how one listens to new music. “New
music keeps reopening the wound, instead of affirming the world as it exists…”312 The
old view of the body as substance or essence relies on a consistent view of reality that
aligns with the subject’s dominance. The transfigured body that suffers is dialectically
indispensable, that is, it is hopelessly entangled with its concepts while it continually
unfolds against them.
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Although considerable differences separate affect theory and negative dialectics,
there is an important sense in which both theories crucially depend on the body and its
reconfiguration. Affect theory conceives of the body in terms of movement and what it
can do, providing a robust alternative to the body that is invoked dialectically. Such a
conception makes a heavy demand on the subject to unlearn habitual perceptions that
assume passive-active relations between the body and world. According to Massumi, this
is problematic because it attributes a single entity as the linear cause of suffering and
limits the vast scope of becoming to a narrow orientation of “becoming-reactive”. Its
only action is reaction, constituted and renewed through a fear of potential rather than an
embodiment of it.
From the standpoint of affect theory, this becoming-reactive of the body enacts
the illusion that the body is separate from what it can do. This is a constitutively “stupid”
mode of being, because it relies on a habitual perception that blocks out the complexity of
relations moving through the object. Massumi prefers the term stupid over the concepts
of delusion or illusion, because the latter refer to a cognitive deficit (and are too closely
associated with the debunking activity of critique), and assume rationality to
independently possess its own motivating power. However, as Hume pointed out, only
affect motivates reason, and only affect can modulate affect. Massumi’s “analytic of
stupidity” addresses the “existential posture having to do with how one’s life is anchored
in the field of bare activity, and what potentials that posture toward the immanent limit
allows to express themselves – how a body perceives and channels potential.”313
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Ressentiment, for example, is constitutively stupid because its power to act is defined by
an object misperceived as the linear cause of suffering or a social wrong. Objectifying a
threat in this way may be necessary in some contexts for basic survival, but it is
detrimental to the possibility of a life lived from its full moving field of potentialities.
Massumi extends this logic of the analytic of stupidity to explain how the “‘I’ is
constitutively stupid.”314 When the ‘I’ is experienced as a solid unity in reaction to the
perceived objective cause of its pain, it is cut off from the larger field of affect in which it
is never not embedded and from which different potentials for perception are always
stirring. Massumi critiques identity as an embodied stuckness that relies unnecessarily on
a claustrophobic relation that blocks out the “larger field brimming with alien, non-I,
even nonhuman, perspectives.”315 Massumi insists that “critical reflective
consciousness”316 lacks the kind of perception that can break through this attachment to
stupidity.
How to break through is the crucial question. Massumi references Whitehead’s
example of mistaking the objects reflected in the mirror as real objects in front us. The
act of reaching out to touch them jolts perception and forces the body to recalibrate.
Bergson’s definition of perception as that which “measures our possible action upon
things, and thereby, inversely, the possible action of things upon us,”317 means that the
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recalibration involves a different orientation of the body and its potential action in
relation to the mirror and to the mirror on the body. The field has shifted, and the
interaction of the virtual in the actual is tweaked by the perturbation of grabbing
something that is not there. Massumi describes this as a “relational groping in error,
knocking against the surface of the mirror - against the clarity of conscious perception as
it presents itself.”318 The gap between ‘I’ and the complex field of the emergent
potentialities of the non-I in which it is situated, is always present. But how can it be
made available? From the perspective of a fully determined subject, the gap between the
virtual and actual is habitually glossed over before it has the chance to matter. Massumi
refers to Erin Manning’s concept of the minor gesture as something immeasurably small
in quantitative value and yet so vital to qualitative change. Affective attunement fosters
the kind of sensual awareness that can perceive these minor gestures. It is a mode of
paying attention to the useless, the ephemeral, to thwarted perceptual expectations, or to a
feeling that something just happened and you missed it. Noticing these minor gestures
resituates the body “in a more complex relational field in a way that supplements the
perception with an immediate, embodied understanding of the potentials brewing.”319
Whatever form priming takes, if it is to be effective it must orient attention to the
gap between being and becoming. In chapter three I remarked that Massumi does not
stress enough the difficulties encountered in attending to the initial interruption of
perception that causes this gap to appear. Massumi is right to avoid describing the gap
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primarily in terms of stimulus and response, since theoretically so much more is going on
in the encounter between the virtual becoming of time and its actualization. And yet,
finding this gap in the midst of spatially primed perception that is perpetually covering it
over, manifests experientially as a break between stimulus and response. It is precisely in
the moment of stimulus that we have the ability, as Bergson explains it, “to withdraw
ourselves from the action of the moment.”320 This arresting of movement as the point of
departure is a necessary step to destabilizing the speed of habitual reactions. In other
words, resting in the gap is a somatic critique of what reification feels like. However, in
much of Massumi’s work the effect of this crucial engagement with the gap is
overshadowed by the subsequent “aesthetic act”, as Massumi calls it, that “brings the
contrastive intensity of active potential into the specious present as such, to stand alone,
with no other value than itself.”321 While Massumi relies on Libet’s half-second to invoke
suspicion about intention, attending to the gap between stimulus and response requires a
reflexive intention that is aware of its deceptive nature. Resting in the gap falls into a
tricky practice of maintaining the intention to not believe in intention.
I argue that negative dialectics provides an orientation, missing from Massumi’s account,
that focuses on suffering as the catalyst for arresting somatic and conceptual reactivity.
According to Adorno, the groping in error of non-identity can be triggered by an
experience of suffering or false pleasure (still a form of suffering), but the bodily
recalibration is guided by concepts that reveal the contradiction between what the subject
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is experiencing and what the subject thinks it is experiencing. The two are intricately
related, constituted dialectically through each other. This dialectical attunement is a form
of groping in error. Affect theory draws attention to a different part of the process of
recalibration that focuses on the dissolution of the subject and the solidity of the body.
We think of ourselves as directing the shifts in our attention. But if you pay
attention to paying attention, you quickly sense that rather than you directing your
attention, your attention is directing you. It pulls you into your coming
perception, which dawns on you as attention’s next-effect.322
Awareness starts with a subject who is aware, but then this transforms into something
like awareness being aware of itself while the subject becomes absorbed into a looking
with no reference point. What happens to the body in this fluid state? Does it become less
physical? Does it become more energized and alert? What causes it to tighten and
become too focused, too intentional? I think Massumi’s concept of the body as action and
not substance highlights the moment to moment habitual default to spatial conditions that
solidify the body far beyond what is necessary for survival. Even the term ‘embodiment’
is problematic for Massumi because it presumes a pre-existing fixed body that incarnates
different ideas. Thinking of the body and world in terms of affect provides a framework
through which the body can be re-imagined as an amorphous, confused multiplicity
capable of interpenetrating with other bodies to the point where referring to them as
bodies becomes a conceptual constraint that blocks their passage.
Affect theory re-values the body and corporeality as a vital force, and any critique
of culture that does not include this as an essential dimension of reality will be partial and
compromised. The impasse between negative dialectics and affect theory concerns the
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issue of mediation. Massumi argues that only the desubjectivized body can meld with the
becoming of time that is the primal ground of reality. Conceptuality and critical analysis
are obstacles to realizing the embodied knowing of affect because they require a
mediating subjectivity. However, Adorno’s observation about Bergson highlights a
crucial point that Massumi consistently evades, which is that every attempt to break
through conceptuality to a non-mediated experience involves thought. The futility of
Massumi’s claim to the possibility of accessing an unmediated reality can by tested by a
simple experiment: try not to have a thought. This usually triggers a barrage of thoughts.
Commonly cited examples of non-conceptuality such as being thoroughly consumed in
an intense sport, communing with nature, experiences of extreme shock, or anything
starting with ‘Zen and the art of…’, are mediated experiences. Although they are viewed
as purely somatic activities unencumbered by thought, closer attention reveals
increasingly subtle and almost imperceptible layers of conceptual activity. Massumi’s
affective attunement would direct attention to the first perceivable moment (the smaller
than smallest perceivable moment) of these experiences in order to notice the sensation
before it is covered over with thoughts about the sensation and subsequent thoughts about
those thoughts. But even in that initial moment of the smallest perceivable, the mind is at
work, whether it is the subtle conceptual exertion to notice the moment, or the thought
that the moment is being noticed. It is difficult to prove that there could be a somatic
experience unaccompanied by thought, because it is thought that does this work.
The impossibility of an unmediated experience is the closest Adorno comes to
positing a seemingly immutable given about human nature. To start with the presumption
that bodily sensation always occurs with some form of discursivity is not the same as
170

reducing the body to a discursive construction. It means the attention that priming
cultivates needs to include conceptual activity because it is not possible to exclude it.
The ground of negative dialectical attention is suffering, but the experience of suffering is
already an interpretation. Negative dialectics detects the reified elements within that
interpretation that impose a layer of suffering upon suffering. There are no origins in this
scenario, only beginnings in the middle, which is what Massumi claims the constitutive
relationality of the body to be.
The process of negative dialectical interpretation that attends to the suffering of
reification does not identify an original suffering. Instead, it draws out memory and
facilitates an encounter with an always unique past. The fearlessly passive subject shifts
its trust to experiences of somatic and cognitive dissonance, but it is not a blind trust, as it
has already been guided by the intention to sense dissonance or contradiction. Due to the
diremption of subject and object inherent in reified experience, one element may
overshadow or block out the other. It is only when the body is seen as solid that the mind
becomes separate; inversely when concepts are reified, so are the objects they classify,
including the body.323 Does the body lie? To the extent that sensual perception covers
over the backlog of incomplete experiences that have not been allowed to come to
expression, the body lies. But the lie is an expression of experience that has been cut off
from its memory. The body dialectically expresses the truth of its untruth. The fearlessly
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passive subject attends to dissonance because it is the gateway not to an unmediated
origin such as affect, but to an active engagement with the full intensity and reality of
thought. By constellating concepts, the dissonance which expresses the guilt of thought is
unlocked.
By themselves, constellations represent from without what the concept has cut
away within: the “more” which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of
being. By gathering around the object of cognition, the concepts potentially
determine the object’s interior. They attain, in thinking, what was necessarily
excised from thinking.324
Constellations are a form of memory that is evoked through relating familiar
concepts to each other in a way that brings out the particularity of the object suppressed
by identitarian logic. Creating new concepts does not eradicate their universalizing
nature. The depth of attunement to contradiction determines the intensity of the body’s
openness and curiosity around its experience. Is there a heightened sense of sharpness or
is there an experience of opacity and dullness when the fearlessly passive subject attends
to sensations of genuine pleasure? If pleasure numbs suffering, then breaking with this
form of complicity requires an undiminished but not unmediated experience of suffering.
I have proposed a reading of Adorno that points to the centrality of suffering in
constellation with the body and critique. The body is invoked to attest to suffering, but
there are some experiences that Adorno dismisses as regressive when in fact they may
present a more ambiguous space for interpretation. For instance, although Adorno’s
nuanced analyses of joyful encounters with tonal music provide a compelling
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interpretation of these experiences as false pleasure, it cannot go unnoticed that it is the
music that makes bodies want to move and dance that Adorno considers to be the most
repressive. The serious music that Adorno views as authentic in its truth content because
it reveals the falseness of the whole, demands by comparison a less embodied
engagement for both listeners and performers. It is also notable that in his critique of jazz,
Adorno feminizes the regressive nature of jazz music that makes the body move. “ ‘Give
up your masculinity, let yourself be castrated,’ the eunuchlike sound of the jazz band both
mocks and proclaims, ‘and you will be rewarded, accepted into a fraternity which shares
the mystery of impotence with you.”325 By this logic, truth recedes the more the body
moves and this is an inevitable result of compromised masculinity. The craving for
immediate experience that jazz promises to fulfill emerges from a false, feminized
consciousness.
Massumi predictably concludes that critique lacks the theory and capacity to
entrain with the intensity of affect because it over-values conceptuality at the price of
neglecting the potentialities of the body. However, while affect attends more explicitly to
the body as movement and fluctuating flows of intensity than negative dialectical
critique, its concept of the body does not escape mediation as Massumi claims. For
instance, Massumi’s reliance on the theories and technologies of neuroscience fail to take
into account its discursive production of normal and abnormal bodies. Autism remains
classified as a pathological affective disorder. Erin Manning’s depiction of autistic
perception, while highlighting aspects of autism that offer glimpses into the ontologically
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relational nature of reality, reproduces the dualism in neuroscience of normal and
abnormal bodies by simply reversing the roles. Neurotypicals are the ones who suffer
from an affective deficiency, and autistics have a natural, biological disposition to be on
the right side of reality. All of this is complicated by imaging technologies that
scientifically verify the absence of affective relational capacity (empathy) in autistic
brains, perpetuating its pathological classification. One of the stranger cultural
phenomena that have emerged from this production of normal and abnormal bodies, is
the trend of individuals claiming to be on the autism spectrum in order to rationalize
awkward and socially inappropriate behavior. Because affect is prior to discourse and
meaning, the scientific truth of bodies and brains is privileged over critical discourse
about who is excluded from material resources and supports, which voices are heard or
silenced, what subjectivities have the capacity to change and what kind of bodies require
a cure. The body is the site of suffering and is inseparable from identity, as evidenced by
the norms that reinforce social exclusion of some bodies and not others. Autistic
perception may very well be attuned to a dimension of reality that neurotypicals would
benefit from experiencing more of, and the normative standards that exclude people with
autism need to change, but this does not lessen the actual physical and mental pain of
needing to interact with caretakers for basic bodily functions, or experiencing a beautiful
snow fall as a deafening cacophony of shattering glass. The neurotypical ability to chunk
the world into manageable units of experience would bring tremendous relief to someone
who is incapable of pulling back from the compulsion to constantly foreground
movement. No amount of inspiration porn or mood stabilizing pharmaceuticals can
alleviate the daily sufferings of the autistic body. I am not suggesting that Massumi and
174

Manning should refrain from continued exploration of the potential of affective wisdom
expressed through autistic perception, but critical examination of the suffering
experienced by individuals with autism would provide a fuller engagement with the
complexity of relations between messy bodies, the social function of science, the
production of norms, and the realm of affect. I realize that what I am proposing is
precisely what Massumi aims to provide an alternative to, but if structures and
institutions are defined by what escapes them, could affect be defined by what escapes it?
Massumi’s response to this would be a resounding ‘No’ and that to propose such a
relation misses the most crucial feature of affect – its autonomy.

Future Directions
In my reading of Adorno, I have argued that the concept of non-identity
dialectically invokes the body through the primacy of suffering. Because the conceptual
mediation of suffering is unavoidable, interpretation focuses on the reifying conceptual
processes that produce and sustain suffering as second nature. Although this critique of
the guilt of the concept assumes from the outset a non-conceptual element, the
indispensability of the somatic dimension of reality is not fleshed out, so to speak, with
the same degree of rigor and micrological astuteness that is applied to the dialectical
analysis of the concept. The alienation that ensues from the non-identity of the concept
and object then is limited to epistemological parameters that proclaim to address
suffering on all levels, but is heavily directed towards philosophical anti-idealism. This
presents a challenge for how negative dialectics would engage effectively with, for
example, contemporary environmental issues that new materialism approaches are
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attempting to address. Although Adorno is rooted in the Marxist tradition, and although
Marx addressed the capitalist exploitation of nature through the concept of the metabolic
rift, it is not clear how the critique of the kind of suffering that manifests through the
universalizing nature of the concept and the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity can
adequately address global warming. While Adorno recognizes the concept’s constitutive
relation with the body, what is needed for negative dialectics to fulfill its critique of a
wrong world without reproducing complicity with oppressive structures, is a more rich
and nuanced delineation of the human body and the earth’s body. Proclaiming its
importance is not enough.
Affect theory addresses this need by reconsidering the body in terms of what it
can do rather than what it is and by stressing the performative nature of affect that never
fully resides in a specific body and extends to all matter through transindividual
movement. This has proven to be particularly suitable to engaging with the duplicitous
affective processes of neoliberalism that are not confined to the immediate sphere of
production and that saturate every conceivable (and inconceivable) social space.
However, Massumi’s claim that only the body can perceive change at the ontological
level of incipiency - the only terrain on which capitalist power can be challenged underestimates the perseverance of the reified body and the social-historical conditions
from which it emerges. One example of this was outlined in the previous section
regarding Massumi’s neglect to recognize the contradiction of the discursive production
of normative bodies in the field of neuroscience which provides Massumi with evidence
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for the autonomous pre-ideological and “irreducibly bodily”326 nature of affect. Another
example that I have returned to throughout this work is the paradox of neoliberal selfenrichment techniques that simultaneously empower the individual in genuinely fulfilling
ways and ensure that the myriad forms of innovative transformation fuel the capitalist
production of surplus value. Affect theory can only offer the possibility of resistance
once its ideological commitments are revealed and subjected to negative dialectical
interpretation that is grounded in that suffering. Its purported autonomy is both its truth
and untruth. Priming must include the critical work of negation if it is to be effective as
an indirect incitement of counter-ontopower.
The mutual dependency of affect and critique bears an interesting resemblance to
Kant’s condition for the transcendental structures: “without intuition concepts are empty;
without concepts intuition is blind.”327 On the one hand, critique needs affect to sink its
teeth into something – the fullness of the world. Adorno argued that theory reacts to the
world and then added that the world is faulty to the core in order to ensure that human
suffering would always be the focus of critique. Affect theory expands the scope of
reality that causes thought to think and articulates a paradoxically more robust and subtle
body than the body implicated through dialectical absence and lack. Without the
movement and materialization of affect, negative dialectics would be nothing more than a
lifeless activity of the intellect. On the other hand, affect needs negative dialectical
critique to confront its blind spots and to reign in its self-legitimizing compulsion for
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affirmation. Without critique, affect lacks direction. Without affect, critique does not
have sufficient corporeal grounding.
The inherent limitations of both approaches warrants a consideration of a possible
third way that can build on the profound insights of affect theory and negative dialectics
and address the deficits that block their fruitful integration. One possible future direction
for the dilemmas posed by affect and critique could be found through a constellation of
disciplines that not only reconsider the privileged position of the human subject without
resorting to a universal flat ontology, but that also offer different ways to analyze the
uptake of affect by discourses that work through hierarchical ontologies of being. Mel Y.
Chen’s Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect, is a transdisciplinary
work that explores the concept of animacy through the lens of critical linguistics, queer
theory, disability studies, animal studies, critical race theory, and new materialist theory.
The concept of animacy includes some of the definitive aspects of affect theory: the
capacity to affect and be affected, transversal engagement with organic and inorganic
bodies, and intensity. Chen also acknowledges the work’s debt to Bennett’s vital
materialism, although it is significant that her explorations go beyond expanding vibrancy
and liveliness to materialities typically characterized as inanimate. For Chen, animacy is
a “specific kind of affective and material construct”328 that can be used to queer reified
hierarchies that classify humans, animals, plants, metals, etc. according to their degrees
of liveliness. While building on the insights of affect theory, she takes it in a different
direction by “leveraging animacy toward a consideration of affect in its queered and
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raced formations.”329 For example, Massumi challenges the distinction between humans
and animals by showing how capacities considered unique to humans such as reflexive
consciousness, language, and distance from instincts, are only possible because of the
animality within humans. Animal play creates the conditions for language and abstract
thought because it operates within the affective zone of indiscernibility that is the source
of creativity and “lived abstraction”. While Massumi demonstrates how humans and
animals are not ontologically distinct but rather exist on a continuum, Chen examines the
animacy hierarchy operative in establishing the human’s superiority through invoking
less animate nonhuman animals – a hierarchy that cannot be separated from the racialized
discourse of animality and colonial history. Her analysis of the media discourse
surrounding the mauling of a woman by a chimpanzee who had been a former TV animal
celebrity and the public reaction to this incident reveals the invocation of racialized and
sexualized hierarchies of animacy that are also deeply entangled with the liveliness of
language. In another example, Chen discusses the unprecedented animacy of one of the
most inanimate elements of matter. The racialization of lead in relation to the Chinese toy
panic in 2007 reanimated “lead’s deadness” to a “new semiotic-material form of lead.” 330
As an agent of harm to predominately white middle-class children, this transnational
“yellow lead” triggered anxieties about disability, race, and geopolitical instability that
replaced previous domestic concerns about lead toxicity in the buildings of poor black
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neighborhoods. Chen’s disruption of the binary of life and nonlife shows the extent to
which relationality (which is key to affect) and critique are determined by animacy
hierarchies.
“The stakes of revisiting animacy are real and immediate, particularly as the
coherence of “the body” is continually contested.”331 By tracing the affective movement
and conceptual mediation of animacy, Chen’s work offers a way to think about the body
in a way that cannot be adequately addressed through generic notions of the somatic or
the spectral figure of a dialectically induced body. It also situates affect in a more
intimate relation with critique so that perceiving the vitality of matter can include the
possibility of engaging with material, social, and semiotic contradictions that may direct
animacy in oppressive ways. There are areas of Chen’s work that invite further
elaboration. The liveliness that is extended to bodies and other myriad forms of existence
risks discounting the potential value of being immobile, stuck, or immersed in unwanted
states. I have shown how this is a similar liability for affect theory and how the dialectical
negativism of critique attempts to speak to this missing part. Massumi states: “Our
degree of freedom at any one time corresponds to how much of our experiential ‘depth’
we can access towards a next step – how intensely we are living and moving.”332 The
queering of animacy and its attendant discourses of race, sex, and disability provides the
analytical tools and the terrain in which these concerns can start to be addressed.
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